“Regional Security in the South
Caucasus: The Role of NATO” is a Policy Paper produced by the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies,John Hopkins University. It is co-authored by Svante E. Cornell, Roger
McDermott, William O’Malley, Vladimir Socor, S.Frederick Starr.
Regional Security in the South Caucasus:
The Role of NATO
Svante
E. Cornell
Roger
N. McDermott
William
D. O'Malley
Vladimir
Socor
S.
Frederick Starr
Table of Contents
Executive Summary............................................................................ v
I. Why
Should We be Concerned
Over Multilateral Security
and the South Caucasus?............................................................................ I
II.The Security Deficit
in the South Caucasus................ 4
Unresolved Conflicts..................................................................................
6
Political Violence........................................................................................
9
Transnational Threats................................................................................11
Geopolitical Competition..........................................................................
12
The Need for Security............................................................................
13
III.Geopolitical
Interests and Multilateral Security......................... 16
Russian Interests....................................................................................
16
Iranian Interests...................................................................................
18
Turkish Interests........................................................................................19
Euro-Atlantic Interests......................................................................... 20
Multilateral Security
Arrangements: NATO as the Only Feasible Option............... 22
IVThe Military Situation in theCaucasus.................................
34
Armenia.................................................................................................. 36
Azerbaijan.............................................................................................. 42
Georgia.......................................................................................... 40
V. Western Security
Assistance to the States of the South Caucasus......................55
Armenia............................................................................................. 55
Azerbaijan............................................................................................... 57
Georgia................................................................................................... 60
Conclusion......................................................................................... 64
VI. The Role of Partnership
for Peace in the South
Caucasus.....66
Armenia................................................................................................ 68
Azerbaijan............................................................................................. 70
Georgia.................................................................................................. 73
Conclusion........................................................................ 76
VII. Recommendations for NATO...................................... 77
From Anchoring to Integration................................................................
78
Door Open also to
Armenia............................... 79
Concrete Step 82
VIII. Recommendations for the South
Caucasus States............... 86
Joint
Steps..................................................................................................86
Azerbaijan............................................................................................ 88
Georgia.....................................................................................................
91
Developing the Niche capabilities
of the South Caucasus Militaries.... 94
Appendix: The Baltic Defense
College....................
96
Author Biographies 99
Executive Summary
Unresolved security
issues in the South Caucasus have a direct
and
negative impact on the
security interests of NATO and the U.S. They impede access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, threaten the security
of needed energy resources as well as access to friendly allies in the Wider
Middle East, and create an environment of instability that Russia can both
exploit and perpetuate. NATO's enlargement to the western Black
Sea and the planned enlargement of the European Union are turning
the South Caucasus into a direct neighbor to
the institutionalized West. Concurrently, with U.S.-led anti-terrorism
coalitions projecting power into Central Asia,
Afghanistan
and Iraq,
the South Caucasus has de facto been drawn
into the perimeter of Euro-Atlantic strategic security interests. Regional
insecurity there, which is Europe's
Southeastern flank, affects the EU directly.
Unresolved security
issues in the South Caucasus have a decisive
and adverse effect on democratic reform, market-based development, and overall
prosperity across the region. Continuing shortfalls in these areas threaten to
turn the region into a haven for transnational organized crime and even
terrorism.
This paper argues that
the national security interests of NATO and its members in the South Caucasus,
especially concerning the war on terrorism, NATO's obligations in Central Asia
and Afghanistan, and the role of the Alliance in the Wider Middle East, have
grown to such a degree that its interests would be significantly affected negatively
by instability and unrest in the South Caucasus. The individual and collective
interests of NATO members therefore suggest that a larger role of the Alliance in strengthening
the security of the South Caucasus is
warranted.
This paper does not
propose the inclusion of South Caucasus
countries as NATO members, which is unlikely under any circumstances for many
years. But it nonetheless considers NATO to be the sine qua non for
security in the South Caucasus. It argues that
the most promising, and
indeed sole, means of
redressing the "security deficit" in the South
Caucasus is through the gradual extension of the widest possible
range of
NATO programs into the
area. In short, it shifts the focus from the question of "To Be or Not To
Be?" with respect to NATO membership to one ofhow to select, develop, and
compound NATO programs that will, together and increasingly over time,
transform the regional security picture overall. By this point the region will
also have evolved to a point at, or nea.r, the doorstep of both NATOand the EU
This paper therefore
suggests that NATO, in its June 2004 Istanbul
summit, asserts that the security of the countries of the South
Caucasus is an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic security
architecture. Specific NATO initiatives holding the most promise for enhancing South Caucasus security include the following:
1) Exploring the possibility of creating a
special format for NATO's dialogue with the three nations of the South Caucasus, on the model of those set up for Ukraine and Russia;
2) Exploring the possibility of creating a Regional Defense College
in the South Caucasus, similar in concept to
that of the Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) and building on its experience.
3) Greatly enhancing the number of regional officers
receiving training through PfP in order to foster a cadre of officers
benefiting from contact with Western militaries that, in turn, are able to
share their knowledge and expertise with colleagues;
4) Raising the profile of the region in NATO's
own hierarchy by appointing a political/military specialist as an advisor to
the Secretary-General on the region; creating a "Security Working
Group" under NATO in order to optimize security assistance efforts; and
prioritizing the development of expertise amongst NATO's planning staffs on the
IPAPs of the regional states.
While this paper
proposes an a la carte approach to NATO involvement as most promising to
the interests of South Caucasus countries, it
asserts that such an approach is impossible without a focused and strategic
approach to the South Caucasus as a whole on
the part of NATO.
Central to such an
approach is that the definition of NATO and U.S. interests and goals must be
carried out initially without regard for Russian responses. Russia itself is
in flux and its policies a half decade hence may differ from those of today,
especially as they relate to former Soviet territories. If NATO and the U.S.
demonstrate that their policies in the South Caucasus are compatible with
Russia's legitimate security concerns (as opposed to political aspirations),
and can even be supportive of them, it enhances the possibility that Russians
not committed to zero-sum thinking may gain influence in Moscow. Clarity by
NATO in defining its own strategy, directness in articulating it, and
flexibility in its execution are the hallmarks of any future success.
The point of conjunction between U.S. and
Russian long-term interests in the South Caucasus,
and also those of Turkey
and Iran,
is the strengthening of sovereignties there, the progress of reform, and the
development of sustainable modern economies that take advantage of regional
complementarities.
The policies set forth in this
paper are not directed against anyone; they advance these objectives by
creating a web of relationships and structures that strengthen the essential
prerequisite: regional security.
I. Why Should We be Concerned Over Multilateral Security and the South Caucasus?
Rarely in recent years have so many
crucial issues appeared simultaneously on the international community's
security agenda. Iraq,
Afghanistan,
North Korea,
Kashmir, Pakistan, and Iran all pose
serious challenges that cannot be ignored. Other issues once thought resolved
in fact remain open, placing further claims on time and resources. Why, then,
should the South Caucasus not only be added to
the agenda but accorded increased importance?The short answer is that issues in
the South Caucasus have already been on the
agenda for a decade. And rightly so. Here are three new and weak states, each
with serious and unresolved territorial problems that have provided excuses for
outside interference. All have sought refuge in external security arrangements,
Azerbaijan
and Georgia
with bilateral links to the U.S.
and Turkey
and increasingly NATO's Partnership for Peace, and Armenia through limited contact
with NATO/PfP but an extensive security treaty with Russia. Russia also maintains three bases
in Georgia,
a large base in Armenia,
and has provided Armenia
with a billion dollars worth of modern armaments.
The war and subsequent reconstruction work in Agfhanistan, and the
establishment of US bases in Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan,
underscore the role of the South Caucasus as a
transfer point and its overall importance to US and western security strategies.
Multiple resolutions on Mountainous Karabakh by the United Nations
Security Council and NATO-Russian and US-Russian understandings and agreements
on Georgia
have all acknowledged that peace and stability in the Caucasus
warrant the international community's most serious attention.
Unfortunately, these and other initiatives have not led to the solution
of a single one of the region's security problems. Discussions of Karabakh,
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia all remain frozen
within the UN, OSCE, and other bodies. For many years Brussels, Moscow, or Washington may have deemed such an outcome
acceptable and even desirable. All
three had other interests with respect to each other which they
considered
so urgent that they found it convenient to replace solutions in the South Caucasus with processes, even when those process
manifestly were leading nowhere.
The fact that so many major bodies have recognized the dangerous
potential of unresolved security issues in the region has given rise to
understandable expectations of action within Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. As
these expectations give way to frustration, the international community will
face the reality that the viability of its tactic of replacing solutions with
processes has relied on the disinterest or passivity of countries within the
South Caucasus themselves. But everywhere in that region new and younger forces
are emerging, and few of these are content with what they consider the
fruitless patience of their elders. In short, positions are hardening, with
potential fatal effects.
Even if this were not the case, the unresolved security issues in the South Caucasus are taking a heavy toll. From the
foundation of the United
States in the 1780s to the present, young
post-colonial countries have been preoccupied with confirming their sovereignty
from external dangers, and especially from those external threats that might
manipulate internal conditions within their countries to their disadvantage. In
modern times this has caused more than one
newly sovereign state to give priority to issues of security, even at
the expense of economic and social development.
It is vain for the established and secure states of western Europe and North America to wish that this were otherwise. Like it
or not, the road to reform and development runs directly through the issues of
sovereignty and security, not around them. The price of the West's closing its
eyes to urgent security issues in the South Caucasus is mounting insecurity in
the region, which all but guarantees the failure of democratic reform and
market-based development there.
These, after all, are small and isolated economies. In the long term
they can thrive only by taking
advantage of regional complementarities and by opening multi-sided trade with
their neighbors and with economies further distant. Among such developments,
the ancient role of the Caucasus as a pivot of
both East-West and North-South continental trade must be revived if the region
is to prosper. This is particularly important with respect to the long-term
development and orientation of the five new states of Central
Asia. In spite of grandiose plans by the European Union to open a
single transportation corridor from Europe to China via the Caucasus and Central Asia,
little or nothing has been achieved to date. The reason for this failure, and
others is that unresolved security issues block them all. As a consequence, the
populations of the south Caucasus and areas
even as far afield as Central Asia are
condemned to further years of poverty and deepening frustration.
The world is now familiar with the consequences of failed reform in weak
states. As was evident in Afghanistan,
Somalia,
Pakistan,
and elsewhere, weak states invite the involvement of international criminal
groups and religious extremism. The dire situation in Georgia's
Pankisi Gorge during the waning Shevardnadze era removed all doubts about
whether this could also happen in the South Caucasus.
This in turn poses a yet more ominous possibility. The failure of the
international community to bolster security in the South
Caucasus will in due course pose threats to the security of the
region's powerful neighbors, Russia,
Turkey,
and Iran.
Whatever the actual scale of such threats, insecurity in this pivotal region
will invite any of the above neighbors, singly or two together, to intervene in
the name of protecting their own security. Given that the neighbors in this
case include one and possibly two nuclear powers and a member of NATO, this
possibility alone should prompt Europe and the
United States
to action.
This paper explores a number of alternative formuli for enhancing the
security of all three states of the South Caucasus,
and of the region generally. It considers the actual and potential roles of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization, and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Its authors conclude that of these, only NATO offers the potential to foster
and maintain conditions of genuine security throughout the South
Caucasus. They then set forth various specific proposals for NATO
and the regional countries by which they might achieve this commendable goal,
and without undermining the legitimate concerns and sensitivities of the
region's chief neighbors, Russia,
Turkey,
and Iran.
Readers may differ in their evaluation of specific proposals and of the larger
suggestion that NATO is best positioned to offer practical guarantees of
stability in the
South Caucasus. However, it is hoped
that at the very least they will all concur with the authors that regional
security in the South Caucasus is
too important to world peace to continue to relegate it to a secondary
place on the international agenda.
II. The Security Deficit in the South Caucasus
Since before independence, the South Caucasus
region has been plagued by conflict and instability. The ethnopolitical
conflicts in the region that raged in the early 1990s led to the death of over 50,000
people, great material destruction, and contributed significantly to the
political instability, economic hardships, and the increase in transnational
organized crime that has characterized the region in its first decade of
independence. The conflicts came on the heels of the weakening and subsequent
break-up of the Soviet Union. These conflicts
centered on the territorial status of three regions populated by ethnic
minorities: the mainly Armenian-populated Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous
Province of Azerbaijan; the Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia,
and the South Ossetian Autonomous Province, both in Georgia. At present, none
of the conflicts in the South Caucasus has
found a negotiated solution, and the conflicts are "frozen" along unsteady
cease-fire lines. A relapse to warfare is a distinct possibility in all three
conflict areas, as negotiations have yielded no positive results. Besides these
active conflicts, other minority regions in the three states have seen tensions
between the central government and representatives of ethnic minority
populations, demanding higher levels of autonomy. Areas with conflict potential
include, significantly, Georgia's
mainly Armenian-populated Javakheti region. The Spring 2004 standoff between
the Georgian Central Government and the leadership of the Ajarian Autonomous
Republic was resolved
peacefully, nevertheless it illustrates the conflict potential in the region
outside the secessionist territories.
In addition to ethnic tensions, which have been the region's main type
of conflict, all three countries have been afflicted by the use of violent
means to alter the leadership of the respective states. This has included armed
insurgencies that managed to overthrow existing governments in Georgia in
1991, in Azerbaijan
in 1993, as well as several unsuccessful attempts made to alter the political
environment since then. Assassination attempts have also been made against
leaders, including two failed attempts on the life of Georgia's
President and the assassination of Armenia's Prime Minister and
Speaker of Parliament in 1999. In a positive development, Georgia's
regime change in 2003 took place in a peaceful, non-violent manner. To compound
this unruly picture, the South Caucasus has in
the last few years been increasingly affected by other security threats of a
more transnational nature, including organized crime, specifically trafficking
of narcotics, arms and persons, and the rise of Islamic radical movements.2
While these are all internal security threats, the international
environment surrounding the region compounds the regional scene. The South Caucasus has gained importance through its
strategic location and its energy resources. The region's strategic location
between Russia and Iran and connecting Europe to Asia, as well as its oil and
gas resources and the region's position as the chief route for the westward
export of Caspian energy resources, has gradually led to an increased
geopolitical attention to it. Especially after September 11, 2001, the South
Caucasus is no longer a backwater of international politics. With U.S. and allied
military presence in Central Asia, Afghanistan and
the Middle East, the South
Caucasus is a crucial area enabling the connection between NATO
territory and military operations in Afghanistan and staging areas in Central Asia. Yet, as Alexander Rondeli has pointed out,
the important geopolitical location of the South
Caucasus has been as much, if not more, of a liability as an asset to
the regional states.3 International interest in the region has
tended to increase the polarization of regional politics,
entrench existing conflicts, and thereby make the region's road to
stability more complicated. Having dramatically differing and existential
threat perceptions, the three South Caucasian states have developed diverging
strategies to ensure their security: Armenia perceiving threats from Turkey and
Azerbaijan, has sought security through ties with Russia; Azerbaijan,
perceiving threats from Iran, Armenia, and to a decreasing extent from Russia,
has sought western and Turkish support; while Georgia, mainly perceiving
threats from Russia and internal challenges with links to Russia, seeking
mainly American protection. The alignments emerging out of these differing
threat perceptions are contradictory and potentially devastating to regional
security.
In this sense there is an acute security deficit in the South Caucasus. In spite of the manifold security
challenges to the region, there are no functioning security mechanisms or institutions
that help build regional stability or meaningful conflict management or
resolution. International efforts at conflict resolution, sponsored mainly by
the OSCE and the UN, have so far brought little result.4 International security assistance to the regional states have had
limited results, while their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions has
progressed slowly. Meanwhile, the increasing strategic value of the region and
the actual and potential exacerbation with time of security threats there imply
a prohibitive potential cost of inaction on the part of the international
community, especially western powers with increasingly vital interests in the
stability, openness and development of the region. The security deficit in the South Caucasus consists of four main components: First,
the unresolved territorial conflicts, which form the single most dangerous
threat to security in the region and whose peril, contrary to conventional
wisdom, may be increasing rather than decreasing with time. Secondly, civil and
political conflicts, which were up until 2003 believed to pose major threats to
the stability primarily of Azerbaijan
and Georgia.
These countries both managed to conduct orderly if very different successions
of power, which has not eliminated the risk of political conflict, but strongly
decreased it. Thirdly, the transnational threats posed by terrorism and
organized crime are mounting rapidly, virtually unchecked. Finally, the
potential of overt or covert external military intervention remains present,
though decreasingly likely.
Unresolved Conflicts
Three unresolved conflicts are frozen along cease-fire lines in the South Caucasus: that between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
Mountainous Karabakh, and those in Georgia between the central government
on the one hand and the secessionist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other. Of these, the South Ossetian
conflict has seen an improvement at the grassroots level, with open
communication occurring across the cease-fire line. Mountainous Karabakh and
Abkhazia form considerably more acute security threats, given the larger size,
tension, and potential for large-scale violence of these conflicts.
Mountainous Karabakh
Of these, the unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the
largest threat to peace and security in die South Caucasus
and perhaps in the wider region. With every year that the deadlocked conflict
continues without a solution, the risk of a resumption of hostilities looms
larger, with ever larger implications. At present, the current political
elites in both Armenia and
Azerbaijan seem inclined
to find a solution
by peaceful means. While Armenia
has suffered considerably in both economic and demographic terms (due to
out-migration) as a result of the conflict, its current leadership refuses to
compromise on Mountainous Karabakh's independence. This is the case in part due
to the dominance of a Karabakh elite in Armenian politics: President Robert
Kocharian is the former President of the unrecognized republic, and defense
minister Serzh Sarkisian is its former defense minister. This elite seems to
give at least equal emphasis to Karabakh's distinct interests compared to those
of Armenia
proper, unlike former President Ter-
Petrossian, who concluded by 1997 that Armenia's interests required a
compromise on the status of Karabakh. The Armenian leadership currently
controls the territory
of Mountainous Karabakh
and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions, and therefore feels less urgency
in a solution. Armenia
is clearly interested in preserving the military status quo until it can
get a favorable deal. The Azerbaijani society and leadership, on the other
hand, is deeply disturbed by the humiliation of losing almost a fifth of the
country's territory, and the massive refugee and IDP population is both an
economic drain and a political concern. Both Azerbaijan's Communist regime and
the Elcibey government fell in great part due to their failures in the war, and
the new President, Ilham Aliyev, is well aware of the centrality of the
Karabakh issue in the country's politics. Moreover, popular frustration in the
country is on the rise with what is perceived as Armenian intransigence and
international disregard to the aggression committed against their country.
President Heydar Aliyev's efforts to control the IDP population seems to have
been the major reason that spontaneous revanchist movements, including
paramilitary ones, are not emerging, especially among the refugee population.
The failure of negotiations has worsened matters. When President
Ter-Petrossian accepted the 1997 Minsk Group proposal, hundreds of thousands of
IDPs rejoiced at the prospect of an imminent return home. In late 1999, an
imminent deal was shelved after the October 27 tragedy in the Armenian parliament,
while great hopes were again dashed in the Spring of 2001. In August 2002,
President Heydar Aliyev offered the restoration of economic relations in return
for Armenian withdrawal from the four occupied territories along the Iranian
border. President Robert Kocharyan's refusal to discuss this offer led to a
widespread sentiment in Azerbaijan that Armenia's leadership was not interested
in a negotiated solution, and that as a result a military solution is the only
remaining option to restore the country's territorial integrity and enable
refugees to return to their homes.5 Ilham Aliyev's government, which
has always kept the military option as a last resort, is now increasingly
stressing that the Azerbaijani army is ready to liberate its territory if negotiations
fail.
If the present deadlock
continues, as seems likely, the public and elite mood in Azerbaijan will
continue to gradually tilt towards war. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is recovering
economically, and is beginning to receive substantial oil revenues. It is also
building its armed forces with Turkish assistance - and Armenia's
population is shrinking. Azerbaijan
may hence feel the odds are in its favor.
A new war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan,
should it take place, is unlikely to remain as limited as the previous one was.
In 1992-94, the two states had only rudimentary weaponry, and the military
forces involved were far from professional. But in the last eight years, both
states have acquired more sophisticated and therefore more deadly arms, meaning
that a new war would almost certainly cause much larger human and material
destruction. Perhaps even more alarming is the network of alliances that both
states have built, with Russia
and Turkey
respectively. Neither Turkey
nor Russia
is likely to remain on the sidelines of a new confrontation. Fighting is also
likely to take place close to the Iranian border, therefore possibly drawing Iran into the
conflict as well. Pakistan
has also offered Azerbaijan
military assistance, while the United
States has crucial interests in the region's
stability. Great power involvement may help prevent a new war, but would give
it regional implications of a massive scale if it were to occur.
Abkhazia
The conflict in Abkhazia has the same symbolic importance for Georgia as
Mountainous Karabakh has for Azerbaijan.
Similarities abound, including a humiliating defeat against a numerically much
smaller enemy supported by external powers; ethnic cleansing and the creation
of a large IDP population; a mutiny during the war that threatened collapse of
the state; and protracted negotiations that seem to yield no results. But
unlike in Karabakh, unrest has returned to Abkhazia several times since the end
of large-scale hostilities. Firstly, Georgian paramilitary forces stemming from
the IDP population have been carrying on a low-intensity conflict along the
border regions of Abkhazia and Samegrelo for several years. But more
importantly, a brief return
to warfare occurred in May 1998, which forced ca. 30,000 Georgians that
had returned to their homes in Abkhazia's Gali region to flee again. Then as
now, the Abkhazian side relied heavily on
Russian peacekeeping troops that have been considerably closer to the
Abkhaz de facto authorities than to the Georgian side. UNOMIG, which is
responsible for monitoring the situation in the region and the demilitarization
of the border, has practically no influence over the Russian
peacekeepers, who, together with Georgian Paramilitaries and Abkhaz
forces, are heavily involved in the smuggling business going through Abkhazia.
Participation in the illegal economy extends high into the state hierarchy,
knows no ethnic limits, and remains one of the few areas where quick enrichment
(and ironically, interethnic cooperation) is possible. Neither side has an
economic interest in finding a resolution to the conflict, although neither
desires a resumption of hostilities. Recent clashes between peacekeepers and
guerrillas in Gali have occurred on economic (redistribution of spheres of
influence) rather than political grounds. There are no guarantees for the
safety and dignity of the 40,000 IDPs, who returned to the Gali region after
hostilities in May 1998. Russian peacekeepers deployed along the Inguri have
assisted Abkhaz de facto authorities to build up a state border with Georgia, and to
advance towards the Kodori gorge in eastern Abkhazia, which is out of Sukhumi's control and
remains a Georgian outpost in Abkhazia. Kodori became a haven for Georgian
guerillas and Chechen irregulars, who launched abortive attack against Sukhumi in October 2001.7
In the Fall of 2001, unrest returned to Abkhazia, when Georgian
paramilitaries supported by Chechen irregulars under field commander Ruslan
Gelayev entered Abkhazia from the Kodori gorge, breaking through Abkhaz
defenses before Russian air force jets bombed their positions, forcing them to
retreat. The Georgian government denied any knowledge of the events, however
high echelons of power were undoubtedly informed. The episode spurred debate in
Georgia
on whether a reconquest of Abkhazia was possible. The Georgian regular army is
presently in no condition to stage a military operation in Abkhazia. However,
the size differential is so large that even a small but reasonably well'trained
and disciplined Georgian force could alter the balance heavily in Georgia's
favor. The U.S. Train and Equip program for the Georgian military could create
exactly that. Abkhazian concerns center around on the future potential of
Georgian troops using their training and newly acquired equipment in renewed
attempts to reconquer separatist territories in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
Political Violence
No change of government in the South Caucasus
has taken place in a completely peaceful, constitutional, and orderly manner.
President Elchibey came to power in a mainly
bloodless revolution in 1992, as did President Saakashvili in Georgia in
2003. Armed Coups unseated Presidents Gamsakhurdia of Georgia in 1991 and
Elchibey in 1993, bringing former Communist-era leaders Eduard Shevardnadze and
Heydar Aliyev to power. A palace coup removed Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossian and brought Robert Kocharyan to power, while limited violence
surrounded the election of Ilham Aliyev in 2003.
Attempts to murder political leaders have also occurred. The 1994 and
1995 coups against Aliyev clearly intended to eliminate him. In Georgia, two
attempts to assassinate President Shevardnadze have narrowly failed, in 1995
and 1998, and several other coup or assassination attempts have been foiled.
The most tragic event took place in October 1999 in Armenia, when armed gunmen entered
the parliament in full session and succeeded in killing the Prime Minister
while addressing a plenary session, as well as the Speaker of Parliament and
several cabinet members, plunging Armenia into a political crisis
that it has barely managed to recover from. Military insurgencies are another
problem that has especially plagued Georgia, whose army is in the worst
material condition and suffers from poor discipline. A revolt by a tank
battalion in Senaki in western Georgia in 1998 led by colonel Akaki Eliava was
put down, while a National Guard insurgency in Mukhrovani 25km East of Tbilisi
in May 2001 was silenced, though it seemed to have more to do with the
desperate condition of the soldiers than with politics.9
That said, warnings of succession crises threatening civil war and state
collapse in Azerbaijan
and Georgia
turned out, with the comfort of hindsight, to have been significantly
exaggerated. A planned and relatively orderly succession took place in Azerbaijan,
whereas Georgia
went through
a velvet revolution bringing about an unexpected change of government.
In the case of Azerbaijan,
opposition protests on Ilham Aliyev's election briefly turned violent, but
failed to generate mass support and was rapidly suppressed. In Georgia, the
opposition led by Mikheil Saakashvili capitalized on mass support for their
protests against President Shevardnadze's electoral fraud and succeeded in
bringing about a revolution without bloodshed, very much thanks to U.S. and to
some extent Russian efforts at mediating between the two sides. In sum,
domestic political threats to security remain present in all three countries,
though the potential for unrest should not be exaggerated.
Transnational Threats
Transnational threats with both criminal and ideological motivations are
present in the South Caucasus today. The
trafficking of narcotics, arms and persons in the South
Caucasus has gradually increased since the demise of the Soviet Union. While transnational crime does not yet pose
a danger of the magnitude that is the case in parts of Central Asia, the
location of the South Caucasus on the major trafficking routes from Afghanistan
to western Europe imply that growing drug trafficking could become a serious
threat to statehood and breed instability, especially as Afghanistan's
production of opium in 2004 is reported to be growing significantly over the
already high level of 3,600 tons in 2003. The trafficking of WMD materials is a
serious issue, particularly in Georgia.10 Most worryingly,
transnational organi2ed crime is rampant in secessionist territories,
sustaining the deadlocked conflicts there, while criminal organizations are
infiltrating government and bureaucracy at central, provincial and local
levels."
With persistent economic and political instability in the region,
combined with the inability of South Caucasian governments to gain control over
all their territory, transnational crime seems set to remain a palpable
challenge to the region. Criminal networks have successfully infiltrated state
institutions, thus impeding the state's efforts to crack down on criminality.
Neither of the three states have the capability or political will to control
the illicit drugs trade, given the risks of potential reprisals associated with
targeting relatively powerful actors. As far as the arms trade is concerned,
there -will remain great demand for weapons until the secessionist conflicts
are resolved and the influence of criminal actors is meaningfully reduced.12
The threat of transnational crime capturing state organs is evident by
Georgia's Pankisi Gorge experience, where reliable indications suggest that
transnational criminal groups were practically renting the area from former
high officials in exchange for large sums of money.'3 While the
cadre changes in the ministries of interior and state security in 2001, the
Pankisi clean-up operation in 2002, and the change of government in 2003 have
considerably improved the situation, the implications of state penetration by
transnational crime is apparent. International influence may prove capable of
preventing this type of collusion in the future. However, during periods of
instability,
.
for example in the event of a protracted succession struggle or revival of
ethnic conflicts, it is conceivable that criminal or terrorist networks in
search for a base of operations will seek to find a haven in the South Caucasus
- especially given the strategic location of the region.
In the ideological realm, radical Islamic movements are another
transnational threat. These groups exist in the South
Caucasus though not on a significant scale. However, dire
socio-economic conditions and the continued deficit of democratic governance
are factors that could spur the rising influence of radical and militant
Islamic movements. Being the only overwhelmingly Muslim country in the region, Azerbaijan is
more affected by this problem than its neighbors, though Georgia also
experienced its fair share of the problem. While the overall risk is low in the
region, the proximity of the war in Chechnya and disillusionment with
the ideologies of democracy and market economy are risk factors. The second war
in Chechnya,
raging since 1999, has led to a marked increase of Islamic radicalism not only
among the Chechens but among neighboring republics of the North
Caucasus, including Dagestan.
Arab missionaries preach the
Salafi version of Islam and are gaining a growing popularity among people whose
lives have been ravaged by war and economic despair. By 2000-2001, this process
had begun to affect the South Caucasus as
well. The Sunni north of Azerbaijan
has become an area of Salafi influence, whereas
both the Pankisi gorge of Georgia and other, not
traditionally Muslim parts of mountainous northern Georgia are also affected. The
modest but noticeable rise of Islamic radicalism in Azerbaijan developed partly due to
the support it has received from Iran, but also because of
disappointment among the general public with political, economic, and social
conditions. Loss of faith in both communism and market economy increases the
appeal of Islam, with its notions of equality, brotherhood and fairness. This
could potentially serve as an aggravating factor in the democratic development
of the country, while in the short term, the rise of Islamic radicalism is
likely to remain manageable.
Geopolitical Competition
The political balance within and between the three Caucasian states and
societies is already fragile; however, the weakness of these states has
required them to seek foreign patronage and support, while the attractiveness
of the region has itself led to a high level of great power interest, as
described above. The interests of and relationships with foreign powers
therefore typically affect political processes within the three states.
Political forces and leaders in the Caucasus
remain watchful of their relations with Moscow,
Washington or Ankara, in the hope that such relations would
give them an advantage in domestic political struggles. Combined with the
changing policies and uncertain commitment to the region on the part of the
great powers, this increases the instability and unpredictability of South
Caucasian political processes.
An overt external military threat to the regional countries remains a
possibility if not likely. Two main scenarios are possible: a Russian military
threat to Georgia
under the pretext of anti-terrorism, and an Iranian military threat to Azerbaijan,
primarily a naval threat in the Caspian Sea.
In fact, these scenarios have occurred at a limited scale in recent years. Russia
repeatedly accused Georgia
of sheltering terrorists, occasionally bombing Georgian territory in the
Pankisi and Kodori gorges. Russian media reports in February 2002 that al Qaeda
fighters, possibly including Osama bin Laden himself, found refuge in Georgia were
stoking pressure for outside military intervention. The Russian Defense
Minister declared that Moscow
might feel compelled to intervene militarily to contain Islamic radicals in Georgia, and
other Russian officials have asserted Russia's "moral right" to
launch an antiterrorist operation in Pankisi. A Russian military move was real
threat at the time, perhaps forestalled only by the launching of the U.S.
Georgia Train-and-Equip Program in early 2002. Yet the continuation of the
Chechen conflict indicates a risk that Russia may use the pretext of
anti-terrorism to put pressure, including military action, against Georgia. As far
as Iran
and Azerbaijan
is concerned, the dispute over the Caspian Sea
legal status reached a climax after significant oil or gas resources were
identified in the Sharq/Alov oilfields, lying in an area disputed by Tehran. In July 2001,
Iranian warships forcibly evicted a BP-owned exploration vessel operating over
the Sharq/Alov field. This was followed by almost two weeks of daily
overflights of Azerbaijani waters and land by the Iranian air force, which
eventually prompted a Turkish reaction and in its aftermath, increased American
military assistance to Azerbaijan,
with a focus on naval defense. Tensions have abated somewhat, but the Caspian Sea status is unresolved and future Iranian moves
are not to be excluded, especially given the increasingly strong hardliner
control over the government.
The Need for Security
This security deficit stemming from the interrelated and unregulated
security threats described above have plagued the region for a considerable
time. The increasing importance of the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the
anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq have now made the
security deficit a threat not only to regional security but to that of
Euro-Atlantic interests as well. The need for institutionalized security
arrangements to manage, reduce and if
possible resolve the security threats in the region has become palpable.
The dimensions and multi-faceted character of the Security Deficit described
above are such that they impede not only the regional stability of the South Caucasus and the interests of Western powers, but the
political,
social and economic development of the regional states. In fact, it is
increasingly apparent that failure to provide security is impeding the building
of viable sovereignty in the region.
The insecurity of the South Caucasus
impedes political stability, accountability and democratic development in
several ways. Most prominently, insecurity in the early-to-mid 1990s derailed
the political liberalization processes ongoing in the region and legitimized
the return of authoritarian rule in all three states. The popular urge for
order and stability therefore allowed the governing structures to backpedal on
institutional reform of both a political and economic nature. Political
instability followed as a direct consequence of the conflicts, as government
performance led to the rapid loss of popular legitimacy and encouraged armed
political contenders to challenge authorities. Moreover, corruption and
criminal infiltration of government bodies at a national and regional level was
facilitated by the weakening of government that resulted from the conflicts.
In an economic sense, the conflicts and the insecurity they bred severed
regional trade linkages. Moreover, fighting brought material destruction, and
created an economic burden as well as fall in economic production due to the
displacement of hundreds of thousands of people who became refugees in their
own countries. The downfall in economic production exacerbated problems with
corruption and organized crime, since the collapse of the labor market made
corruption and crime not only attractive alternative sources of income, but for
some people the only possible source of income. Moreover, the loss of licit
trade was replaced by illicit trade, which has been partially concentrated to
separatist areas or territories practically outside government control at
various times in the last decade, such as Ajaria, Javakheti, and
Lezgin-populated areas of Azerbaijan.
On a social level, the refugee populations remain unintegrated into the
general population, with specific problems and both material and psychological
suffering that impact society as a whole, especially in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In
addition, the unresolved conflicts are contributing to fanning the flames of
nationalism in the region, thereby impeding the development of civic-based
identities and democratic politics more generally.
Western aid to the region and to other conflict-ridden areas have often
attempted to go around the hard security issues and approach the multi-faceted
problems of the region from the other end, trying to work at a grassroots level
with confidence-building, encouraging economic exchanges, supporting civil
society, and hoping that these efforts would help bring about a more positive
climate that would in turn lead to improvements in conflict resolution and
regional security. The record so far shows the pitfalls of this process. While
western assistance has undoubtedly been immensely beneficial to political and
economic development in the region, it has failed to generate a positive
tendency with relation to the security problems of the region. It is becoming
increasingly apparent that insecurity lies at the base of the problems of the South Caucasus, and that only through addressing the
security deficit in the region directly will it be possible for the South Caucasus to develop economically and politically
into stable and peaceful societies that will be net security providers rather
than net security recipients.
III. Geopolitical
Interests and Multilateral Security
The South Caucasus forms an arena of
two competing integration visions. A nascent vision envisages the region's
anchoring and eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic security and economic
systems. This would ensure and consolidate the sovereignty and modernization of
the region's countries that choose this model. It is closely linked with
internal evolution toward better institutional performance, constitutional
government and rule of law.
The other model, capitalizing on an early start, is Russia's. It
has sought to regain predominance over the South Caucasus
through military presence, manipulation of ethnic conflicts, control over
energy supplies, takeover of insolvent industries through debt-for-assets
swaps, support for Moscow-oriented local political forces, and expansion of
government-connected shadow business from Russia interpenetrating with local
counterparts. Thriving on the insecurity and weakness of
nation-states in the region, this integration model aims to draw them
into a Russian-led political, military and economic bloc, in which Moscow -would exercise droits
de regard over these states' policies.
Russian Interests
Since the independence of the South Caucasus,
Moscow has
reluctantly seen its influence in the region gradually declining, a process
that it has sought to block by the use of various diplomatic, economic, and
military means. Moscow
has tried to keep the South Caucasus within
the Russian sphere of influence, and has to that end tried to hinder the local
states from pursuing independent foreign policies, and impede the United States
and Turkey
from increasing their presence and influenc e in the region. Ties with Iran have also
served this purpose. Russian overt policy demanded that all three states
acceded to the CIS, accepted Russian border guards on their 'external' border
with Iran
and Turkey,
and allowed Russian military bases on their territory. Moreover, Russia seeks to
monopolize the transportation of Caspian energy resources to world markets, and
has sheltered coup-makers and secessionist leaders from Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Since President Putin came to power, Russia has adopted a more pragmatic
position toward Azerbaijan,
leading to an improvement in relations and a more constructive attitude in the
Minsk Group negotiations; Russia
has also been less vocal toward expanded American and Turkish influence in the
region. However, continued strong-arm policies toward Georgia
generate doubt as to what Moscow's
intentions are. With respect to the stalemated conflicts of the region, Moscow's policies have
given abundant evidence to support that Russia finds the present status quo
convenient, and does not desire a resolution to any conflict.
The Russian integration model aims to a situation where the U.S., NATO and
EU would be required to deal primarily with Moscow - rather than with the South Caucasus states themselves - on key issues of
Caspian energy transit to the West and strategic access to operational theaters
in Eurasia. In that case, Moscow would obtain major bargaining cards
vis-a-vis Washington and European allies. Leading policymakers, especially in Moscow's power
ministries, have sought to apply a policy paradigm of controlled instability in
the South Caucasus through
"peacekeeping" and mediation in ethnic conflicts and through military
footholds in the region. This policy is based on perpetuating the conflicts
within predictable and usable parameters, frustrating their settlement without
allowing their escalation. The primary goal is political leverage over Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia,
through Russian arbitration among the parties to those conflicts and through
preservation of local protectorates in areas of Russian troop deployment. This
paradigm can be seen not only in Georgia, toward which Moscow long pursued a
clearly adversarial policy, but also applies to Russia's ally Armenia in a
slightly different form: it ensures that country's dependence on Russia by
freezing Armenian territorial gains inside Azerbaijan, while asserting control
over Armenian industries as a result of debt-for-equity swaps brought about by
Armenia's economic debt to Russia.
President Vladimir Putin has turned Georgia into the primary target of
Russian pressure in this region. Whether Georgia's new president, Mikheil
Saakashvili, can persuade him to change this policy is too early to tell, while
initial signs exist that a rapprochement between Tbilisi and Moscow is in the works as of May 2004. Russia
has conferred its citizenship on most Abkhaz and South Ossetian residents,
controls the Georgian side of the Georgia-Russia border in these secessionist
regions, maintains direct trade relations and transportation links with
Abkhazia and South Ossetia without reference to Georgia, and encourages
unilateral transfers of Georgian state properties to Russian state and private
entities. Moscow
has reneged on its 1999 commitments to close three military bases in Georgia;
instead, it seeks to keep them for an indefinite period. In many ways, then,
Kremlin policy toward Georgia
seems no longer restrained by international law.
From a Western perspective, regional stabilization requires settlement
of conflicts on terms that would ensure the independence, security and
consolidation of states, democratic decentralization, and full opportunities
for regional economic development, always with an emphasis on giving
Russia a stake in the
stability thusobtained. The dominant power structures in Moscow, however, seem to dismiss the notion
that it could itself benefit from stability and Western-promoted
development in the South Caucasus. This
in turn reflects the traditional assumption that Russia's interests require weak and
vulnerable countries, permeable to Russian influence, on its borders.
For these reasons, Euro-Atlantic anchoring of the South
Caucasus could entail major elements of competition with Russia, and
will require the finessing of the relationship with Moscow while this process develops. While it
is a competition that the U.S.,
NATO, the EU, and Western-oriented political forces in the region have ample
means to win, it will be important to continuously leave a -window open for Russia's
constructive cooperation and display the positive consequences for Russia of the
process.
Iranian Interests
The independence of the South Caucasian states took Iran by
surprise, especially as the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia
revealed deep contradictions in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.
Disagreements within the ruling circles in Tehran have ensured a certain level of mixed
signals, but in spite of these differences, Iranian policy has proven
remarkably durable. Three main facets have characterized Iranian policy.
Firstly, a concern over the emergence of the independent state of Azerbaijan,
leading to a gradual tilt toward Armenia in the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict. Secondly, a dramatic improvement in relations with Russia that,
despite a shaky basis, have developed into a strategic partnership. Thirdly, an
increasing desire to influence the development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian sea, seeking to avoid Turkish influence over
pipeline routes. Iran's
recent belligerence in Caspian naval matters is a rising concern, as Iran in the
Summer of 2001 became the first actor to threaten the use of force in the Caspian sea, as viewed above. Concern over the large Azeri
minority in Iran
has guided Iran's
policy toward the Caucasus.'4 Tehran
fears increased nationalism and separatism among the over 20 million-strong
(over twice the population of the state of Azerbaijan) Azeri minority, which
could threaten the integrity of the Iranian state. Aware of its waning
legitimacy and popularity, the clerical regime has sought to mitigate the
emergence of a strong and wealthy Republic
of Azerbaijan that would
act as a magnet for Azeris in Iran.
Azerbaijani President Elcibey's anti-Iranian attitude worsened relations to the
freezing point in 1992, and speeded
up Tehran's
tilt toward Armenia
in the conflict. Iran
has also found common ground with Russia in many issues. Beyond
economic benefits, Iran
and Russia
share an ambition to limit Turkish and American influence in their backyard,
and to restrict the westward orientation of the South Caucasian nations.
Turkish Interests
Turkey stands out by being
both a regional power in its own right, and simultaneously a key actor in the
Euro-Atlantic community, to which it is tied by its NATO membership, its
bilateral relationship to the United
States, and its bid for EU membership. What
will be said below of Euro-Atlantic interests applies to Turkey as well,
while its unique relationship to the region is briefly treated here.
After a bout of pan-Turkic euphoria in the early 1990s that frightened Armenia, Iran, Russia, and
discomforted Georgia,
Ankara has
since the late 1990s pursued a pragmatic and stable policy toward the South Caucasus. Turkey gives primacy to relations
with Azerbaijan,
both because of the close cultural and linguistic affinities between the two
states, and because of Azerbaijan's
pivotal geopolitical position. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, currently
under construction, and the planned Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline have
added economic importance to the South Caucasus
for Turkey.
A logical result of Turkey's
ambition to become an energy corridor between the Caspian and Europe
has led to increased attention on Georgia, the geographic link
between Turkey
and Azerbaijan
and Central Asia. Turkey has improved its relations
with Georgia
to the level of strategic partnership. After Iranian military threats toward Azerbaijan in
July-August
2001, Turkey
strongly signaled that it had taken on a role as guarantor of Azerbaijan's
security. Turkey
has supervised the building-up of Azerbaijan's military forces, and
entertains close
military ties not only with Azerbaijan but also with Georgia, in a
sense forging a Turkish-Georgian-Azerbaijani military relationship that is in
turn linked to the Turkish-Israeli alliance.
Turkey's relations with Armenia are, by
contrast, chilled. Armenia
sees Turkey
as the chief threat to its security, and still suspects Turkey of
having genocidal ambitions against Armenia. Turkey, for its part, refuses to
recognize the occurrence of a Genocide of Armenians during the First World War
and sees the Armenian government's struggle to achieve international
recognition of the alleged Genocide as a step toward territorial demands on Turkey - a fear
compounded by the Armenian government's reluctance to recognize its border with
Turkey.
Ankara reacted
strongly to Armenia's
occupation of Azerbaijani territories in 1992-93, and refuses to open
diplomatic relations with Armenia
until it withdraws from the occupied territories in Azerbaijan. Significant pressure is
being put on Turkey
to improve its relationshipwith Armenia
and open the border between the two countries. Nevertheless, this is
unrealistic in the absence of a solution to the Mountainous Karabakh dispute.
Euro-Atlantic Interests
The Western world has long regarded the Black Sea
as a boundary separating Europe from Asia, and viewed the South Caucasus
- however close geographically - as belonging to a foreign world. Today's
strategic imperatives have consigned that perception to history. From a
backwater of international politics, the South Caucasus has in recent years
surged to the geopolitical center stage as a result of three processes: first,
the recession of Russian power after 1990, which gave the region's states a
historic chance to pursue a Western orientation; second, the discovery since
the mid-1990s of the real potential of Caspian oil and gas, which hold the key
to Europe's energy balance in the future; and, third, the operational
requirements of antiterrorism coalitions post-9/11.
The South Caucasus forms the hub of an
evolving geostrategic and geo-economic system that stretches from NATO Europe
to Central Asia and Afghanistan. It provides unique
transit corridors for Caspian energy supplies and Central Asian commodities to
the Euro-Atlantic community, as well as direct access for allied forces to
bases and operational theaters in the Greater Middle East and Central
Asia. Thus the Black Sea and
Caspian basins, with the South Caucasus
uniting them, comprise a functional aggregate, now linked directly to the
enlarged Euro-Atlantic alliance.
Although located on the Euro-Atlantic world's outer edge, this region
has already begun functioning as a rear area or staging ground in terms of
projecting Western power and values along with security into Central
Asia and the Greater Middle East. This function is likely to
increase in significance as part of U.S. and NATO strategic
initiatives. For all of the above reasons, security threats to South Caucasus countries and the undermining of their
sovereignty run counter to major Euro-Atlantic interests.
Azerbaijan and Georgia perform
all those key functions in terms of strategic access. Thus, by dint of geography
and their political choice, Azerbaijan
and Georgia
have assumed major Euro-Atlantic responsibilities as members of the
anti-terrorist coalition and NATO aspirants. Both countries have thereby
accepted serious risks to their security. They can only function as a tandem or
not at all: as Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO aspirants, and indeed as viable
nation-states Azerbaijan
and Georgia
stand or fall together.
American policy continues to bear the brunt of overall Western interests
in the South Caucasus in terms of security
assistance, state-consolidation efforts, and promotion of energy projects.
Although Europe has a more direct stake in
this neighboring region's security and energy sector development, European
efforts are meager by comparison to those of the U.S. Such disproportion was never
justifiable, and must be rectified by European allies through NATO at this time
when U.S.
resources are overextended globally.
Current U.S.
and allied policies in this region focus on the new-type security threats associated
with international terrorism, mass-destruction-weapons proliferation, arms and
drugs trafficking. Thanks largely to U.S.-led efforts and active cooperation by
the region's governments, threats of
this type are being dealt with effectively. They are mostly latent or
under control, and must be addressed proactively and with fully adequate
resources.
That focus, however, does not address the traditional-type threats,
including military ones, to countries in the region. These threats are not
potential or latent; they are actual, clear and present,
and in some cases existential. They stem from unwanted, entrenched
foreign troops, seizures of territory, border changes de facto, ethnic
cleansing, "peacekeeping" that cements the outcome of military interventions,
and creation of proxy statelets with troops that have long since been graduated
from guerrilla to conventional troops.
The Alliance
should refocus its attention toward those persisting threats of traditional
types, and reorder accordingly its security priorities for this vitally
important region. Euro-Atlantic strategic interests cannot reliably be
sustained - nor can Euro-Atlantic integration be built - on rumps of countries
that are open to those threats and pressures. The Alliance needs to initiate genuine
peace-support and political settlement of the conflicts, as -well as take the
lead in urging the withdrawal of unwanted foreign forces; in sum, to uphold
international law, which has never really operated in this region since 1991.
Allied interests here have risen exponentially since that time, however.
Euro-Atlantic interests in this region require stable, reform-capable
states, safe from external military pressures or externally-inspired
secessions, secure in their function as energy transit routes, and able at any
time to join U.S.-led coalitions-of-the-willing or NATO operations. Those
interests can only be sustained if the regional partner-states are free from
unwanted foreign troops and bases, in control of their own borders, under protection
of international law, and anchored to Euro-Atlantic structures that ensure
their freedom to choose and to maintain a Western orientation.
While still years away from qualifying for NATO membership, Azerbaijan and Georgia need
effective security arrangements now. Before they can come into NATO, the Alliance must come to Azerbaijan and Georgia with
appropriate security arrangements. Politically, such arrangements can include
security assurances similar to those embodied in NATO's Article Four (i.e.,
short of Article-Five-type security guarantees), and might be included in a
summit statement that would be viewed in the region as a
"Washington-Treaty-Two." These two countries have already graduated
from the situation of pure consumers of security to that of net consumers and
incipient providers of security, as active members of the anti-terrorist
coalition and irreplaceable geostrategic assets to the Euro-Atlantic community.
Multilateral Security Arrangements:
NATO as the Only Feasible Option
The South Caucasus is hence a region
with clear and rapidly increasing Euro-Atlantic security interests. Meanwhile,
it is a region where these interests intersect with those of Russia and Iran. As far as
multilateral security arrangements are concerned, several possible options are
feasible, and have been advanced. The OSCE provides a joint western-Russian
umbrella; which was advanced after the collapse of the Soviet
Union to fulfill such a role. Meanwhile, Russia proposes
to organize the security of the region under the auspices of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization. As far as western security providers are
concerned, two alternatives are feasible: the European Union and NATO. The
former has chosen to remain aloof from the region in terms of security,
reducing the South Caucasus literally to a
footnote in the Wider Europe context, while NATO, through its Partnership for
Peace program is actually the only security arrangement to include all three
states of the region.
The European Union: Splendid Isolation for How Much Longer?
The European Union is now reconsidering its 2003 decision, which left
the South Caucasus countries out of the Wider
Europe/New Neighbors initiatives. For now, the EU remains the great absentee
from the economic, political and security affairs of this region. The EU's
profile in this region has actually decreased continually since the mid-1990s.
A decade ago, the EU launched the great projects, TRACECA (Transport
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia, a set of programs for overland commodity
transport and communications along the historic Silk Road)
and INOGATE (International Oil and Gas Transport to Europe).
The high hopes that had, in Europe as well as
in the South Caucasus, accompanied these
projects, have
come to naught thus far. Both projects are starved of funds and of
political attention in the EU. Their sole institutional expression in the South Caucasus thus far, a TRACECA Secretariat in Baku, is barely alive.
Although the EU is the main
prospective consumer of Caspian oil and gas, Brussels has for years seemed content to
discuss those issues as part of the EU-Russia energy dialogue. Instead of
seeking direct access to Caspian energy, the EU seems comfortable with
Russian-mediated access to that energy. European officials tend often to look
away from the long-term risks inherent in this approach, although it defeats
the EU's own declared goals of energy-supply diversification. While European
companies are actively involved in developing Caspian oil and gas deposits, the
EU as such is not a factor in promoting Caspian energy development and, above
all, pipeline routes to Europe. It is the U.S. who in
practice upholds those European interests through its active diplomacy on
energy and pipeline issues in the Caspian basin.
The EU appointed for the first time in 2002 a special representative for
the South Caucasus. This move could have been
a positive signal, though it failed to do so. The appointee is a veteran
Finnish diplomat, whose permanent office is not located in the region; not even
in Brussels,
but in Helsinki,
whence he travels periodically to the South Caucasus.
His mandate does not cover energy and pipeline issues; and it reduces him to
simply looking at regional security issues or frozen conflicts, without
authority to take initiatives. Although this envoy's mandate was initially a
short-term one, the EU has renewed it, instead of providing for a rewritten
mandate that would reflect EU interests.
Its strategic interests in terms of energy and anti-terrorism
notwithstanding, the EU is absent also from the regional security picture in
the South Caucasus. The Union
has no approach to conflict resolution and no initiatives regarding
post-conflict reconstruction. The EU's decade-old TACIS (Technical Assistance
to CIS countries) program has outlived its usefulness. It must be replaced by
programs on a higher quality level that would focus on building institutional
capacity and administrative competence in the South
Caucasus countries. The EU needs to develop a transit strategy for
Caspian energy, particularly targeting the eastern shore, which holds the great
bulk of Caspian oil and gas, for transit to Europe
via the South Caucasus. If this route is not
available to Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan,
their soaring exports of oil and gas will only reach Europe
via Russia,
and this in turn will strengthen Russian energy leverage on the EU. The Union also needs in its own interest to pull its weight
regarding peace-consolidation and conflict-settlement. This region's place in
the EU's Wider Europe/New Neighbors initiatives, currently being reworked,
should adequately reflect the EU's strategic energy and security interests. It
is especially important to coordinate EU policies in the South
Caucasus (as in the Balkans) with the U.S. and NATO.
The Collective Security Treaty
Organization
In contrast to European integration models, the Russian one relies
almost entirely on direct bilateral links of a vertical type between Moscow and the individual
member countries. Moreover, the most important bilateral links operate outside
nominally multilateral frameworks such as CIS. For example, the Collective
Security Treaty/Collective Security Organization provides a
multilateral-looking, largely symbolic framework, within which Russia develops
relations with each member country separately. Armenia is the sole member country
of the CSTO in the South Caucasus. At the same
time, the Russia-Armenia alliance treaty and other major military programs and
activities are bilateral affairs, not governed by the CSTO.
The CSTO provides a multilateral-looking, largely symbolic framework
within which Russia
develops relations with each member country separately. The CSTO, signed at Moscow's initiative in
1992, was abandoned in 1998 by Azerbaijan,
Georgia
and Uzbekistan,
who did not
renew their membership in the Treaty as it came up for renewal. The
CSTO, a personal initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin, originally
announced at the 2001 CIS summit in Yerevan,
is
intended to operationalize the largely declarative Treaty. Yet the CSTO
serves primarily the political function of casting Russia as a bloc leader on the
international stage.
Armenia is the sole member
country of the CSTO in the South Caucasus. At
the same time, however, the Russia-Armenia alliance treaty and other major
military programs and activities are bilateral matters, not governed by the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, and not administered through those
collective structures.
In theory, the CSTO includes three "regional groups of
forces": the Western group of Russia and Belarus, the South Caucasus group of Russia and Armenia, and
the Central Asian group of Russia,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan.
This means that, in case of a general or theater war, Russia would
take command of the forces of allied countries in the respective theaters.
Member countries including Armenia
rarely take part in collective exercises other than air defense. Of the three
regional groupings, only that in Central Asia
features an element designated as collective rapid-deployment force, configured
for anti-terrorism operations. Russia
has recently proposed to create this type of units with Belarus and Armenia in each
of these theaters as well.
The CIS nominally sponsors the Russian "peacekeeping"
operation in Abkhazia. It is the CIS as a political organization of twelve
member countries (not the six-country CSTO) that formally takes decisions
related to authorizing or terminating this operation and
determining its mandate
and composition. Moscow insists on conducting this purely Russian operation
under a CIS label, and punctiliously refers to the Russian troops involved in
it as "CIS peacekeepers." Initiated in 1994 following the Russian-led
military campaign against Georgia
in Abkhazia, this "peacekeeping" operation enables Russia to play
arbiter in a conflict that it has itself orchestrated and in which it continues
openly to underwrite the Abkhaz side.
Georgia accepted this Russian
operation under duress and on the condition that the CIS reexamine it at
six-month intervals, its prolongation being subject each time to Georgian
consent. In practice, Georgia has had no choice since 1994 but to accept the
prolongation every six months, often under protest; and by 2002 it renounced
the six-month proviso altogether. Tbilisi's attempts over the years to
internationalize this operation, or at least to revise the Russian operation's
mandate - for example, by authorizing the "peacekeeping" troops to
assist in the Georgian refugees' return to their homes in Abkhazia - came to
naught. The CIS as such never took a position on the issues of
internationalizing the Russian operation or revising its mandate. It was only Russia who
thrashed out those issues directly with Georgia, then secured in the CIS a
pro-forma approval to prolong the Russian operation.
The UN over the years acknowledged this "CIS peacekeeping
operation" in official UN documents at Russia's request. The UN Mission in
Georgia (UNOMIG) deploys a small number of unarmed observers in Abkhazia
(usually 150, in a 1:0 ratio to the Russian troops, and dependent on those
troops for safety). On those occasions when Georgia warned that it might not
consent to the six-month prolongation of the Russian operation unless it were
internationalized, the UN came to Russia's assistance by threatening to
withdraw UNOMIG from Abkhazia (citing the safety issue inter alia) if Georgia
exercised its right to request the Russian troops to leave. Otherwise, the UN
has not satisfied Russia's
claim to a special role as peacekeeper in the CIS, nor mandated the CIS as such
to conduct peacekeeping in Georgia or anywhere.
NATO's Role in the South Caucasus
NATO's enlargement to the western Black Sea
and the planned enlargement of the European Union are turning the South Caucasus into a direct neighbor to the
institutionalized West. Concurrently, with U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalitions
projecting power into Central Asia, Afghanistan and
Iraq,
the South Caucasus has de facto been drawn
into the perimeter of Euro-Atlantic strategic security interests. The EU's
energy security interests should sooner rather than later lead to an active
role in this region by the EU as well. Thus, while remaining a permanent
neighbor of Russia,
the South Caucasus has in effect become a
Euro-Atlantic borderland.
This American-spearheaded development is so recent that its full
implications have not yet sunk in, particularly in Western
Europe. Thus the U.S.
continues to bear a disproportionately large
share of overall Euro-Atlantic burdens in the South
Caucasus. NATO is still groping for a regional strategy, while the
EU is only beginning to reconsider its splendid isolation from this region.
In this region, Azerbaijan
and Georgia
made public already in 2000 their goal of joining NATO, each in its own right. Georgia became
officially an aspirant to NATO membership at the Alliance's Prague summit in November 2002; Azerbaijan, in
April 2003. Both countries have been working closely with the U.S., Turkey and
other allies on the long-haul task of reforming their security sectors. As
active members of the anti-terrorist coalition, Azerbaijan and Georgia have
provided transit passage and small troop units for NATO- and U.S.-led
operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan
and Iraq.
In those respects, as well as politically and diplomatically, Baku and Tbilisi behave as de facto allies of NATO and
the U.S.
Successful completion of their Individual Partnership Action Plans
(IPAPs) cycles could potentially lead Azerbaijan and Georgia to
obtain Membership Action Plans (MAPs), a status that Albania and Macedonia, for
example, enjoy presently. Their progress toward that would almost certainly
provide an attractive example to Armenia.
For its part, NATO should map out a two-stage strategy regarding the South Caucasus: from anchoring to integration. This
strategy can capitalize most effectively on the wide overlap in membership
between NATO and the EU. The first stage, to be ushered in by the Alliance's 2004 Istanbul summit, must aim
for anchoring the region to the Euro-Atlantic system in security terms and
economically, and on that basis advance the consolidation of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as
functional nation-states. Successful anchoring can lead to the stage of
integration, beginning with that of Azerbaijan and Georgia into NATO,
and encouraging Armenia
to exercise a Euro-Atlantic option as well.
The South Caucasus in the Anti-Terror
Coalition
Anti-terrorism, anti-rogue-state strategies have created a new set of
Euro-Atlantic interests in the South Caucasus,
gateway to actual and potential hotbeds of crisis in the Greater Middle East.
Key to those strategies in all of their phases - from contingency planning to
conduct of operations to post-conflict stabilization - is access to the South Caucasus on a permanently assured basis. This
requirement in turn necessitates durable coalition building in the region. By
the same token it presents theregion's countries with a historic opportunity to
seek inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic security system.
NATO's November 2002 Prague
summit made twin decisions on enlargement to the western Black
Sea and on retooling for expeditionary operations farther afield.
At present, NATO allies in various combinations operate in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kyrgyzstan.
Meanwhile, the U.S.
has begun repositioning some of its own forces from Western
Europe toward the southeast, closer to the possible operational
theaters. Thus, the South Caucasus has become
NATO's direct neighbor as well as connecting link to the Greater Middle East
for allied forces.
Azerbaijan and Georgia joined
the anti-terrorism coalition instantly on 9/11. They supported the Enduring
Freedom operation in Afghanistan
and Iraqi Freedom operation by providing air and land passage rights, political
backing, and peace-support troops.
Baku and Tbilisi regard their participation in the
anti-terrorism coalition as synonymous with their national interests. They had
experienced terrorist attacks and threats well before 9/11 (externally inspired
coup- and assassination attempts against their presidents, ethnic cleansing
operations). For both Azerbaijan
and Georgia,
participation in the anti-terrorism coalition is also a means to maintain close
relations with the U.S.,
advance the modernization of their security sectors, and earn their credentials
as NATO aspirant countries.
Moreover, Azerbaijan
and Georgia
are on the alert to prevent a spillover of the Russian-Chechen war into their
territories and to interdict the passage of foreign gunmen, their suspected
accomplices, and radical Islamist missionaries. With U.S. assistance, Georgia cleaned
up the Pankisi Valley in 2002-2003 and holds it under
control since then. For its part, Azerbaijan gave
Iran's mullahs no chance to
export their brand of Islam to Azerbaijan's
Shia majority. Successful development of Azerbaijan as a Muslim secular
state is also a shared interest of the Euro-Atlantic
community. This goal stands a good chance of fulfillment in an
Azerbaijani society generally characterized by religious tolerance and
receptive to Western models.
Armenia, on the other hand, has
followed a policy closer to the Russian one, reacting slower to September 11, 2001 than did
Azerbaijan
or Georgia,
and opposing Operation Iraqi Freedom. Its close relations with Russia and Iran
constrained Armenia's
decisions. For its part, Turkey
moved from active participation in Afghanistan to a reluctant and
limited cooperation over Iraq.
Such experiences underscore the importance of ensuring that Azerbaijan and Georgia remain
free at all times to exercise their own option of participating in coalition
efforts. Baku
and Tbilisi
need to feel confident that they
can take such
decisions without exposing
themselves to pressures from Russia
or Iran,
if these oppose a particular allied operation or campaign. Thus, the Alliance needs to
institutionalize security arrangements with Azerbaijan and Georgia now, as
a bridging solution toward their possible membership in the Alliance in the future.
These two countries (along with their Black Sea
neighbors Romania,
Bulgaria
and Ukraine)
have provided crucial overflight support and transit passage for U.S.-led,
NATO-backed anti-terrorist operations. These contributions responded ad-hoc to
specific, largely unanticipated contingencies. The lesson is that the U.S. and NATO
must establish a long-term presence in this region, in anticipation of a full
range of contingencies. Thus, the transformation goals of the U.S. European
Command now require a long-term presence around the Black
Sea and in the South Caucasus.
The goals include establishing support infrastructures, assisting in the
development of allied and friendly forces for self-defense and coalition
operations, and securing peacetime and contingency access for U.S. forces
throughout this region. For NATO collectively, such a presence would be a
natural corollary to the Alliance's
recent decisions to prepare for possible operations in the Greater Middle East
and beyond. In this respect, South Caucasus
countries are indispensable to anti-terrorist coalition building on a long-term
basis.
The Challenge of Unresolved Conflicts
The South Caucasus is currently the
most conflict-plagued region on any new border of the enlarging West. A
coherent Western approach to peace-support and conflict resolution in this
region is still lacking, however. Given the region's high strategic value, it
is high time to move this issue to the front burner of diplomacy and security
policy.
NATO, the U.S.
and the European Union can and should initiate a long-overdue transformation of
conflict-management in the South Caucasus. The
goal must be political solutions that promote the consolidation of the region's
states and advance Euro-Atlantic interests in partnership with these states.
Peacekeeping operations and conflict-settlement negotiations should be
reconfigured and geared to those goals.
Thirteen years after the USSR's
dissolution, conflict-management in this strategic region continues to be
heavily dominated by Moscow.
The latter has a vested interest in keeping the conflicts smoldering, so as to
thwart the Western integration of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The
U.N. and OSCE, left largely to their own devices, have merely conserved these
unresolved conflicts. Euro-Atlantic strategic and economic interests, however,
necessitate hands-on Western involvement in peace-support operations and
conflict-resolution in this region. Almost two years ago, the U.S. and NATO
seemed on the verge such involvement for the first time. The joint communiques
in May 2002 of the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia summits stipulated that
"the United States
and Russia
will advance a peaceful political resolution to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia;" and that "the United States
and Russia
will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including...Karabakh and the
Transnistria issue." Furthermore, under the aegis of the newly created
NATO-Russia Council (NRC), "NATO and Russia...will promote
interoperability between national peacekeeping contingents, and development of
a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations." Washington
and NATO had evidently initiated and
pushed through the innovative language in those documents. Their
apparent intentions were soon shelved, however, as misgivings arose over some
other aspects of NRC's mandate, the U.S. shifted
its focus to Iraq,
NATO experienced internal tensions, and the situation in Afghanistan
began claiming its share of allied resources, with the Iraq crisis now
demanding its share as well.
Although Russia
has fallen short of obtaining international recognition of a special role as
"peacekeeper" in the "CIS space," Moscow continues to hold that role de facto,
along with the dominant position as mediator in conflict-settlement
negotiations. The ceasefires in Karabakh, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia have held over the years (nearly a decade on average)
mainly because the parties themselves know that they would have far more to
lose than to gain from any new hostilities. Russia's policy consists of
freezing not the conflicts as such, but rather the negotiations toward
political settlements.
NATO and the EU may be multiplying their peace-support commitments
elsewhere, but seem to stop shy of any such role in formerly Soviet-ruled
areas. Russia's
privileged role in these areas is a potential ingredient to sphere-of-influence
rebuilding; an ingredient that persists by Western default. It is crucial to
avoid the perception (let alone the fact) of a Russia-West division of
peacekeeping and conflict-management spheres taking hold. This can lead to the
slippery slope of a division into political influence spheres, and even to an
informal partition of countries' territories.
Some analysts nevertheless suggest that the U.S., NATO and the EU should defer
to Moscow on
this issue, lest Russia's
cooperation in anti-terrorism and anti-WMID-proliferation efforts be
jeopardized. This argument seems to underestimate Russia's own declared interest in
cooperating with the West in such efforts; to overestimate the practical value
of Russia's
contributions to those efforts; and to look away from Moscow's outright obstruction of coalition
efforts in a number of cases. Moreover, ittends to confirm the Kremlin in its
view that strategic partnership with the West should entail acceptance of
Russian primacy in the "CIS space."
Another argument for noninvolvement focuses on overextension of NATO
member countries' resources in ongoing peace-support operations, at a time when
NATO is facing a shortfall in deployable forces (along with a large surplus of
nondeployable European forces, however). NATO's stated priorities currently
include Afghanistan at the top, followed by Iraq, then followed by remaining
commitments in the Balkans, and hypothetically by operations in the Greater
Middle East as the need may arise; not to mention UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan's call for NATO peacekeeping in Africa, which NATO's Secretary-General
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has announced he would seriously consider.
Where this leaves the South Caucasus in
terms of conflict-management priorities is far from clear. In any case,
NATO-led peace-support and stabilization in this region would entail far lower
risks and far smaller resources compared to the risks and the resource
commitments in Iraq,
Afghanistan,
or previously in the Balkans. Moreover, turning the South
Caucasus into a NATO priority need not compete with the priorities
assigned to Afghanistan,
Iraq,
or the emergent Greater Middle East initiative. The fact is that a secure and
stable South Caucasus, anchored to NATO, is
necessary in order to sustain those operations and initiatives. This in turn
requires a proactive, coordinated Euro-Atlantic approach to peace-support
missions and conflict-resolution in this region.
Russian "peacekeeping" must and can be internationalized with
full-fledged Euro-Atlantic participation. Small numbers of lightly armed troops
would be adequate for monitoring the ceasefires. The emphasis should shift to
civilian components of peacekeeping missions: on the Bosnia and Macedonia
models, such missions should include police units and police trainers,
internationally appointed judges, administrative-capacity-building personnel,
and customs training teams. The introduction of law and order can marginalize
the criminalized leaderships of the breakaway areas and create conditions for a
democratic opening there, facilitating conflict resolution. Political
settlements should be attainable in short order due to U.S. and allied
political credibility in the region, and their potential, together with the EU,
for post-conflict reconstruction.
Anchoring the South Caucasus to the
Euro-Atlantic system through conflict management and post-conflict
rehabilitation would result in a strategic payoff of global import. The effort
would be
well within the present means of the U.S., NATO and the EU, if they work
in synergy reflecting their common strategic interests in this region.
The Role of Unwanted Foreign Forces
NATO's June 2004 summit will review compliance with the adapted Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and Istanbul Commitments regarding the South Caucasus and Moldova.
Those twin agreements of 1999 require Russia to: reduce certain
categories of heavy weaponry (designated cumulatively as treaty-limited
equipment) in this flank region to the levels set in the adapted CFE treaty;
close two bases in Georgia by 2001, agree with Georgia on a timeline for
closure of the other two bases, and withdraw all Russian forces from Moldova by
2002. The CFE Treaty and the Istanbul Commitments form twin parts of a single
package (a linkage that Russia
accepted in 1999 and afterward, but no longer does).
NATO has all along taken the position that ratification of the CFE
Treaty is contingent on Russian compliance with the treaty's flank-region
limits and with the Istanbul Commitments. Furthermore, NATO and the U.S. have
assured Russia
that the three Baltic states would accede to
the CFE Treaty - thus accepting constraints on allied defensive deployments in
the Baltics - once the Treaty is ratified, which in turn depends on Russian
compliance with the flank limits and the Istanbul Commitments.
This remains NATO's collective position to date; but certain European
governments now seem prepared to accept only a partial and unverified Russian
compliance with the Istanbul Commitments and the CFE Treaty on the southern
flank, at the expense of regional security; and thus to rush the Treaty's
ratification, which would then place the Baltic states under its constraints.
For its part, Russia
wants NATO to call for treaty ratification and inclusion of the Baltics,
despite Russian breaches of the Treaty and the Commitments.
As of now, the noncompliance is threefold: Russian heavy weaponry in
excess of CFE Treaty limits, stonewalling on verification, and noncompliance
with base closure and troop withdrawal obligations.
In breach of its Istanbul Commitments, Russia has held on to three bases
in Georgia,
avoiding since 2002 any serious negotiations about closure. At present, it
seeks a seven-year extension for two of the bases - Batumi and Akhalkalaki - and a bilateral
treaty with Georgia
that would legalize those bases for the duration. The other base, Gudauta, was
due to have been closed in 2001; but Russia retains the base and
garrison, has reclassified it as "peacekeeping" and seeks Georgian
and international acceptance of such an arrangement. In Moldova,
meanwhile, Russia
maintains the troops that were required to have withdrawn by 2002; it has
transferred part of those troops to Transnistria's army--a Russian force in all
but name; and seeks to keep another part of the Russian troops in place indefinitely
as "peacekeepers." The numerical size of Russian garrisons in Batumi, Akhalkalaki,
Gudauta, and Transnistria is unclear and unverified. Russian bases in Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova are not
accessible to inspection, even though the CFE Treaty provides for on-site
inspection by OSCE teams to count the treaty-limited equipment and verify
treaty implementation. Recently, Russia has multiplied the pretexts
for prolonging its military presence in these countries: it cites
"stability," jobs for local residents, secessionist authorities'
objections to troop withdrawal, and Russia's inability to cover the
costs of relocating the troops.
In violation of the CFE Treaty, residual amounts of the Russian
treaty-limited equipment (TLE) - which should have been destroyed or
repatriated to Russia
-remain in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
at the disposal of the illegal authorities there. That equipment includes
tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems. Meanwhile, numerous indications
suggest that Russian-supplied combat hardware including TLE is massively
concentrated with ethnic-Armenian Karabakh forces inside Azerbaijani territory.
The precise numbers are unclear because the arsenals in that territory, as well
as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and in Transnistria,
are out of bounds to verification. The OSCE - nominally the CFE Treaty's
sponsoring body - is powerless to correct or even to call the violations. It
merely acknowledges the existence of "unaccounted-for TLE holdings."
Meanwhile, the CFE Treaty's principle of host-country consent (no
country may station its forces on another country's territory without the
latter's freely-given consent) is being flouted in this region, thus impeding
treaty ratification. At the moment, a few West European chancelleries -
apparently more anxious to help Russia off that hook than to help rid the
countries of those troops - are asking Georgia and Moldova to declare their
consent to Russia's troop presence at Gudauta and in Trasnistria as
"peacekeepers;" this would enable Russia neatly to circumvent the
Istanbul Commitments on troop withdrawal, as well as to cite host-country
consent in urging the CFE Treaty's ratification
If the Treaty's ratification goes forward under such circumstances and
is applied to the Baltic States, NATO would
then forfeit its last significant lever for inducing Russia to withdraw the troops from Georgia and Moldova. There
is no convincing reason for an allied decision to ratify the CFE Treaty at this
time; and every reason to maintain a firm linkage between this issue and the
fulfillment of Russia's
Istanbul Commitments. That linkage has recently been subjected to erosion, and
needs therefore to be reinforced at NATO's summit.
The Euro-Atlantic community and of course the countries directly affected
should call for the withdrawal of those Russian forces on the basis of
international law; raise the issue
in international organizations; place it prominently on the agendas of
NATO-Russia, U.S.-Russia, and EU-Russia relations; and not rush the CFE Treaty's
ratification before ensuring its observance in the southern flank region,
compliance with the Istanbul Commitments on Russian troop withdrawal, reliable
verification, and real observance of the principle of host-country free
consent.
IV. The Military
Situation in the South Caucasus
As the preceding analysis suggests, two of the three states in the South
Caucasus have indicated a desire to become members of NATO, sooner rather than
later, and the third is looking to expand its relationship with the Alliance as
part of its broader Euro-Atlantic initiatives. From a military perspective, the
two countries seeking membership are not ready to be contributing Alliance members. What
does this mean? To answer the question, we must begin with, at least in general
terms, an understanding of the current capabilities, limitations and some of
the challenges facing each of these militaries.
As noted earlier, these three states gained their independence in
turmoil, as ethnic and regional disputes threatened the state sovereignty of Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Moreover, Moscow's
role in the region has been questioned by both states and they have or are
pushing for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops'5; and Baku and Tbilisi soon after independence began looking
to the West for needed military assistance and security guarantees. Armenia, on the
other hand, has remained dependent on Russia for its security and
welcomes Russia's
military presence in the region.
Although the three states of the region differ in many ways, there are a
number of similarities in their recent past that have influenced the
organization, structure and size of their armed forces and provide a basis for
many of the challenges that they have been facing.
O The social and economic
instability they confronted;
O Their success in generating
economic recovery and then growth;
O The country's evolving
security environment and arrangements;
O The size and quality of the
Soviet legacy force;
O The experience-level of their
respective officer corps;
O The challenges of bringing all military and
paramilitary entities under government
control;
O The government's priority for
reform and modernization, which is often balanced against concerns over the
military's possible powerbroker role;
O The constraints of the
Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty.
These shared characteristics generally reflect the common legacy
inherited from the collapse of the USSR. These factors were the
natural results of seven decades of Soviet rule, thus the inherent legacy may
seem more important than it is in reality. The degrees to which they suffered
from
these problems, however, have varied. Georgia was plagued by warlordism
from the very start of its independence, with factional paramilitary groups and
forces sprouting in the security vacuum with mounting divisions on the lines of
regional, ethnic and even on individual leaders' personalities. Though Azerbaijan
suffered similar problems in 1992-93, the state took control over
paramilitary formations quicker than in Georgia as the war with Armenia
served to unite a common and unifying structure of its infant military, a trend
that did not take place in the
Georgian case. Armenia,
by contrast, managed to secure state control over paramilitary formations
before the Soviet collapse, and quickly built a single chain of command in the
military.
Table 1: The Armed Forces of the South Caucasus
|
Country
|
Man-
power
|
Battle
Tanks
|
Armored
Vehicles
|
Artil-
lery
|
Combat
Aircraft
|
Combat
Helicopters
|
Navy
|
|
Armenia
|
44,660
|
110
|
140-240
|
229
|
8
|
10
|
—
|
|
Azerbaijan
|
66,490
|
220
|
210
|
282
|
47
|
15
|
II Patrol/ Mine
Warfare, 4 Amphibious
|
|
Georgia
|
17,500
|
86
|
185
|
110
|
7
|
3
|
II Patrol/
Coastal
Combatants ,4
Amphibious
|
Source: "The Military Balance, 2003-2004", Oxford, IISS, 2003, pp. 64-5, 73.
The manifold problems faced by these developing militaries in recent
years, including conflicts, under-funding of their armed forces and the
problems associated with legacy forces, have contributed to the existing
military balance (represented above). This balance within the region is made
more precarious and complex by the continued presence of elements of the
Russian armed forces. The Group of RussianForces in Transcaucasus (GRVZ)
remains the most combat ready military component in the region. The GRVZ
includes eight thousand Russian soldiers, 153 tanks, 241 Armored Infantry
Fighting Vehicles (AIFVs) and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), and 140
artillery systems and is stationed at the two military bases in Georgia (the
12th in Batumi and the 62nd in Akhalklaki). Two other groups of Russian
servicemen, serving as CIS peacekeepers, are located in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Gudauta (Abkhazia), a separate
peacekeeping-reserve Motor Rifle battalion, and two other battalions operate on
the dividing line between the opposing sides along the Inguri River
and in the Kodori Gorge. There are an estimated 1,600 Russian servicemen in
Abkhazia, plus no less than 100 pieces of military hardware. In South Ossetia, the Russian battalion is tasked with
peacekeeping duties in the area around Tskhinvali and along the Georgian
military road. This formation includes 600 soldiers, plus approximately 50
pieces of ground combat and aviation hardware.1
In addition to the officially recognized states in the South
Caucasus, the separatist areas of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in Georgia
and Mountainous Karabakh in Azerbaijan
also have their own armed forces. Abkhazia has between 3,000-5,000 personnel
(up to 45,000 on mobilization), 35-50 tanks, 70-86 AIFVs and APCs, 80-100 artillery
systems and 6 combat aircraft. South Ossetia
maintains approximately 2,000 personnel (planning to expand to 6,000), 5-10
tanks, 30 AIFVs and APCs and 25 artillery systems. Mountainous Karabakh has
about 15,000 to 20,000 full-time personnel (increasing up to more than 30,000
on mobilization) 316 tanks, 324 AIFVs and APCs and 322 artillery systems.'7
Most military analysts consider this Army (NK) to be highly competent and
combat capable. Russia
has been successful in using these separatist republics as a mechanism through
which to maintain its influence in the South Caucasus,
justifying its military presence and repeatedly warning Tbilisi against military intervention in
Abkhazia or South Ossetia, while pursuing its
own military campaign in Chechnya.
Armenia
Armenia inherited most of the
assets and much of the equipment from the Soviet Seventh Guards All Arms Army
of the Transcaucasus Military District, headquartered in Yerevan, as well as elements of an air army,
and the 19th Independent Air Defense Army. The ground components
were generally lower readiness
units, with older equipment. By late 1994, much of this equipment was deemed no
longer serviceable.18
Armenians frequently pursued a professional military career and there
were large numbers of Armenian officers, including senior officers, in key
command and staff posts throughout the Soviet force.'9 Consequently,
the evolving MoD had little difficulty recruiting competent personnel. Their
Soviet military experience was common to all and they took advantage of what
they knew, which was how the Soviet Army operated, including its procedures,
techniques, tactics and doctrine.
Armenia suffered a significant
economic shock with the break-up of the Soviet Union
in 1991 and the economy is still trying to recover. The demands of the defense
budget, including prosecution of a war, placed a heavy burden on this
struggling economy, even though the annual budget seems paltry by Western
standards. Although a ceasefire has been in-place for several years, the security
of Mountainous Karabakh and the resurgence of hostility remain principal
concerns. This conflict served to escalate the country's concerns over broader
security issues and remains a focal point for its foreign and security policy. Armenia saw
itself increasingly politically and economically isolated, while it was flanked
by enemies to its east and west, with Azerbaijan and Turkey imposing
trade and economic embargoes, seriously affecting an already stressed economy.
Moscow's support for Yerevan in this conflict
helped to further isolate Armenia
from its neighbors and solidify Russia's
position as the country's main security ally. In 1997, Moscow and Yerevan signed a key "Friendship
Treaty," which included a mutual assistance provision - in the event of a
military attack on either party. This agreement was strengthened in January
2003 by a new bilateral military-technical agreement.20 Armenia
receives, in part, military equipment, spare parts, supplies and training from
Russia's armed forces, Armenia still views Russia as the strategic guarantor of
its position within the region and this is reinforced further by the continued
stationing of Russian ground, air and air defense forces on its territory. In
2000, Yerevan
signed an agreement allowing Russian troops to stay in Armenia through
2025 and, in March 2001, it signed a protocol that exempted Russia from
paying rent for its military facilities in Armenia.21 In January
2002, Russia
and Armenia
agreed to establish a joint "counterterrorism" brigade.22
Although U.S. military assistance programs prior to 9/11 were modest,
Washington has provided nearly $1.5 billion in economic, humanitarian and
technical assistance to Armenia since the enactment of the Freedom Support Act
in October 1992.23 Post 9/11, there has been a significant increase
in U.S. security assistance to Armenia, as well as efforts to incorporate
Tibilisi into the war on terrorism and expand and deepen its relations with
NATO.24 With Congressional enactment of a waiver for Section 907 of
the Freedom Support Act, Washington was able to expand it military to^military
relationship with Yerevan (more details later).
Armenia was included in the territory covered by the CFE Treaty that had
been negotiated between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Alliances.25 It
would appear that adherence to these ceilings has had only a marginal
effect on downsizing of the legacy force, with age, combat losses, transfers of
equipment to Mountainous Karabakh and the declining operational status of much
of the remaining equipment undoubtedly having a more significant affect on the
process. As an effort to balance combat power in the region, the established
ceilings on the five basic combat systems restricted by the Treaty is the same
for both Armenia
and Azerbaijan26 , but those assets in Mountainous Karabakh are not
currently accounted for under the Treaty.27
Structure
The Armenian armed forces total around 44,600 personnel that support a
mixed professional, contract and conscript-based organization, with two arms of
service - the ground forces and a joint
air and air defense force. Conscripts serve for 24 months; those
recruited on a contract basis serve periods of 3 to 15 years.28
There is also a reserve base of approximately 220,000 that have served in the
last 15 years.
The Army is the heart of the Armenian armed forces and the largest of
its services, with more than 75 per cent of both the active military personnel
and equipment. The army's assets are organized under five corps headquarters
that are distributed around the country, but heavily leaning toward
the country's eastern border with Azerbaijan. Principal combat
formations are a mixture of motor rifle brigades and regiments. The
restructuring of the army has been ongoing for some time and indications are
that the motorized formations will eventually all be reorganized into brigades
of three or four combat battalions and a strength ranging between 1,500 to
2,500 troops.29 The Army has the largest concentration of conscript
soldiers, but it is also recruiting contract soldiers for the technical
services and a small but growing NCO corps.
The joint air/air defense forces are composed of a combination of combat
assets that can nominally support both offensive and defensive air operations.
The air element has 8 combat aircraft and 13 armed helicopters (8 attack) and
is organized into four functional commands: a fighter/ground attack squadron; a
transport unit; a composite helicopter
squadron; and a training center.30 The air defense elements comprise
a composite fighter/ground attack unit that incorporates the limited
counter-air, offensive air and air defense capabilities, surface-to-air
gun/missile units, and air defense surveillance radar units. Initially, much of
the equipment, and command and control systems were taken over from the former
Soviet 19th Independent Air Defense Army. The capabilities of these
surveillance, and command and control systems have been significantly improved
over the years by the Russians to enhance the capabilities of the CIS air
defense network. The national air defense is significantly enhanced by the
Russian-operated joint air defense command center, which is located near
Yerevan and linked into Russia's and the broader CIS air defense network; and
the one squadron of current generation Russian Air Force fighters, MiG-29
(Fulcrum), and a battalion of Russian ground-based strategic air defense systems,
SA-12S, that are stationed in Armenia. Armenian units and personnel routinely
train with Russian stationed-forces, which helps significantly with the
training burden.
Mountainous Karabakh Forces
In the Armenian-controlled enclave in Azerbaijan, there is also the
well-equipped, trained and led Karabakh army that must also be considered.
There is a high degree of integration between the Karabakh army and the
Armenian armed forces, as it receives direct economic and logistics assistance
from Yerevan.3' Both conscripts and officers from Armenia routinely
serve in Karabakh, while Karabakh soldiers and officers in uniform are a common
sight on Yerevan's streets.
The active components of this force are organized into regular military
formations and stationed in garrisons around the enclave. The active force is
about 20,000 strong, which can expand to approximately 40,000 with
mobilization. The Karabakh Defense Force is predominantly a ground force,
having only a minor helicopter component. It does have a robust ground-based
air defense capability, but any air support provided must come from Armenia. The
force operates predominantly along Soviet operational lines, with former Soviet
and Russian equipment. The Karabakh
military has often
Assessment
The strength of Armenia's
armed forces is in its ground forces, which is in part being reorganized and
restructured. A combination of the competing, new mission requirements and the
very rugged terrain in much of Armenia
has required a reassessment of its force structure and unit mix. Clearly, the
army will maintain much of its traditional mechanized formations, but it also
is looking to lighten and make more mobile and self-sustainable a small number
of other formations to support its international requirements and effectively
operate in mountainous and other rugged
terrain - but it must do this without affecting the mechanized
capability that is needed to confront Azerbaijan's conventional forces.
It is anticipated that the light, mobile force component will require some new
equipment items to support both its capability requirements, such as
transportability, and the need for improved interoperability with
Western as well as Russian or Russian-equipped forces. These requirements
suggest a need for improvements in compatible
tactical communications, mobile logistics kit, transportation
helicopters, and access to long-range air transport.
The Armenian military is essentially a single-service force, with only a
nominal air component of its own, and little combined arms operational
capability. Moreover, there are no indications that this situation will change
in the near term. The army continues to compare well with the Azerbaijani army,
although the differential between them in equipment, morale and training is
continuously shifting.
Fore the time being, the Armenian military is likely to be able to
defend its territory, as well as to halt an Azerbaijani attempt to regain
control over Mountainous Karabakh, and arguably also over occupied territories,
although the Armenian willingness to take losses to secure the latter areas is
more doubtful. The state of the other regional militaries suggests that this
assessment will not change soon, but, if the economic trends hold steady in Azerbaijan and
the government remains committed to reversing the situation in Mountainous
Karabakh, Baku
could invest heavily in improving both the capability and readiness of its
forces. In this respect, the Armenian army in the field remains vulnerable to
modern air operations33 and the operational readiness rate for the
older legacy equipment that populates much of the force is in decline.
Recognizing these trends and concerns, Defense Minister Sarkisian claimed in a
November 2002 interview that "despite possessing greater human and
financial resources, Azerbaijan
will never gain military superiority over Armenia." Responding to these
trends, there has been a steady upward trend in the Armenian state budget for
defense: $88.62 million in 2004, a ten percent increase from the 2003 level of
$80 million, again an increase of 20 percent from the pervious year (2002).34
Without its own effective air component, the army has only limited
offensive capability against a comparable force with an air component and will
be constrained in movement by its ground-based air defense umbrella. This
underscores the need for the army to ensure that its ground-based air defense
capability stays ahead of emerging air threats. Although most regional military
analysts consider this is a very professional and highly rated military, it
does not have the battle-space awareness, the extended reach, or the
operational flexibility inherent in most modern, combined arms militaries.
Since 1999, there has reportedly been a gradual but steady decline in the
morale and readiness of the army, strained by a very tight economy and priority
requirements elsewhere, as well as a reducing conscript pool. These problems
are creating retention problems in the junior and mid-level ranks of the
officer corps.35 Moreover, this deterioration of the military is
coincidental with the growing level of politicization in the MoD and services.
Time and the evolving security environment appear to demand a renewed
program to complete efforts to reform and restructure the military, and to
improve the readiness, upgrade the capabilities of selected older systems, and
replace other systems. Such a program must be politically supported, well
scripted and funded, and will take time. Moreover, the constraints of the
economy will restrict the scope and timing of any major equipment modernization
efforts or acquisitions. It is likely that the MoD will have no choice but to
continue a gradual and piecemeal modernization effort, taking advantage of
external military assistance and equipment transfer programs where possible,
most likely from Russia.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan's armed forces were
built principally from the military assets that were inherited from the Soviet State
when it dissolved. As a result of the 1992 Tashkent Agreement, Azerb aijan
received most of the assets and much of the equipment from the Transcaucasus
Military District's Fourth Army, including four of its Motor Rifle.
Divisions (MRDs). In 1990, these MRDs were generally lower readiness
formations that were poorly manned and had older equipment stocks. Few
Azerbaijanis were part of the Soviet professional officer corps, with only an
estimated 3,400 in the more than 4-million strong Red Army in 1991, and only a
handful of these rose to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel or higher. This
was a result partly of discrimination against Muslim officers in the
Soviet military, especially after the second world war.
Although Azerbaijan
was not adequately equipped or prepared for independence, it immediately was
forced to create a national military, with the conflict over Mountainous
Karabakh providing the main driving force behind almost all early foreign and
security policy decisions. As its conflict with Armenia escalated, Azerbaijan
initially made advances in mid-1992, as it was advancing into Mountainous
Karabakh, briefly taking back control over ca. 40% of its territory. The power
transfers in Baku
in summer 1992 and summer 1993 affected the country's military structures most
negatively. It was the defection of a chief regional commander, Surat
Husseinov, from the front that prompted the Armenian conquest of Kelbajar in
early 1993, and the subsequent bid for power by Husseinov and ensuing coup in
Summer 1993 that led to the collapse of the army morale and chain of command
and the loss of the remaining occupied territories to the South and East of
Mountainous Karabakh itself. In this context, its security forces could not
defend and retain control of a significant part of its territory, with Armenia taking
control of over 17 per cent of the country's territory. Although there remains
a long-standing truce in the conflict, Azerbaijan remains committed to
disarming Mountainous Karabakh and restoring its territorial integrity, and
resettling the large refugee population that was displaced form Mountainous
Karabakh. The economy declined dramatically with independence and was slow in
its recovery through the 1990s, limiting available funding for the armed
forces. This has begun to change as of the late 2000s, with increasing monies
from foreign direct investment and oil sales entering the state budget and the
State Oil Fund.
Restructuring Azerbaijan's
Armed Forces
The active armed forces include 66,490 personnel. The forces remain
conscript-based and comprise three arms of service: ground forces, joint air
force and air defense forces, and navy, as well as a reserve base.
The Army is the heart of the
Azerbaijani Armed Forces and the largest (56,840 personnel) and lead service,
with more than 80 per cent of both the active military personnel and equipment.
The Army remains heavily mechanized and still has 220 tanks (T-72S and T-55S),
210 AIFVs and APCs, more than 280 pieces of artillery (100mm or larger), and 15
attack helicopters, with the numbers of these particular combat systems heavily
influenced by the equipment limits of the CFE Treaty.37 The Army is
organized into four Corps Headquarters that are geographically distributed
across the country. The principal ground combat formation is now the motor
rifle brigade, with the former Soviet army and division structure being
reorganized into this smaller and more manageable combat formation -
restructuring is a positive move. The Army has a mix of brigades to include 19
motor rifle brigades, an air assault brigade and two mountain infantry
regiments, which will likely be restructured into brigades as well. One and
possibly two of the motor rifle brigades are responsible for peacekeeping
duties and should be trained and outfitted accordingly. The continued threats
of renewed conflict over Mountainous Karabakh means that many of the army's
combat brigades remain deployed in the zone around the enclave and along the
Armenian border. The Army also has the largest concentration of conscript
soldiers that serve 18-months on active service, while conscripts with
university education serve 12 months.
The joint air/air defense forces are approximately 7,900 strong and
include a combination of combat assets to support both offensive and defensive
air operations. The air element reports holdings of 47 combat aircraft3
and 15 attack helicopters39, which along with the other
non-reportable aircraft are organized into five functional commands: a fighter
ground-attack regiment; a fighter squadron; a transport squadron; a training
unit; and a composite helicopter regiment. The air defense elements comprise
fighter units (in their primary role, these units also are considered
part of the offensive air element), surface-to-air gun/missile units,
and air defense surveillance radar units. Initially, much of the equipment and
command and control systems were taken over from the former 19th Independent
Air Defense Army, with only marginal upgrades to the network since
independence. The various air units are built around a mix
of aircraft types because several
of the legacy units were heavily attrited during the Mountainous
Karabakh conflict, which claimed over 50 aircraft, including Mi-24 (Hind-attack
helicopters), Mi-8 (support helicopters), Su-25 (Frogfoot-close air support),
MiG-25PB (Foxbat- reconnaissance, used as fighter-bombers) and L-29
(Delphin/Maya-armed trainers) aircraft.
The small Azerbaijani Navy's assets and equipment are based on the 25
percent portion of the former Soviet Caspian Flotilla Baku received under the
terms of a CIS agreement (March 1992). Turkey and the U.S. have also
contributed several newer patrol craft. The Azerbaijani Navy is second in size
only to Russia's
Caspian Sea Flotilla but far distant in operational capabilities, and is
comprised of approximately 20 ships and 1,750 personnel. There is one frigate,
but the bulk of the surface combatants are smaller patrol boats that operate
effectively in the coastal waters on anti-smuggling, anti-poaching, oil field
security and similar types of operations.
Although no formal reserve system has been established, Azerbaijan does
have a reserve base of approximately 300,000 personnel that have served in the
armed forces in some capacity since 1993. These personnel could conceivably be
mobilized in time of war and be used as individual replacements to fill out
existing formations or as a base for additional light infantry or support
formations.
Assessment
Since the establishment of the armed forces in September 1991, the high
command has consistently displayed significant shortcomings in establishing an
effective national defense force, despite the nationalization of large
quantities of former Soviet military hardware, much of it currently of doubtful
operational readiness/capability. The legacy forces that they inherited were
structured, equipped and trained to fight the Soviet Union's
wars, as were the doctrine and tactics supporting them. Such forces soon proved
to be inappropriate for Azerbaijan's
actual security needs and reform was needed. Some of the critical initial steps
have been taken, but the forces are still tied to equipment sets that are
rapidly aging and falling into more critical disrepair. Other factors
contributing to the low readiness levels of many formations are:
o Manpower shortages that are affected by low conscription rates, poor
living conditions and morale that contribute to high desertions rates and poor
quality of service, and shortfalls in the retention of junior officers and
NCOs;
o The short-term of service for conscripts, which adds to unit training
burdens and to the personnel turbulence at unit level, and restricts the level
of technical skill and competence one can expect;
o Poor, unstructured training
that focuses at the small unit level, with little opportunity for brigade or
combined arms training.
In addition, the leadership's early attempts to play a role in political
affairs contributed to the government's reluctance to trust the military and to
view it as a possible power base for future opposition. Leadership positions
within the force have been politicized, with many of the more qualified leaders
and potential innovators falling by the wayside. Effective command and control
has been made extremely difficult for several reasons, including internal
political feuding; a lack of experienced, dedicated and professional senior
officers; and corruption, which remains a serious problem even in the upper
echelons of the Defense Ministry - as is the case in the other countries of the
region.
Although there are some exceptions, the readiness and combat capability
of the Azerbaijani force is generally thought to remain behind that of its
principal rival, the Armenian national army and the Armenian forces of
Mountainous Karabakh. Azerbaijan has a superior air capability on paper, though
its initial use of air superiority in the Karabakh conflict was lost, as
foreign pilots were no longer being recruited and paid, and spare parts and
even jet fuel came in short supply. That is
likely different today, although it is unlikely that Azerbaijan's forces
could successfully conduct offensive operations against Armenian forces, partly
due to the difficulty of using air force with precision in the mountainous
terrain in the region and given the technological level of Azerbaijan's Air
Force. Moreover, Armenia's
nominal lack of an Air Force may be mitigated by
the transfer of MiG-23 and other aircraft from Russian bases in Georgia to Armenia. In
general, it is unclear to what extent Armenia has control over the Air
assets on its territory, including the advanced MiG-29 Aircraft that are under
Russian command in Armenia.
However, long-term economic trends favor Azerbaijan and, with the proper
funding and a good reform program, Azerbaijan could be on the way to
overcoming many of these problems. Moreover, many of the other security
challenges that Azerbaijan
faces require only small force commitments and the development of a few elite,
higher readiness formations; and this should be the focus of future reform and
modernization efforts. In fact, an elite force known as the Nakhchivan
battalion has already been created, and is considered to be of high quality.
It should be mentioned that recent signs indicate substantial
improvements, at least in selected parts of the armed forces. The United States
Department of Defense recently conducted a defense assessment in Azerbaijan,
which showed improvements in the performance of the armed forces and came out
generally on a more positive tone than expected. In addition, DoD officials
laud the performance of the Azerbaijani peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, Afghanistan
and Iraq.
As far as the Army is concerned, much of the ground combat equipment
that Azerbaijan
inherited from the Soviet Armed Forces in 1991 was dated then and has continued
to deteriorate because of poor maintenance and a chronic shortage of spare
parts, repair and testing equipment, and qualified mechanics. As a result, the
quality and readiness of much of its equipment is a problem, as many systems are
non-operational, cannibalized for parts, or operating at less than optimal
status. Moreover, if it is to remain operationally effective, much of the older
generation equipment is in need of systems upgrades and modernization, e.g.
communication packages, fire control and target acquisition systems, and so on.
As a result, the readiness levels and operational capabilities vary
significantly between units. Put simply, the Azerbaijani Army is in need of a
major maintenance transformation and systems modernization even more so than
its Armenian adversary. A positive step in this direction could well have been
taken with Baku's
latest military cooperation agreement with Russia that included the sale of
critical spare parts and the provision of technical assistance.40
As noted earlier, much of the Army's heavy combat equipment is not
appropriate for many of the newer security concerns and mission requirements.
Performance in the conflict with Armenian forces highlighted a number of
shortcomings. Not only are there requirements for modern munitions and
technology but the quality of leadership, training and morale also need to be
vastly improved. From a force structure and capabilities perspective, the newer
mission requirements demand light, mobile and sustainable formations to
confront guerillas, help protect the country's extensive energy sector - such
as the production and distribution infrastructure, international deployments in
support of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, and effective operations
with multinational forces. The ongoing crisis with Armenia and Karabakh, however,
require the retention of a mechanized capability as well.
The state of readiness of most of Azerbaijan's military forces
severely limits what the Army can do. Given the terrain along the Armenian and
Karabakh borders and Azerbaijan's superiority in numbers, the Army can contain
the forces in Karabakh, but they do not currently seem to have the combat power
or capability to reclaim the lost territory, whose
terrain favors the
defending forces.They are,however developing and should be able to
maintain several elite formations to support their evolving new missions and
international obligations. Toward this end, the U.S. has committed itself to the
training of an Azerbaijani Peace Support Operations (PSO) formation. This, of
course, is very different capabilities compared to an offensive war in the
mountains.
Although the exact operational readiness of the Azerbaijani Air Force is
unknown, it is clear that its operational capabilities are limited, as flight
time and training is severely restricted by a chronic lack of spare parts and
adequate maintenance, and funding constraints. As a result, the majority of the
force's fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft are not operational, operating at less
than
full capability, or in storage. The air force's training and maintenance
problems are exacerbated by the number of different types of air-frames in the
inventory, many in small numbers, as well as the advanced age of most of these
air-frames, which are either close to or past their expected flying life and
have not had necessary life extension overhauls and/or system upgrades. The age
of most
of these aircraft; the outdated avionics, weapons systems, target
acquisition and targeting systems; and the limited aircrew training severely
limit the roles these aircraft can effectively perform. The fighter squadron
cannot effectively prevent incursions by any modern air force, but in their
regional environment, they can provide limited air cover for ground or
naval operations. Close air support is the air force's principal mission,
however, the best mix of aircraft or weapons appears to be absent. Only two of
the Su-25 (Frogfoot) close air support aircraft remain operational and
available munitions are limited to dumb bombs and guided rockets, not any type
of precision-guided munitions. Moreover, these older aircraft are not
configured to deliver such weapon systems, as the on-board targeting systems
cannot effectively support their delivery, and the pilots are not trained to
employ them. The air force has been trying to upgrade its ground attack
capability for several years, but funding constraints have so far restricted
any modernization.
The backbone of the country's strategic air defense brigade is built
upon 20 and 30 year old SAM systems that have only marginal utility against
modern air forces, but they do provide a limited defense against possible
regional aggression.
Much of Azerbaijan's navy remains crippled by poor maintenance, parts
shortages and serviceability, with many of the craft non-operational or not
fully operational.4' Among the navy's biggest challenges are
improving the operational capabilities and readiness rates of its craft, and
the recruitment, solid training, improved morale and retention of a cadre of
young professional officers and development of a viable NCO corps. The navy can patrol the
country's coastal waters, but it does not have enough operational craft to
effectively protect the coast. The navy should be able to respond to
small-scale incidents and given time, training, and some modernization, it may
be able to support limited sea denial missions.
Azerbaijan needs both a major
equipment modernization and a re-equipment program, but this is unlikely to
occur while the armed forces continue their costly effort to restructure and
reform. The MoD will continue to piecemeal its modernization efforts, taking
advantage where possible of military assistance and equipment transfer programs
from partners such as Turkey
and the U.S.
As critical as modernization is needed, it is possibly even more important to
force readiness for the military to effectively upgrade the logistics and
maintenance programs supporting their existing systems. Financially, MoD hopes
that increased production of the country's energy resources will both improve
the economy and bring additional assets for military reform.42
Despite the 15 percent growth in the MoD budget over the last two years,
reporting suggests that there was neither enough funding to pay off the
Ministry's significant debt nor was there a significant improvement in the very
poor conditions of service prevalent among the services.
The country's military strategy has long been pre-occupied with fighting
a defensive campaign against Karabakh Armenian forces, but changes in the
country's security environment have highlighted a number of new mission
requirements and the need for a broader range of military capabilities for each
of the services. To be successful, this modernization effort must be well
scripted, funded and will take time. There are no indications that such a plan
has been developed.
As mentioned earlier, the problem of poor equipment readiness is
compounded by the lack of consistent and regimented training at the individual,
small unit, battalion and brigade, and then combined arms levels. Training
teams from Turkey
are working with the Azerbaijanis to refine their training techniques and
procedures, bringing them more in line with NATO standards.
Georgia
The early development of the armed forces in independent Georgia was
beset by a number of problems, including: the fact that the government had
failed to gain full control of Georgian territory and many independent and
quasi-official paramilitary units continued to exist and hold allegiance to
regional, rather than the national leadership.
During the early-1990s, a young cadre
of officers occupied most of the army's senior positions despite their
lack of any formal higher military education or experience. The subsequent collapse
into civil war, and continued presence of small militias, contributed to the
problem of establishing civil-control of the military establishment. The
Georgian army acquired its hardware from Soviet units formerly stationed in
the Georgian SSR, including; 109 tanks, 164 APCs and some helicopters
and fixed wing aircraft.43 In the mid 1990s, Revaz Adamia, former
chairman of the parliamentary defense committee,
highlighted his concerns about the development of a viable military that
addressed Georgia's
emerging security challenges, noting, "We are building a typical Soviet
army".44
Simultaneously, internecine squabbling amongst the various government
bodies, lack of political direction for military reform, the deep scars of
civil conflict, problems emanating from Soviet legacy forces and inadequate
defense budgets combined to cripple attempts to successfully reform the
Georgian armed forces. Georgia
remained heavily dependent upon Russian weapons and equipment throughout its
formative years, and often discovered that Moscow was in no hurry to meet its
requirements. Consequently, its armed forces were often left without the spares
(parts and supplies) necessary to maintain the equipment's operational
readiness or sufficient ammunition even to conduct live-fire military
exercises.
The shortage of experienced officers capable of providing essential
leadership and direction to the reform process was also an inhibitive factor in
the early development of the Georgian armed forces. No Georgian officers had
graduated from Soviet military academies since 1985, and many of the middle and
lower level officers were removed from the armed forces following the 1994
purges that followed the resignation of General Ghia Qarqarashvili, former
Minister of Defense. Consequently, in order to address the lack of sufficient
numbers of commanders for platoons, reserve officers were drafted into units
and in turn, their lack of appropriate experience often presaged their
desertion from the army.45 By 1999, desertion had reached staggering
proportions, reportedly around 3,000 in that year, attributed to poor living
conditions, lack of respect for military superiors and the low reputation of
the armed forces within Georgian society.4 There seemed little or no
guidance on reform from the political leadership, nor from an increasingly
corrupt Ministry of Defense.
Structure
The active armed forces include 17,500 personnel (including 5,800
centrally controlled staff and 10,400 conscripts). The forces remain
conscript-based and comprise three arms of service: ground forces, joint air
force and air defense forces, and navy, as well as a reserve base.
The army is the largest service with around 8,620 personnel (including
1,578 National Guard and 5,572 conscripts). Conscript service is compulsory for
males aged 18-27, serving for 18 months. The structure of the ground forces has
undergone considerable change within its short history, until 2001 the ground
forces consisted of two Operational Directions; Western Operational Direction
with its HQ in Kutaisi, and Eastern Operational Direction, HQ in Telavi.
Numerous units including training centers, communications, engineers and rapid
reaction units, support the 11 and 22n Motor Rifle Brigades. As a
result of reforms carried out in 2002, the Operational Directions were
eliminated, resulting in the reorganization of the ground forces staff.
Therefore, the ground forces now consist of a Land Forces HQ, 2 Motor Rifle
Brigades, 1 National Guard Brigade and its training center, 1 Artillery
Regiment, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion, 2 Marine Infantry Battalions (1 cadre), 1
Peacekeeping Battalion and 1 Special Forces Battalion.47 The Army
remains heavily mechanized and still has 86 tanks (T-72S and T-55S), 185
armored combat vehicles, more than no pieces of artillery (more than 100mm),
and 15 attack helicopters. The key challenge for the army will be managing the
transition from Soviet legacy forces towards small, mobile, highly trained and
combat-ready formations, with an adequate support structure for the rapid
deployment of its elite formations.
The joint air and air defense forces, with principal bases at Kopitnari,
Marneuli and Tbilisi
[from amongst the 20 formerly functioning airfields], consist of 1,250
personnel (including 490 conscripts). Its fixed wing aircraft include: 7 Su-25
(Frogfoot) and 5 non-operational Su-17
(Fitter). Transport aircraft include: 4 An-2 (Colt), 1 Yak-i8T (Max), 2
Yak-40 (Codling) and 1 TU-134A (Crusty); training aircraft: 4 Yak-52s, 9 L-29
(Delphin/Maya) and 2 Mi-2 helicopters (Hoplite). Its attack helicopters, based
at Tbilisi,
include: 3 Mi-24 (Hind), 4 Mi-8/17 (Hip), and 8
UH-iH (Huey). Its SAM systems consist of 75 Sa-2/-3/-4/-5/-7.48
In 1990, the Georgian based Soviet air force operated around 190 tactical
aircraft, 55 inceptors and more than 40 helicopters.
All Soviet aviation units were withdrawn by mid 1992, affecting the
creation of the Georgian air force. Tbilisi
built Su-25s reportedly entered service
shortly afterwards. Loses of aircraft during the conflict with rebel forces in
Abkhazia set back the air force, which was neglected in the remainder of the
1990s. Problems relating to pay and inadequate living conditions further
undermined this arm of service, afflicted by poor standards in training,
aircraft maintenance and operational doctrine.
Georgia's Naval forces are
modest, totaling 1,830 personnel (including 670 conscripts), with its HQ and
its main port on the Black Sea at Poti. It is
responsible for the defense of Georgia's
territorial waters, coastal strategic facilities and supporting combined and
joint maritime operations. Naval assets include 11 patrol and coastal
combatants and 4 small amphibious craft. It is currently being assisted in its
development through Georgia's
close bilateral relationship with Greece.
Assessment
Georgia has made some progress
towards successful reform of its armed forces, though the process remains in
the early stages and achievements are still modest, in practical terms. Since
its inception the force structure has undergone changes and downsizing,
witnessed the introduction of NCOs albeit in an embryonic stage, and devised a
structure for foreign language training that will require further improvement.
Military education is conducted at the Cadet Corps, the Defense Academy
and in the NCO Training Center.
Foreign language training has been introduced at the National Defense
Academy, offering
English, French, German and Turkish courses. A Greek language course is offered
at the Poti Naval base, and additional English language courses at the Kodori Training
Center. The Georgian MoD
also offers further access to language courses, with France, Germany, Greece,
Turkey, the UK and the U.S. have supported all these initiatives on a bilateral
basis. Key to future success in raising the numbers of officers with adequate
foreign language training skills, so vital in attaining interoperability with
NATO forces, will depend on deepening and broadening the work of these centers
with greater support from NATO and its member states. Equally, all the training
aimed at introducing an NCO cadre into the Georgian armed forces will
necessitate complimentary social and personnel development programs, providing
a full range of support to the NCOs and encouraging the pursuit of a long-term
military career.
Georgia is also giving
attention to the development and enhancement of its Special Forces. These
formations, which are directly subordinate to the MoD, are lightly armed mobile
units that are designed for rapid reaction in response to emergencies and critical
situations. They are charged with a
broad-range of tasks, to include: special operations, counter-terrorism and
'low-intensity' conflict, humanitarian missions, and search and rescue (SAR)
operations. These units are receiving higher priority owing to the presence of
militants in the Pankisi gorge and Georgia's determination to
demonstrate that it can deal with such internal threats. The peacekeeping
battalion is located at Nikozi, Samachablo, with representative offices in
nearby Tskhinvali and Zugdidi, Abkhazia.49 Peacekeeping deployments
at company level can be supported through six monthly rotations from the
peacekeeping battalion and from units within the n Motor Rifle Brigade. These
elite units, though high priority and crucial in emergency situations, cannot
be readily deployed abroad without host nation support. Their training
facilities also require upgrading to NATO standards in order to ensure greater
capacity for joint exercises.50
In addition to continued reform of its elite units Georgia also
requires enhanced air capabilities, particularly in improving its troop
mobility and will therefore need security assistance to meet such needs. Its
maritime defense capabilities will also depend upon continued western support,
in
he areas of training, equipment, operational procedures, generating a
cadre of professionally trained officers capable of planning and conducting
operations with Georgia's
western partners.
Overall standards within the armed forces can only be expected to
improve gradually, and will be inhibited by the cost of defense reform as well
as the task of upgrading aging Soviet systems and equipment. Georgia's
current priorities are foreign language training, military training and
education, enhancing its peacekeeping capabilities and interoperability
and developing adequate training programs for elite formations and prioritizing
its participation in joint military exercises.
Conclusion
As this brief assessment suggests, the militaries of all three states
are currently confronting a number of significant problems and challenges as
they work to strengthen the foundation of their armed forces and adjust to the
rapidly evolving new security environment that they must now manage. Although
all three states are involved internationally, the commitments are generally
small and supported by assets and personnel from a few elite formations, with
most of the force still struggling with readiness issues. All three states are
in the midst of reform and restructuring programs that they know must be
effectively completed, but they are often challenged to resolve how to proceed.
To this end, they are looking outside for necessary guidance and military
assistance to support the process of change and the development of the skilled, professional personnel to
both manage and command the planning elements and combat assets of their future
force.
V. Western
Security Assistance to the States of the South Caucasus
Over the past decade, the level of western security assistance to the South Caucasus has continuously increased. It has taken
the form of multilateral assistance, mainly through PfP, but also significant
amounts of bilateral assistance, involving states as varied as the U.S., Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom,
and other European states. Among these, American assistance has been present in
all three countries, with an emphasis on Georgia, as Armenia and Azerbaijan were
until recently only eligible for limited security assistance. Turkey has been
a crucial provider of security assistance to Azerbaijan and Georgia, while Greece has been
important in Georgia.
This assistance is often complementary to the multilateral assistance provided
through NATO, and occasionally coordinated among donors, as has been the case
with U.S.
and U.K.
assistance to Georgia and U.S.
and Turkish assistance to Azerbaijan.
Armenia
Although relations with the U.S. have been generally friendly, any
military assistance was constrained by Yerevan's near security dependence on
Russia and U.S. legislation limiting the types of assistance that could be
provided.5' On March 29, 2002, the U.S. State Department removed
Armenia from the list of countries barred from receiving U.S. military and
security assistance under the U.S. International Traffic in Arms (ITAR)
restrictions.52 Armenia's Minister of Defense visited Washington not
long after this announcement to discuss future U.S. security assistance. The
meetings reportedly included plans for enhanced Armenian participation in PfP,
the training of an Armenian peacekeeping unit with Greek assistance,53
and efforts to improve the military's interoperability with NATO.54
In October 2003, Armenia announced the deployment of a platoon (30 soldiers) to
Kosovo as part of Greece's peacekeeping battalion in the U.S. commanded
Multi-National Brigade (East).55
Before 9/11, Washington's
military engagement program with Armenia was limited and the types
of activities that they could sponsor constrained by restrictive Congressional
legislation.56 This post-9/11 U.S. Congressional action, lifting
its restrictions on military assistance to Armenia, opened the door for direct
military aid and U.S.
military assistance programs that have since increased significantly. Annual
security-related U.S.
assistance almost doubled to $10 million in
2002, nearly doubled again to more than $18 million in 2003 and is
expected to increase yet again in 2004.57 Current U.S. programs are
focused on professional military education, establishment of
peacekeeping capabilities for the Armenian military, modernization of
military communications, and development of prevention capabilities to counter
weapons proliferation and other illicit trafficking.58 In FY 2002,
six personnel were sent to the U.S.
for training and DoD-sponsored 100
Armenian military officers and civilian officials for training at the George C.
Marshall Center
in Garmisch, Germany, with these numbers
expected to rise slightly for both 2003 and 2004. These programs look to
promote interoperability and regional stability. As one of the first major
in-country training activities, Special Operations Forces conducted training on
demining in all three countries (2001). This humanitarian effort was intended
to help the three states better deal with countless land mines remaining from
the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Abkhazia-Georgia conflicts.59 Most
recently (April 2004), Armenia and the U.S. signed an agreement for the
provision of mutual services, which ensures that rear or logistical support is
provided to parties (Armenia) when carrying out joint actions or exercises with U.S. forces. ° Armenia is also
in negotiation with U.S. European Command for the future deployment of a
peacekeeping platoon to Iraq.
'
Despite these inroads by the West, Russia continues to be the leading
provider of security assistance. Overtime, Armenia may be able to lessen its
reliance on Moscow for security assistance, but because of their continued
dependence on Soviet legacy equipment and high levels of direct Russian
military assistance, it will remain tied to Russia for certain types of assistance
and stocks for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Yerevan has ratified a number of important
security treaties with Moscow,
to include a mutual assistance treaty and agreements on the long-term
stationing of Russian forces in Armenia.
Russia
remains the principal guarantor of Armenia's security. There are
differing opinions about the degree of Armenia's dependence on Russia, with
many in the West believing that their margin of maneuver is limited, while the
Armenians see that they have much more flexibility in pursuing their own
interests; reality likely lies somewhere in between these two extremes. Armenia
describes this approach to foreign and security policy as a policy of
"complementarity," through which it seeks to balance its links with
both Russia
and NATO.
Azerbaijan
Congress restricted direct U.S. military assistance to Azerbaijan in
response to Baku's
trade and transportation embargo of Armenia during and following the NK
conflict. Section 907a of the Freedom Support Act was imposed at the behest of
the Armenian lobby in Congress in early 1992. This Act, which was considered
contrary to U.S.
national interest by each successive President, was waived in October 2001 to
reward Azerbaijan's
"support for the U.S.
campaign against international terrorism". 3 This post'9/11
action opened the door for the provision of direct military aid for the first
time and U.S. military/security assistance programs have increased
significantly since then, with only $2.3 million in 2001, $13.6 million in 2002 and an estimated more than $20 million in 2003. 5
In July 2002, an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) was established at the
U.S. Embassy in Baku
to manage the anticipated growth in U.S. military assistance
activities. The U.S.
signed a major security assistance agreement with Azerbaijan (2002) 7,
which defined the focus of its assistance efforts, to include:
o Upgrading air space control
and air traffic safety at civilian and military airports, in accordance with
NATO standards;
o Training officers in the U.S.;
o Training an Azerbaijani
peacekeeping unit and improving the protection of the country's land borders;
o Enhancing its naval
capabilities, so as to secure its maritime borders and protect its economic
zone and territorial waters.
There was also a continued emphasis on language training, emergency
preparedness training and border control. For FY 2002, the U.S. increased
security-related assistance programs to enhance Azerbaijan's export control and
border security systems, particularly maritime border security;
promote military reform with training at U.S. institutions; and facilitate Azerbaijan's
PfP participation.
Security programs include the professional and technical training of
Azeri military personnel at U.S.
training schools, initially focused on English Language Training (ELT),
enhanced airspace
management, and enhanced interoperability with the U.S., NATO, and
other international organizations. In FY 2002, 56 Azerbaijani military officers
and civilian officials attended training
provided through the George
C. Marshall Center
in Garmisch, Germany, with this number expected
to rise slightly for both 2003 and 2004.
Turkey has concluded a number
of military cooperation agreements with Azerbaijan and its military has
been deeply involved in providing a broad range of military assistance. To
support their growing number of programs, the Turkish military established a
management office in Baku
and there is a growing presence of Turkish officers, trainers and technicians working across the
military, from MoD/Joint Staff Headquarters, to the training centers and down
to the tactical level. They are looking to technically enhance capability and
interoperability with a number of equipment upgrade projects, such as fitting
of T-72 main battle tanks with Turkish tactical radios. In training, Turkish
trainers (individuals and teams) have been working in Azerbaijan
training trainers and helping to improve local training facilities and
programs, and the training of Azerbaijani officers at Turkish military schools
and at the military academy in Ankara.
° The country's main military training school is the Military Academy
in Baku.
Turkish officers have played a key role in reorganizing the Academy and
updating its training programs and curriculum. After two-years of effort by
dozens of Turkish military personnel working to improve the quality of training
in the Academies, especially in the junior officer programs, the Turks declared
in early 2002 that the programs and curriculum were up to "NATO standard".70"
There are a growing number of NATO informed junior officers graduating from
these programs, with the bulk of them coming from the J. Naxcivanski Military
Academy. Its first graduation class was 600 officers.7' A small
number of cadets and junior commanders study at Turkish military schools and
the Military Academy in Ankara, or in one of the other countries supporting
their training, such as the U.S. and Pakistan.72
In the end, however, Azerbaijan
has found that, because of their continued dependence on the Soviet legacy
equipment, they remain tied to Russia
for certain types of assistance and stocks. After a number of years of neglect,
Moscow renewed
efforts to improve its relations with Azerbaijan and they have improved
markedly since Putin's visit to Baku
in 2000; and, during his visit in February 2003, Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Ivanov signed a new military cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan's
Defense Minister, Safar Abiyev. This
pact establishes a framework for future
arms sales, including heavy weapons and spare parts, and the training of
military personnel.73
Georgia
In 1998, the International Security Advisors Board (ISAB) produced a set
of recommendations to establish a conceptual basis for reforming the security
system in Georgia,
and outlined necessary steps to achieve institutional changes of the existing
system. The initial document covered strategic to operational issues and was
followed up by a U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Evaluation Team in 2000, working
in-country to complete a "Full Scale Defense Assessment". In 2001,
EUCOM issued another assessment document, "Combat Capabilities Final
Report on Georgia".74 Together these three documents establish
the basis for restructuring Georgia's armed forces, as well as the country's broader
security system. Nonetheless, many of the recommendations made by EUCOM have
not been implemented in Georgia
owing to the lack of funding and trained personnel, compounded by the lack of
political will under the Shevardnadze regime.
In order to facilitate the various foreign assistance programs, the
following international cells are working in close cooperation with the
Georgian MoD:
O ISAB (not resident in Georgia)
O U.S. EUCOM Joint Contact Team (former Military Liaison
Team)
O Turkish consultants form DAKOK
O Turkish instructors in the Commando Battalion
O Turkish instructors on Marneuli Air Base
O German Advisor on Logistics
O German Advisor on NCO training
O Greek Advisor in the Georgian Navy
O UK Advisor in the Planning
Programming and Budgeting (PPB).75
Foreign assistance to the Georgian armed forces is currently focused on
the following: The 11 Motor
Rifle Brigade; Military
Education and Training
(in Georgia and abroad);
Logistics; Navy; Resources management; Peacekeeping activities; the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting (PPB) process; Language Training (English is the
priority, as well as French, German, Greek, Italian and Turkish).7
The U.S. has been a major provider of direct military assistance to
Georgia, with its security assistance in 2001 totaling $39.6 million77,
$31.7 million in 2002 and $41.4 million in 2003, with the total expected to
grow even further in 2004.7 These totals are significantly higher
(nearly double) than the assistance provided to Azerbaijan during the same
period, and include the full range of security assistance programs, including
the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) Assistance Program. The
GBSLE has been an element of the State Department's Export Control and Related
Border Security (EXBS) Program, and remains the largest single U.S.
Government-funded assistance program in Georgia. In 2002, for instance, the
U.S.
provided $17 million in GBSLE assistance to the Georgian Border Guards
(GBG)/Georgian Coast Guard (GCG), Georgian Customs Service (GCS), Ministry of
Defense (MoD) and other export and border control and law enforcement agencies,
totaling more than $89 million between 1998-2002. GBSLE assistance has helped Georgia control
its borders since the 1998 departure of Russian border guards, though the
country's border security remains vulnerable. Continued conflict in Chechnya poses
a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. In
2003, Georgia
became eligible to receive U.S. Excess Defense Articles, which will help to
promote further its defense reform.79
The development of a small, well-trained, English- or French-speaking
cadre is a necessary beginning if the militaries in this region are to support
increased interaction with NATO and the
development of their long-term PSO programs, since these are the recognized
operational languages within the Alliance.
This cadre must be able to speak and understand the military-technical aspects
of English well enough to appreciate the military message implicit in an
instruction or order. ° These states have taken the first steps toward
developing that cadre of linguists by sending a small contingent of officers to
the U.S.
for ELT. A common operational language is essential in the decision-making chain
where tasking is concerned. For PSOs, this will require ELT capabilities down
to, at least, company and possibly platoon-level.
Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)
In May 2002, the U.S.
initiated the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), costing $64 million,
which is the largest and most significant political and/or military assistance
program, to date. The two-year program is aimed at enhancing the
counterterrorist capabilities of the Georgian army, and helping to alleviate
tension between Georgia and Russia that was caused in part by Tbilisi's
apparent inability to deal with the gangs of Chechen and other militants basing
themselves in the Pankisi Gorge82. The program itself
features a time-phased training program that is conducted in-country in close
cooperation with the Georgian MoD, with its key focus on training the Georgian
16 Mountain Battalion, 113 Light Infantry Battalion and 11 Motor Rifle Brigade.
83 Its early stages, which were conducted under Special Operations
Command Europe (SOCEUR), concentrated on the Georgian MoD and Land Forces
Command, and looked to enhance their effectiveness in creating and sustaining
standard operating procedures, training plans, and a property accounting
system. The curriculum supporting the training program included
performance-oriented practical exercises. Tactical training, consisting
of approximately 100 days per unit, is designed to instruct the Georgian
battalions in light infantry tactics, platoon-level
offensive and defensive operations and airmobile tactics. 84
This curriculum includes basic
individual skills; combat
lifesaver; radio operator procedures; land navigation; human rights education;
and combat skills, including rifle marksmanship, movement techniques and squad
and platoon tactics. 85
Those trained and subsequently entering service in one of the target
battalions do so on a professional basis, signing contracts on the completion
of their training, thus enhancing the readiness and combat capability of the
battalions. Furthermore, the participation of Georgian border troops and two
platoons from the Interior Ministry (MVD) ensures greater cooperation and
interoperability amongst Georgia's
military and security forces. 87 However, the plague of desertion
and low morale among these units, even within the most elite units, has
hindered the overall effectiveness of the GTEP.
Georgia also supported the
program by its adoption of NATO standards, not only in training but also for
the whole army, moving to discard Soviet military tradition within the Georgian
armed forces. This action is entirely consistent with the political target of
Georgian membership in the Alliance
[NATO]. 88 Nevertheless, GTEP has had its critics within Georgia. For
example, issues such as frequent requests for more equipment made by the
Georgian MoD as GTEP unfolded, together with problems persuading the Georgian
MoD to devise a blueprint for future training after the scheduled departure of U.S. military
advisors in May 2004. Despite the initial success of GTEP, the program's
implementation has revealed the gross ineptitude and lack of forward planning
that continues to plague the Georgian MoD. 89
In addition to GTEP, Turkey
is providing training for Georgia's
Commando Battalion. Turkey's
security assistance to Georgia
also includes sponsorship of the reform of the Military Academy
along similar lines to the Turkish
General Staff Academy, which mirrors their effort in Azerbaijan.
Since 1999, it has financed, with the exception of salaries, the participation
of the Georgian platoon in Kosovo.90 Greece is helping in the
reorganization of the Navy. In March 2003, Athens agreed on the transfer of a Fast
Patrol Missile Guided Boat (La Commbattante II) at a cost of 22 million
Euros to help bolster the capabilities of the Georgian Navy. Significantly,
rather than merely aiding the Georgian armed forces through the
provision of hardware, Greece not only intends to provide the hardware, but
also plans to train the required 40 man crew in Greece, which will facilitate
the successful introduction of the vessel into service.91 On a
bilateral basis, Georgia sends its cadets, officers and senior staff officers
to Estonia (BALTDEFCOL), France, Italy, Germany, Greece, UK, U.S. and Turkey.92
Coordinating Security Assistance
In order to address issues resulting from any duplication or conflict in
the various bilateral security assistance programs, Georgia has conducted annual
military political staff talks with its partners. The scale of the managerial
task involved in properly coordinating international assistance has proven
challenging to the MoD and its mechanisms for achieving progress are evolving.
Plans are currently being examined in Tbilisi to establish a Joint Security
Working Group within the MoD, which will be tasked with defining, planning and
evaluating the assistance programs and ensuring minimal overlap and proper
coordination in practice.93 The challenge of harmonizing
international security assistance to Georgia, which could become a force
multiplier, clearly represents an area where NATO planners could offer valuable
assistance. The most common solution to such problems lies in establishing a
team within the J-5 responsible for coordinating all international security
assistance activities and managing this area for the MoD. However, its actual
success hinges upon the existence of a time-phased program driving military
reform, with clear goals and an understanding within the MoD of why and how the
reforms are being developed, programmed and implemented, as well as a clear
appreciation of when, where and how external military assistance fits into this
national reform program. The recent appointment of the new Defense Minister and
his stated plans to reform the ministry and "clean
house" may be an important indication that the new Georgian
government is committed to these goals.
Conclusion
Since independence, the states of the South
Caucasus have all looked beyond the region for military
assistance. In the beginning, the principal provider was Russia, as it
represented the link to the Soviet Army that they all knew and whose equipment
and other assets they all inherited. It
took time, but a number of Western militaries are making inroads into the region and now providing a
broad range of military assistance. As noted earlier, the principal mentor for
both Azerbaijan
and Georgia
has been the Turkish military, with the U.S. becoming more directly
involved post-9/11. Although Armenia
is now receiving nominal military assistance from Western states, it remains
heavily tied to Russia
for its security assistance. Although the bilateral Western military assistance
programs are providing positive inputs, the programs are not as well focused
and managed to insure that what is provided fits into an established,
time-phased national reform program. The national general/joint staffs
generally have not been effective in planning and managing these programs and
they are looking outside for direct assistance in better managing them, but
more importantly developing the staff officers and procedures necessary to
successfully do this on their own. They, especially Azerbaijan and Georgia, have been
looking to NATO and its member states for the critical training and guidance
needed. However, because of the continued dependence of all three countries on
their Soviet legacy equipment stocks, they all remain tied to Russia for
certain types of assistance and stocks. The current inability of any of these
countries to afford a major equipment modernization program ensures an
important role for Russia
- for the foreseeable future - in their efforts to improve the readiness and
operational capability of their forces.
VI. The Role of
Partnership for Peace in the South Caucasus
NATO's presence in the Caucasus is
currently most visibly seen in the growing role PfP is playing. During the
1990s, NATO's relationship with the countries in this region, which has been
traditionally regarded by Russia
as within its sphere of influence, evolved very slowly, as ongoing ethnic
conflict and the seemingly intractable issue of Mountainous Karabakh served to
temper the Alliance's
willingness to quickly get engaged in the region and pursue closer relations.
The other fundamental obstacle for NATO involvement in the South
Caucasus is trepidation; both justified and exaggerated, by the
Armenians and Mountainous Karabakh of any Turkish military role in the region,
even if through the NATO alliance. Moreover, the strategic military
relationship between Armenia
and Greece,
although outside the confines of NATO, is also rooted in this apprehension over
Turkey's
potential security cooperation through NATO. All three countries in the South Caucasus joined NATO's Partnership for Peace94
program in April 1994, each sent liaison officers to SHAPE Headquarters in Mons, Belgium
and they have all actively participated in PfP-sponsored activities.
NATO's PfP program, launched in 1994, was initially received with mixed
success in the South Caucasus. Indeed, the
first two years of the initiative witnessed little practical progress in Georgia. This
was hampered to a large extent by the continued strength of Russia's
influence over Georgia's
MoD, which continued until the late 1990's. The initial attempts of the Russian
Federation to transform the CIS into a military alliance in order to counter
its perceived threat from NATO's expansion finally failed in 1996, with the
decisions taken at the OSCE summit in Lisbon in December 1996 that paved the
way for the full participation of CIS countries in the process of Euro-Atlantic
integration contributing to the failure of Moscow's efforts.
By contrast, PfP became NATO's chief tool for deepening its military
cooperation with the states of the South Caucasus, as it proved to be an
effective security cooperation tool, not least in allowing weak, inexperienced
defense structures to learn from the experience of western militaries, but also
in facilitating bilateral relations with NATO member states, such as the Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the UK, the U.S.,
as well as
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Romania.95 Importantly, many of these states, especially the new
NATO accession states, have recently confronted many of the same challenges
that the states of the South Caucasus are
currently working through.
NATO's objectives for PfP include fostering regional security and
stability through peacetime engagement; ensuring access to Caspian Basin energy
resources; combating nontraditional threats such as international terrorisms,
drug trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
containing Russian resurgence at the expense of the sovereignty and/or
territorial integrity of either Georgia or Azerbaijan.96 Lord
Robertson, then Secretary General of NATO, highlighted his perception of the
growing importance of the region by telling a conference on Regional
Cooperation and Partnership with NATO that "the more secure our neighbors
are the more secure we are...European security first of all depends on how well
are neighbors are protected."97
PfP contributed to the education and professionalism of partner states,
promoted democratic control over the armed forces and in general terms promoted
democratic values. NATO was uniquely qualified to carry out this task,
providing a framework for such large-scale efforts. In the South
Caucasus this was especially important as PfP helped in the
building of security systems as well as structures under rather unfavorable
political and economic conditions.
Armenia
Armenia's membership in the CSTO, its close security relationship with
Russia including a Collective Security Treaty and hosting Russian stationed
forces, as well as its historical problems with Turkey, have served to
reinforce the perception in the West that Armenia has no intention of operating
closely with NATO in the foreseeable future. Russia maintains its military
presence in Armenia, consisting of 3,500 personnel, through the 102 Military
base in Gyumri, where 74 tanks, 165 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFVs)
and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), and 84 Artillery systems are located.9
Additionally, Moscow provides the air/air defense assets that form the backbone
of Armenia's strategic air defense, counter air and possibly offensive air
operations. This is important because at least on paper Azerbaijan has
a modest air capability and Armenia
essentially has none of its own. Collectively with the Armenian Armed Forces,
the Russian forces stationed at the 102 Military Base constitute the
Transcaucasian Group of the CSTO. Joint exercises are held frequently. Yerevan provides
considerable backup support for the base. Russia also actively participates
in a joint border guard group (approximately 3,000), including 10 percent
Russian officers, while soldiers and warrant officers are drawn from amongst
local Armenians."
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Armenia has poor relations with the
Alliance.
Indeed its decision to host its first NATO-sponsored military exercise,
"Cooperative Best Effort 2003" (June 16-27, 2003), most certainly signaled the
potential and desire on the part of Armenia for stronger relations with
the Alliance.
"Cooperative Best Effort 2003" featured approximately 400
troops from 19 different NATO and partner countries, including: Armenia,
Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uzbekistan. The exercise was
in fact also remarkable as it witnessed Turkish troops setting foot in
independent Armenia,
albeit only three of them. Given that Yerevan and Ankara have no diplomatic
ties and their shared border remains closed, this was a significant development
and one of the first instances of Turkish
troops setting
foot in Armenia.100 Armenian
uniformed personnel, along with their Azerbaijani and Georgian
counterparts, also attend NATO courses and seminars on crisis management and
peacekeeping in addition to the other exchange activities. Along with
peacekeeping, Armenia
is also looking to improve its ability to cope with and respond to natural
disasters, especially earthquakes; and has been seeking assistance and training
to improve its disaster preparedness capabilities.
As mentioned above, Armenia
has pursued what it describes as a policy of "complementarity" that
seeks to balance its links with both Russia and NATO. Only in this
context can it further develop its cooperation with the Alliance. PfP has thus proven to be a useful
tool of security cooperation with the West and Armenia is participating in more
than thirty PfP activities annually. It wishes to
utilize PfP in order to enhance the level of effectiveness amongst its
officers and command and planning staff(s). Its involvement in NATO military
exercises is expected to continue. Armenia gains politically from its
relations with NATO, using the mechanism of its partnership status to build
good relations with member states. In 2003, Armenia joined PARP, demonstrating
its determination to expand its security ties with NATO, as it seeks
Euro-Atlantic integration."" Yerevan
has also developed its own Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)102
and expects to sign and forward it to NATO later this year (2004).
As noted earlier, Armenia's
participation in NATO's PfP has exposed a small portion of the army and a much
smaller portion of the air force to Western tactics, techniques, procedures and
training methods. Despite this improved exposure to the West, Russia remains
the principal source of training for Armenia's trainers and trainees,
officers, NCOs and technicians. That said, Armenia in 2004 contributed a
platoon of peacekeepers to NATO-led operation in Kosovo, as part of the Greek
forces under the U.S.-led multinational Brigade of KFOR. It also decided to
participate from Summer 2004 in the peacekeeping and reconstruction in Iraq by
providing medical personnel, de-mining troops, and transport trucks.
While Armenia
continues to cooperate with NATO, it holds the Alliance at a respectable distance, as it
remains heavily reliant on its security relationship with Russia. By
contrast, both Azerbaijan
and Georgia
are very proactive in their push for much stronger ties with the Alliance and its members,
offering bases and overflight rights, participating actively in PfP and other
Alliance-sponsored activities, and actively vying for Alliance membership. Moreover, Azerbaijan and Georgia have
fostered bilateral cooperation in a number of areas, including energy security,
most importantly, and the new leaders in both of these countries are looking to
extend that cooperation103; whereas Armenia's relations with Azerbaijan
remains strained due the dispute over Mountainous Karabakh.
In 1999, Azerbaijan
and Georgia
refused to extend their membership in the 1992 Collective Security Treaty,
leaving Armenia
as the sole member of this Moscow-sponsored organization in the South Caucasus. In 2003, this organization was expanded
into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - in theory
constituting a full military alliance.104 Instead of looking back, Azerbaijan and Georgia
deepened their level of participation in PfP and their security cooperation
with NATO by joining the Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan has been an active member
of NATO's PfP and has tried to expand its relationship with the Alliance and its member
states, as a means to satisfy some of its military assistance needs and
counterbalance its perceived threats. Despite monetary and linguistic
constraints, Azerbaijan
has been a very proactive member of PfP and has participated in a wide-range of
Alliance-sponsored activities, has established liaison offices at both NATO and
SHAPE Headquarters, and continues to push its efforts to enhance its
relationship with the Alliance
and individual member states. Turkey
has been the country's strongest supporter in the Alliance and a key mentor to its forces.
Azerbaijan clearly previewed its proposed relationship with NATO in a
March 2001 meeting with the DCINC, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), General
Carlton Fulford, where Defense Minister Safar Abiyev outlined Baku's position
that the establishment of a NATO base in Azerbaijan would serve to
"strengthen peace and stability" in the region. The defense minister
added that the Russian military presence in Armenia posed a threat to Azerbaijan and
contributes to an overall lack of security
in the South Caucasus.105 Then Foreign Minister Vilayet Guliev
affirmed the defense minister's call and stated that Azerbaijan
would welcome a NATO base or a Turkish military base to bolster the region's
balance of power.106
At the NATO Summit in Prague
(November 21-22, 2002),
Azerbaijan
and Georgia
declared their aspiration to join the aliance. In moves to expand Baku's ties to the Alliance and broaden the
training focus from PSOs to interoperability and NATO standardization, it has
entered the PARP program107, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) and developed its own Individual
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).108 Azerbaijan accepted 28
Partnership Goals (PGs) for 2004 and is actively seeking to participate in the
Membership Action Plan (MAP),109 Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE)
System, PfP Trust Fund, and is supporting the opening of a PfP cell in Baku. Azerbaijan also contributes financially
toward its participation in more than 300 PfP activities annually, whereas
other partner states request 100 percent funding from the Alliance, at a cost
of $240,000 in 2002 and $260,000 in 2003.no Although still at an
early stage, PARP has been instrumental in developing stronger ties with NATO,
though its future success will depend upon NATO's continued political
willingness to tailor its aims in accordance with the full spectrum of
priorities for defense reform in Azerbaijan. Baku has also committed a number of
formations and facilities to support PfP activities, see the Table below.
Table 2: Azerbaijan's
Contribution to PfP
|
Quantity
|
Asset
|
|
1
|
Helicopter Unit (2-Mi-8s)
|
|
1
|
Training Center for Battalion/Brigade
Level for Peacekeeping Exercises
|
|
1
|
Air Traffic Control
Services for Overlight Rights Granted to NATO
Member States
|
|
1
|
Airport Facilities and
Services for NATO Aircraft
|
Source: Azerbaijan's Individual Partnership
Plan, 2000-01,
Part II - Partners Forces &
Assets Available
Baku has been expanding the
list of forces for contribution to PfP, to include an infantry company for PSO
or humanitarian operations, a civil defense unit, and either a medical or
logistics team.
Following the government's lead, the Army has become more active
internationally through PfP, other international and bilateral agreements, the
U.S.-led war on international terrorism and participation in international
peacekeeping operations."' Baku
has deployed a platoon (32 soldiers, one senior lieutenant, and one warrant officer)
to Kosovo as part of the Turkish contingent in the German sector of KFOR. The
government is also a member of the Afghanistan peacekeeping coalition and is
supporting the NATO-commanded stabilization force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with a
small force contingent
(23 soldiers).112 In May
2003, the Azerbaijani parliament approved the
deployment of a 150-man peacekeeping force to Iraq, and despite Moscow's
exertion of tremendous pressure to prevent this deployment, it finally occurred
in early August 2003.113 The Azerbaijani PSO battalion has in fact
benefited mainly from bilateral assistance from Turkey, which has proven much
more effective than PfP.114 Reportedly, this is mainly as a result
of Turkey's training assistance being more flexible than a programmed, generic
activity, allowing them to maximize the benefits by concentrating on
Azerbaijan's specific training requirements.
Georgia
Since joining PfP, Georgia has been an active
participant in its activities, including joint exercises, short courses for
staff officers and planning conferences, etc. The country's political and
security elites began to recognize the potential role that NATO could play in
enhancing Georgia's
fragile security, particularly in the aftermath of the "war scare"
that developed with Russia
in the summer
of 2002, resulting from Moscow's
public threat of military intervention in Georgia based on its concerns over
the link between radicals in the Pankisi Gorge and those fighting in Chechnya."5
On September 13, 2002,
the Georgian Parliament passed a resolution confirming the political aim of
eventual NATO membership:
"[T]he Parliament of Georgia confirms that all the major political
forces of the Parliament support the full membership of Georgia in NATO
and recognizes that this decision is a historic choice of
Georgia, justified by the will
of the people, and considers that the aforementioned issue will not become the
subject of further political debates. The Parliament of Georgia declares that Georgia carries
out the process of reforms in the spheres of politics, economics and security,
so that the country in the nearest period can satisfy the criteria necessary
for NATO membership”. 116
Georgia officially declared its
aspiration to join NATO at the Alliance's
Prague Summit in 2002. In both public and private, former President
Shevardnadze and other Georgian government officials signaled a renewed sense
of urgency in deepening relations with the Alliance; President Saakashvili has
underscored this more recently, stating "We closely cooperate with NATO in
the framework of the PfP program and do not change our purposes in regard to
entering this organization". He further indicated that the criteria
necessary for Georgia's
further integration into NATO would be agreed upon at the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004.
"We need stable guarantees of security, and NATO is the only
guarantor", Saakashvili said."117
In general terms, this posturing explains the constant reiteration of
Tbilisi's goals for military reform, namely the creation of small, mobile,
modern forces that are well trained and geared towards NATO interoperability.
With these goals in mind, Georgia's
PfP participation has expanded and become more active, joining PARP,
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Individual Partnership Action Plan
(IPAP). Georgia also agreed to 28 PGs for 2004 and is actively seeking to
participate in the MAP process, ASDE System, and PfP Trust Fund and is
supporting the opening of a PfP cell in Tbilisi.118 On October 1,
2002, a memorandum of understanding on logistic cooperation was signed between
Georgia and NATO's Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO), paving the way
for the implementation of a PfP Trust Fund Project for the demilitarization and
disposal of missile stockpiles and the remediation of Georgian military sites. Georgia also is
maximizing its presence at NATO, with a Mission
and a military representative at NATO HQj and a liaison officer in SHAPE. It
also has forces deployed in Kosovo as part of NATO's peacekeeping forces. This
role in KFOR is seen to demonstrate the country's ability to "effectively
and smoothly" operate with allied peacekeeping forces. Georgia has also made available the
following assets within PfP:
Table 3. Georgia's
Contribution to PfP
|
Quantity
|
Asset
|
|
1
|
Army Company for
Peacekeeping
|
|
1
|
Combat Engineer
Platoon
|
|
1
|
Training Area
|
|
2
|
Airfields
|
|
1
|
Military Harbor (Poti)
|
Source: Georgia's Individual Partnership
Plan, 2000-01,
Part II - Partners Forces &
Assets Available
Georgia's training facilities at Vaziani, which were renovated in 2003
through U.S. and Turkish bilateral assistance, are considered by NATO to meet
Western standards and hosted multinational military exercises in 2002 and 2003.
Its Kopitnari and Marneuli airfields, part of its PfP assets available, have
witnessed improvements, particularly the Marneuli airfield which has undergone
significant modernization (to NATO standards) by Turkey, including a runway repaving
and extension and the replacement of the airfield's electrical system. All PfP
participation has been geared towards the achievement of Georgia's PGs.
One key PG was the creation of a peacekeeping battalion by 2004. Since 1999, Georgia has
participated in the KFOR mission in Bosnia with a platoon (43
personnel), placed under the operational control of the Turkish battalion. In
that period, almost 200 officers, NCOs and soldiers have gained international
peacekeeping experience."9 In June 2003, one Georgian company
(140 personnel) was sent to Kosovo as part of the German-Italian Brigade. The
Georgian MoD has thus sought to prioritize peacekeeping within its PfP program.
Many of Georgia's
other PGs witness no progress towards implementation owing to the restrictions
of funding placed upon the MoD.
Despite the apparent progress in NATO's relationship with Georgia,
privately many Georgian officials have been dissatisfied with PfP. Their
critique centers on the nature and breadth of many of the areas covered and
goals established by PARP, which they see as overly ambitious and perhaps
unrealistic given the current capabilities and weakness of the Georgian armed
forces, not to mention funding constraints; they believe that many of the
programs have lacked focus and failed to appreciate the needs of the Georgian
state that often compete or even conflict with PARP. PARP has proven to be an
important tool in encouraging dialogue, but it has not addressed the key and more immediate issues
affecting the reform and development of the armed forces.
Georgian officers committed to the country's closer partnership with
NATO express concern that meticulously planned PfP programs, which support such
bilateral assistance, should complement U.S. International Military Education
and Training (IMET) sponsored initiatives. Indeed, the argument continues,
NATO's lack of expertise in the region has gone hand in hand with the political
stalemate brought about by Russia's continued military presence and a belief
that NATO does not wish to seriously assist in building Georgia's security
whilst risking its important relations with Moscow.121 The bottom
line is that PfP programs need to be more tailored to Georgia's specific
security needs.
Conclusion
As this chapter indicates, PfP has become NATO's principal vehicle for
deepening the level of its cooperation and engagement with the states of the
region. It has succeeded in this arena and all three states are currently
involved with NATO in at least one peacekeeping operation. PfP also has been
successful in providing these militaries with a valuable introduction to
Western operational procedures, techniques and tactics, and given them broader
access to the Alliance
community. As the Georgian officer notes above, however, these militaries are
beginning to look to the Alliance
for assistance that is better directed to their critical military reform and
growing security needs. They question whether PfP as it is currently configured
and managed can provide this assistance. To meet their evolving needs, it
appears that a strategic change is required in the nature of the program or in
the relationship of the partner states to the Alliance.
VII.
Recommendations for NATO
The fundamental challenge facing NATO is the issue of whether the Alliance is in political
and strategic terms willing to change the nature of its relationship with the South Caucasus. However, two of the key challenges
hampering the countries developing closer relations with the Alliance are generally financial and
linguistic, though complicated still further by the problems of corruption and
their as yet limited exposure to Western militaries. Moreover, the constraints
of their rather stubborn reliance on Soviet-era doctrine, a resistance to
change, and their differing priorities (such as, to forge a capability to
retake and restore territorial integrity by rroving against
the breakaway regions rather than a true professional national armed
forces, and their present and potential ambitions to wield a political role)
underscore deep worries over the future course of civil-military relations in
the regional states.
The financial constraints placed upon national defense budgets also
slows the pace of defense reform and ensures that any efforts to increase the
level of participation in NATO programs will be dependent upon either changing
political priorities or external financial assistance. Key, therefore, to NATO
developing its partnership with the South Caucasus lies in actively seeking
sponsorship from member states to fund serious time-phased programs that are
designed to enhance the military and security capabilities of the indigenous
armed forces and seek to promote regional cooperation and, in turn, stability.
Clearly, such challenges are extreme in a region that has been plagued
by internecine political violence and "frozen conflicts", however,
the process, as difficult as it may be, requires every possible encouragement
from the international community and NATO can play a unique role in promoting
dialogue and stimulating confidence building measures. The roadmap to closer
relations between NATO and the region must receive visionary political backing;
otherwise all efforts to achieve progress will fail. Equally, given the
interdependence between these states and Russia, stability can only be
achieved in the context of continued good relations between the Alliance and Russia, whilst
seeking to remind Moscow
of its 1999 Istanbul
commitments to "completely" withdraw its military forces from Georgia. During
his visit to NATO Headquarters on April y, 2004, Saakashvili received
support for Georgia's stance on this
issue from Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer, NATO Secretary-General, who
said thatNATO supports the full
implementation of the Istanbul agreement and hoped that negotiations between
Georgia and the Russian Federation on the withdrawal would resume as soon as
possible. 122
From Anchoring to Integration
Both Azerbaijan
and Georgia
are looking to the NATO Summit in Istanbul
this June for a dramatic change in their relationship with the Alliance, pushing for invitations to
membership. Is this a realistic goal? Are they ready? Should it be seen as only
a win or lose decision? It is our
contention that it need not be.
In Azerbaijan
and Georgia,
allied interests and national expectations and requirements are of a different
order than those in Armenia.
Azerbaijan
and Georgia
are active members of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition and aspirants to
NATO membership. Armenia
is neither as deeply involved in the war on terrorism, nor is it as proactively
pursuing a deepening of its relationship with the Alliance; nevertheless, opportunities for Armenia to
choose otherwise in the future need to be opened at this time.
As part of a regional security concept, applied on a country-by-country
basis, the Alliance
can address peace-support and conflict-resolution efforts, traditional and new
types of threats to security, and the acceleration and broadening of security
sector reforms in the three countries.
For their part, Azerbaijan
and Georgia
are ripe for a significant acceleration in the development of niche capabilities
enabling participation in coalition operations. Certain military units can be
earmarked for developing interoperability with NATO forces. U.S.-led
train-and-equip programs must continue seamlessly in Georgia and be initiated
in Azerbaijan, focusing in both countries not only on the military but also on
internal security troops, border troops, and coastal-guard capabilities for
better protection of their maritime borders and economic zones in the Black Sea
and Caspian Sea, respectively. The two countries must be assisted in their
efforts to preserve air sovereignty through establishment of air situation data
exchanges with NATO, as well as to accelerate the upgrading of civilian and
military airports to NATO-compatible standards. Such goals should find
expression in formalized arrangements with Azerbaijan and Georgia, to be
announced or at least mandated at the Alliance's
summit.
NATO's summit provides the right forum and timing for allied political
recognition of Georgia's
and Azerbaijan's
aspirations to eventual membership. Such recognition can at this time take the
form of offering Azerbaijan
and Georgia
a clear prospect of membership through Individual
Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) leading to Membership Action Plans
(MAPs). With their established benchmarks, standards and timetables for
progress, such plans hold built-in incentives to the aspiring countries, as
well as amounting to nondeclaratory political recognition by the Alliance of their
membership goals.
That goal reflects Georgia's
and Azerbaijan's
overall Western orientation, resting on a broadly-based political and societal
consensus. In both countries, the Euro-Atlantic choice is a national choice.
Internal challenges to that orientation stem basically from state weakness and
local conflicts. Twin aspects of the Soviet legacy, those challenges can be
remedied through security assistance and conflict-settlement under
Euro-Atlantic aegis, paving the way for institution-building and closer
economic links with Europe. Moreover, as
post-communist European experience shows, the prospect of NATO membership is a
major stimulus to reforming the state and improving institutional performance.
In sum, anchoring the South Caucasus to
the Euro-Atlantic system must begin by projecting security to this region. The
costs and the draw on resources would only be a fraction of U.S. and NATO
efforts elsewhere; the social and political environment in this region is
friendly and receptive; and the strategic payoff to the Alliance would be of historic proportions.
Until now, the U.S.
has taken the lead in this effort, with only nominal support from other Alliance members. At
present, U.S.
global overextension means that European allies must increase their
contributions to projecting stability and security in the South
Caucasus. NATO's new members such as the Baltic States and
Romania, familiar with this region and sharing their recent experience as
post-Soviet legacy states and NATO aspirants, are enthusiastic about
contributing to this effort alongside older allies.
Door Open also to
Armenia
This process can gradually be opened to Armenia on similar terms and in
similar stages; but should in no way be delayed for Azerbaijan and Georgia if Armenia marks
time, or if Russia
objects to Armenia's
inclusion.
The U.S.
and other allies must hold out an attractive security option for Armenia as
well. This would require taking the lead in promoting a resolution of the
Karabakh conflict on the basis of tradeoffs, e.g. land-for-peace (return of
Azeri lands, determination of Upper Karabakh's status, and security
guarantees), or land swaps, or a combination of those two approaches,
accompanied by the opening of borders for trade between Armenia, Turkey and
Azerbaijan. The effort will be arduous, and even its possible success might not
necessarily persuade or enable Armenia to moderate its current ties to Russia
in the short term and extend its security relations with NATO and broaden its
economic ties with the EU. This, after all, is the policy flexibility that Yerevan has long talked
about.123
Thus, progress on NATO-Azerbaijan and U.S.-Azerbaijan security ties
should not depend on progress of such ties with Armenia. It should also be borne in
mind that the security of Azerbaijan
is indivisible from that of Georgia,
owing to their common Western orientation, the geography of Caspian energy
transit, and that of U.S.
and NATO strategic access eastward. Azerbaijan and Georgia form a
tandem both functionally and for security purposes. Thus, delaying NATO Action
Plans for one or both of them in deference to any third party is not an option.
On the contrary, bringing such plans to earliest feasible fruition will provide
an attractive example to Armenia,
and ultimately increase U.S.
and NATO options for addressing the problems of the South Caucasus
in a comprehensive regional framework.
For now, however, Armenia
relies principally on Russia
for security and defense (including preservation of territorial gains in the
Karabakh conflict), and has ceded its energy infrastructure and manufacturing
industry wholesale to Russia
for debt relief. The Armenian government has long neglected to develop deep and
long standing relations with NATO or to cooperate effectively with the U.S. in the
sphere of security. It -was only last year that Armenia began showing a serious
interest in NATO's Partnership for Peace program and hosted for the first time
a joint exercise (Cooperative Partner-2003).
For their part, the U.S.
and EU encourage the opening of trade and travel between Turkey and Armenia. The
hope is that such steps can facilitate a political settlement of the Karabakh
conflict and help initiate a historic reconciliation of Armenia with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
While highly desirable in themselves, those goals should not be allowed
to delay the fulfillment of Azerbaijan's
and Georgia's
NATO aspirations. Some have counter argued that bringing Azerbaijan and Georgia
in while leaving Armenia out would "reinforce the dividing lines" in
the South Caucasus, with Western interests on one side and Russian interests on
the other side of the divide. It seems, however, more likely that U.S. and/or
NATO security arrangements with Azerbaijan
and Georgia would help erase or more likely
temper, not reinforce, any dividing lines. Such arrangements would in any case
focus on external security, infrastructure development, and training for
coalition missions, not on local ethnic conflicts (those require political
handling). If demonstrably successful with respect to Azerbaijan and Georgia, such
security arrangements can appeal to Armenia and induce it to rebalance
its policies.
Georgia wisely separates the
Abkhazia problem from its NATO aspirations and security cooperation with the U.S. For its
part, Azerbaijan
must not link its NATO aspirations with the Karabakh conflict's resolution; and
might conclude that it is in its own interest to encourage, not discourage,
Armenian participation in NATO or U.S.-led joint exercises and trainings for
the three countries of the South Caucasus.
In the region, there are also a number of recommendations that seek to
help direct the reform efforts in each of these countries, support national
military reform programs, and improve the readiness and capabilities of
national forces. Why these recommendations? Those presented were chosen because
they are affordable and within the capacity of the national forces but avoid a
"cookie cutter" approach. They also positively influence
military-to-military contact and cooperation, democratization of the militaries
and promote the achievement of NATO interoperability. It is imperative that any
programs supported avoid negatively influencing the regions' balance of
military power and instead work toward fostering regional cooperation and
stability. It should be stressed that the proposed deepening of NATO's partnership
with the South Caucasus in no sense implies a
weakening or undermining of the historic and legitimate security concerns of
the Russian Federation
within the region. It is the firm conviction of the authors that there is in
fact significant confluence of security interests, since both NATO and Russia aim at
achieving long term stability in the region. Moreover, Russia is in a
unique position to play a very positive role in supporting the reform and force
modernization efforts of all of these states, should it choose to do so.
We begin with national actions that focus on reorganizing and reforming
the MoD and GS, improving and standardizing operational planning, establishing
a multiyear planning, programming and budgeting system, improve civilian control
and reduce corruption. The list of activities should be seen as a series of
building blocks that can effectively support the national reform program(s) and
facilitate greater NATO and partner state assistance.
Concrete Steps
NATO can demonstrate its commitment to security and stability in the
region and significantly expand its security relations with the three states,
without necessarily making a commitment to future membership for these states,
by considering elements of the following:
o Taking the opportunity of the 10 anniversary of PfP to reaffirm the
Program's basic principle of supporting the independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity of the states of the South Caucasus, and to assert that
the security of the countries of the region is an integral part of the
Euro-Atlantic security architecture;
O Exploring the possibility of creating a special format for NATO's
dialogue with the three nations of the South Caucasus, on the model of those
set up for Ukraine and Russia;
O Appointing a political/military specialist as an advisor to the
Secretary-General on the region and expand its own expertise (e.g., within it
planning staffs) on the South Caucasus;
o Explore the possibility of creating a NATO Defense
College in the South Caucasus, the rationale of which is explained in
detail below;
o Establish PfP cells in each country in the South
Caucasus. [Among other duties the cells will be responsible for
the onsite management of Alliance programs, serving as a clearing house for
NATO-sponsored activities and harmonize assistance provided by member states.];
o Based on interest, appoint one NATO country as lead to help the PfP
cell coordinate and manage Alliance
efforts in each country;
O Create a "Security Working Group" under NATO in order to
optimize security assistance efforts and avoid programs overlapping and
unnecessary duplications. On each program (for example: NCO, Navy, Military
Education, J-5, personnel training, Public relations and CIMIC; PPB, etc.) a
leading nation and participant nations should be defined, and all the findings
should be reported to the NATO Secretary General's Advisor (chairperson of the
Group);
o NATO should develop "third party funding" programs,
according to this program one NATO nation would assist the cooperation of two
candidate nations (for example, Georgia + Macedonia + Germany) For the last 4
years Estonia and Georgia developed bilateral cooperation with the help of the
UK);
o Assist [Azerbaijan and Georgia's] defense reform through providing
working groups of civilian and military experts operating closely with each of
the MoDs in order to construct workable plans for restructuring and reforming
and establishing standard operating procedures across the Ministry and Joint
Staff and then the broader armed forces; this should be based on NATO's
operational planning guidance and concepts;
o Support the development of a Combat Support System (CSS) formation,
its training and the establishment of operating tactics, techniques and
procedures for a deployable CSS unit, which is necessary to support deployable
PSO formations. The current national formations are designed to operate from
internal logistics facilities and do not have the organic, mobile CSS assets to
effectively support formations deployed out of country;
O Prioritize the development of expertise amongst NATO's planning
staffs, capable of fully understanding and tracking the evolution of I PAP with
Azerbaijan
and Georgia,
as well as Armenia
when it has presented its IPAP;
O Support the ongoing effort to improve the communications network
supporting both the tactical formation and operational level, insuring
interoperability with NATO systems (focusing on those assets committed to the Alliance and the
country's designated PSO formations); and develop procedures and formats that
are similarly compatible with NATO;
o NATO should seek to greatly enhance the numbers of regional officers
receiving training through PfP in order to foster a cadre of officers
benefiting from contact with Western militaries that, in turn, are able to
share their knowledge and expertise with colleagues;
O Seek sponsorship from amongst member states in order to place greater
numbers of regional officers on education and training courses within western
military institutions.
O Support the deployment of Mobile Training Teams to Baku, working
in-country to foster the development of indigenous military experts in border
security, crisis management and reform of military educational structures;124
O Provide assistance and necessary support to upgrade the National PfP Training
Center in Baku to an officially
recognized PfP Training Center;
O Azerbaijan and Georgia could potentially benefit from access to NATO's
Security Investment Program (NSIP). Though normally restricted to members, this
could be offered in the context of creating the interim status of 'Candidate
Members'.
NATO cannot directly help any of these countries improve the readiness
and the overall combat capability of their formations through the provision of
combat equipment or upgrading their existing stocks, as retaining the regions
military balance remains an important component of stability. However, what the
Alliance can do
is help these militaries improve their management, leadership and training
skills.
Creating a Regional
Defense College
for the South Caucasus
NATO should take advantage of Azerbaijani and Georgian efforts to
enhance their bilateral cooperation and support the establishment of a regional
Defense College, similar in concept to that of the Baltic Defense College
(BALTDEFCOL) and building on their experience.125 Look toward the
possibility of using the establishment of a regional defense college as an
incentive for broader regional cooperation and Armenian inclusion.
Not long after independence, the leaders of the Baltic
States realized that they did not have the numbers of qualified
military officers and civilian personnel necessary to effectively lead and/or
manage the development of their defense structures." But the three states
lacked the professional expertise necessary to grow their own. To this end, the
announced "purpose of BALTDEFCOL is to educate and further the personal
and professional development of the personnel of the Participants (the three
Baltic States) as well as participate in the enhancement of academic studies in
selected, relevant fields - all in close interplay with the Military (National
Defense) Academies of the three states." This is mainly accomplished
through the College's core activity, the Joint Command and General Staff Course,
which is similar in most aspects to Western one-year Joint Command and General
Staff programs.Course work in this program focuses on operations (including
tactics, logistics and mili technology - ca. 50 percent), as well as strategy
and political studies, staff dui management and administration. Legal aspects
of operations, the principle: democratic control and NATO operational planning
procedures and techniques integrated into the program. The College also runs a
parallel colonels course for i grade officers and a shorter course for
civilians working national security or defence policy issues. For all of these
programs, all training is in English and there is emphasis on the use of NATO
formats and operations.127
VIII. Recommendations for the South Caucasus
States
The recommendations to the states of the South
Caucasus are partly of a joint nature, and partly specific to the
individual states, here focused on Azerbaijan and Georgia due to
their stated interest in closer ties and eventual membership in the Alliance. Should Armenia desire
a closer relationship with NATO comparable to that toward which Azerbaijan and Georgia have
been working, many of these recommendations would apply to Armenia as
well. In addition to concrete steps we recommend be taken either jointly or
individually ty the regional states, suggestions for developing the niche
capabilities of the South Caucasian militaries are included here.
Joint Steps
o Group Candidacy, the history of NATO expansion clearly shows that
strength of group candidacy. Whether in the case of the Visegrad countries, the
three Baltic states, or the candidacy of Romania and Bulgaria, the
decision by the states involved to coalesce and cooperate in joint candidacies
led to them joining the alliance much more rapidly than many analysts had
predicted. In the case of the South Caucasus,
this is likely to be even more pronounced. The relative geographic distance
from the core NATO area is one factor; another is that the interests of the Alliance and its members
is regional, not focused on one state. As mentioned earlier, the security of Georgia and Azerbaijan
cannot be understood separately; they stand or fall together. Especially in
view of part of NATO's security interests in the South
Caucasus being related to the region's role as a logistical
corridor for its operations in Central Asia
and Afghanistan,
the alliance is unlikely to approach one country without a regional approach
that is focused on the strategic value of them jointly and together. Hence Azerbaijan and Georgia,
building on their already existing friendly relations and strong security ties,
would benefit from approaching their relationship with NATO in tandem rather
than separately.
o Azerbaijan and Georgia should request assistance from the Alliance in
creating expertise within the J-5, MoD relating to IPAP; how it functions,
works in practical terms, and have responsibility for monitoring its progress
and recommending amendments as necessary (This will also apply to Armenia when
they submit their IPAP to NATO); o Develop a single manager for all future NATO
related activities and bilateral security assistance programs within the J-5,
to ensure coordination, compatibility and these programs build on one another
and are supportive of their planning goals;
o Develop, fund, recruit and train/educate an NCO corps, which will
require efforts to change the military culture, establish positions and roles
for the NCO across the force, establishing a personnel management and education
program, and ensuring that the rules, regulations and government legislation
are in-place to support these developments;
O Recommend the development of a regional military academy (similar to
BALTDEFCOL) to train mid-level officers and civilians. NATO- and
member-state-assistance is needed to support the development of curriculum, the
provision of necessary equipment, the assignment of experienced teaching and
support cadre to facilitate the creation of the facility and its adherence to
NATO teaching standards, and the development of indigenous personnel to assume
greater responsibility over time. This academy could reasonably be established
in Baku and use the Azerbaijani Military Academy as a base upon which to build
the new facility, taking advantage of the considerable Turkish efforts to improve
the quality (with a goal of bringing it up to NATO standards) of this national
program;
o With NATO and bilateral support, recommend the establishment of a
regional disaster preparedness center, with responsibility for the planning for
and management of natural disasters, and the training of regional and national
experts. The region is prone to earthquakes and floods that tend to be
devastating when they occur. This is an area of concern for all three states
and one where cooperation with NATO and each other could significantly improve
planning and execution. This is an area for possible future cooperation and the
training and management responsibilities could most effectively be accomplished
jointly.
O Expand the military's language training programs, to include building
these language instruction into the curriculum at the military academies and
any future NCO training programs;
o Recommend to the U.S.
and NATO that they help establish a regional PSO training center, using the
GTEP experience as a base, taking advantage of the facilities established and
the cadre trained. The countries of the Caucasus
are already involved in supporting PSOs and they are looking toward continuing
to do so through both NATO and other international organizations. An effective regional training program
that focuses on NATO and UN procedures and standards would ensure proper
training for planners and commanders; and significantly enhance their
preparedness for such operations and smooth the preparation, deployment, integration
into the PSO force and support of deployed troops through the course of their
commitment. Once again the recent Baltic experience in this area could be used
as a basis. Look toward using experienced third party administrators and
trainers to develop the facility, establish the curriculum, and train the PSO
personnel and future training center cadre;
o Recommend the development of a regional NCO training program that
supports the needed development of a professional NCO corps in these militaries
and builds on the basic national NCO training programs. This would be the NCO
complement of the regional defense college and similarly would focus on
training national personnel in NATO techniques, standards and procedures, as
well as providing the language training that is critical for senior NCOs.
Consolidation would allow for easier mentor support (providing planners,
trainers and equipment) that will be necessary to get such a project off of the
ground;
o Support needed efforts to improve the operational capabilities of the
navies and maritime border guards of both of these states; and help them
clearly define the roles of each service and their inter-relationship, and
establish the procedures, techniques and tactics under which they will operate.
It is underlined that whereas these steps apply mainly to Azerbaijan and
Georgia given their expressed interest in closer ties to NATO, many of these
steps, where applicable, could also apply to Armenia should there be sufficient
political support for within Yerevan for the deepening of the Alliance's
regional role.
Azerbaijan
After more than a decade of neglect, the Army and the armed forces as a
whole face a number of daunting challenges that they must overcome if they are
to develop into a competent military force. Changes will not come overnight and
they will not come without greater government support, economic and political.
Internally, the Defense Ministry continues to grapple with efforts to reform
the staff, establish effective and efficient operational planning, programming
and budgeting processes, and develop the necessary number of competent military
and civilian professionals to successfully man it. The armed forces have long
been under-funded and held at arms length by a government that distrusted the
potential opposition it presented and preferred to fund the security services.
At existing funding levels, the best they can do is focus their restructuring,
refurbishment and modernization efforts on a couple of brigades at a time. They
cannot afford to swap out their equipment base, rather they must focus on
salvaging as much of this equipment as is needed and upgrade it where possible.
In line with Azerbaijan's
attempts to present a favorable image to the West, the military is looking
towards NATO for its role model. Despite these efforts, they have found it
extremely difficult to breakaway from the Soviet model and modified Soviet
tactics are still followed. Part of the problem is that the Army and its
leaders are not trained to effectively manage the more complex combined arms
tactics, nor are the units equipped or prepared to execute these tactics,
especially with poorly trained and motivated conscript soldiers and little or
no large unit or combined arms training being conducted.
Clearly, the problem of poor equipment readiness is the most visible
problem, but it is compounded by the lack of consistent and regimented training
at the individual, small unit, battalion and brigade, and then combined arms
levels. Training teams from Turkey
are working with the Azerbaijanis to refine their training techniques and
procedures, bringing them more in line with NATO standards. However, the
training challenge for the enlisted soldier is compounded by the many problems
noted earlier and by the personnel turbulence created by the short-term of
conscript service. Furthermore, the short-term of service makes it extremely
difficult, often impossible, and very expensive to train these conscript
soldiers in any technical skills and then get any meaningful term of service
from them. In turn, this makes it difficult to develop a skilled enlisted corps
that can effectively support the Army's extensive technical support
requirements, which expands the need for extended service NCOs and contract
personnel, or out-sourcing some essential services, such as maintenance, to the
civil sector, which is potentially an expensive option.
A small number of cadets and junior commanders study at Turkish military
schools and the Military
Academy in Ankara, or in one of the
other countries supporting their training, that is, the U.S. and Pakistan.
Within Azerbaijan,
the main military training school is the Military Academy
in Baku (the
navy has its own Academy in Baku,
based on the former Soviet
Caspian Naval
School). In addition to
military training, the Academy offers courses in administration and strategic
research. Turkish officers have played a key role in reorganizing the Academy
and updating its training programs and curriculum.
After two years of efforts by dozens of Turkish military personnel
working to improve the quality of training in the Academies, especially in the
junior officer programs, the Turks declared in early 2002 that the programs and
curriculum were up to NATO standard. Just a few months later, in September
2002, more than 2,000 cadets deserted the Azerbaijani Higher Military Academy,
protesting poor living conditions and corrupt leadership, claiming that
corruption and bribery demands were common place practices. The cadets
specifically called into question the Academy's dismissal of the Turkish
officers assigned to the faculty. Turkish officers since 1999 had been serving
as specialized instructors and were well respected by the cadets because of
their professionalism and their reported "open condemnation of corruption within
the Azerbaijani officer corps". After more than a month of claims and
counterclaims, the administrator was replaced and many of the student leaders
were expelled and reassigned within the military. This action was significant
because this academy was the model for the Turkish program to modernize the
Azerbaijani armed forces and bringing them eventually into conformity with NATO
standards. It remains to be seen if the Army and MoD's leadership will take the
actions necessary to foster
reform, rather than discouraging it. Even if they do, training the
junior officers to NATO standard is only the first step toward improving the
quality of training at all levels across the force.
If the Azerbaijan
government seriously looks to reform, restructure and modernize its armed
forces, it must begin with a serious, long-term program for change that has
sustained political backing and funding; and it must address the problems of
corruption within the MoD and look toward facilitating closer relations with
NATO. But given the serious and doubtful question of the necessary political
backing, are there ways or measures to encourage the political leadership to
engage and accept these needed reforms? Perhaps with a strategic reorientation
reflected in foreign aid, aimed at rewarding compliance with these objectives
by the political elite? There are numerous ways NATO and its member states can
help, but it is imperative that any programs supported avoid negatively
influencing the regions' balance of military power and regional stability.
Moreover, they should positively influence military-to-military contact and
cooperation both within the Alliance
and the region, democratization of the militaries and promote the achievement
of NATO interoperability.
Some practical first steps to be taken by Azerbaijan include the following:
o Reform of the Azerbaijani MoD and Joint Staffs should be initiated,
addressing the problems of corruption and staff procedures;
o Review the country's national guidance documents, including its National
Security Strategy (which remains a work in-progress and is currently being
reviewed by the Milli Majlis), ensuring that it reflects current security
concerns and develops feasible mission requirements for the security forces;
o Develop a military strategy that translates the political guidance in
the NSS in mission requirements and tasks for the armed forces and provides
order and direction to the defense reform program; Help the MoD develop and
Introduce multi-year planning, programming and budgeting system;
O Provide assistance to efforts to clarify and document the
responsibilities and functions of MoD and General Staff entities;
O Mid- and long-term planning are a chronic problem and assistance is
needed to develop planners and the tools necessary for them to do their job,
such as a formal guide for operational planning. Use NATO's Guide for
Operational Planning as a base for this development, to ensure standardization
and enhance interoperability;
O Develop a transition plan for civilianizing control of the armed
forces and the education of a civilian cadre of managers;
O Train civilian defense experts to improve civilian control of
military, establishing a base for a security trained civilian bureaucracy;
O Steps should be taken to ensure gradual increase in the defense
budget, with the initial focus on developing niche capabilities and investing
in training and education;
A force modernization and restructuring program must be developed that
is feasible given budget constraints, effectively supports evolving security
concerns and mission requirements, enhances interoperability with NATO, and
provides a time-phased planning goal.
Georgia
The most significant barriers to successful defense reform in Georgia lies in
the limited nature of recent defense budgets, coupled with endemic corruption
within the MoD itself. These are further compounded by the slowness of the
transition from post-Soviet legacy forces to successfully reformed armed forces
capable of NATO inoperability. Of course at the political level, the continued
presence of Russian bases on Georgian territory presents an equally formidable
obstacle to NATO membership.
Defense budgets in recent years have been consistently below 2 percent
of GDP, which has severely restricted the progress of defense reform; already
dropping in 1998 to 1.46 percent, falling in 1999 to 0.96 percent, 2000: 0.71
percent and reaching 0.46percent in 2001.128 The Georgian armed
forces have, therefore, suffered from chronic under-funding; denoted by
allowances unpaid, military pensions often paid several months in
arrears, a significant proportion of officers are compelled to take on outside
employment in order to subsist.129
Consequently, too little money trickles down into the defense budget,
often subject to later revisions and failure to pay sums initially promised to
the MoD, and what is actually allocated often arrives late from the Ministry of
Finance, which in turn has a knock on effect for equipment acquisition,
upgrading, maintenance or replacement. Put simply, the funds are often not
there for essential tasks, let alone meeting the requirements of defense
reform. Maintenance has particularly suffered, as privately Georgian officers
and planners confirm that in recent years no Lari has been allocated in the defense
budget for these essential tasks. Basic needs are not met, including a lack of
uniforms for recruits, and food supplies for the army have been very scarce. I3°
Since President Saakashvili was elected, the aim of increasing the defense
budget to 2 percent of GDP by 2008 has been set; Tbilisi will need constant reminding of the
importance of adequate defense budgeting to support its defense reform in the
critical years ahead.
President Saakashvili's appointment in February 2004 of the country's
first civilian Defense Minister, Gela Bezhuashvili, fulfils a key requirement
for NATO membership. Indeed it is significant that his predecessor Lieutenant
General David Tevzadze was also appointed as Georgia's Ambassador to NATO,
signaling the new governments determination to move forward in its relationship
with the Alliance.
Sharing a legal background in the U.S. with Saakashvili, the new Defense
minister is widely regarded as capable of delivering the necessary progress in
this area.'31 Tevzadze announced in January 2004, the publication of
a draft document on the division of powers between the MoD and General Staff,
which had been elaborated by a team of U.S. military experts that began work on
the document in August 2003.132 Clearly, this is a positive step forward,
however, given the constant flow of information in recent years, highlighting
the entrenched problems of corruption within the Georgian MoD, the task of
conducting successful reform will continue to be difficult and very lengthy.
Corruption within the Georgian MoD has been an endemic feature of the
woeful condition of the state and its inability to address its own security
problems. Colonel Nika Djandjgava, former commander of the Land Forces,
resigned from his post in July 2002, after leading a protest - joined by around
ioo officers - concerning insufficient financing and "incompetent
commanders", in the elite Kodori Battalion.'33 More recently,
in a scathing attack on the Georgian MoD, Djandjgava alleged that Tevzadze had
run the army into the ground and ignored widespread corruption.134 Social
conditions and under-funding provided the conditions for the revolt of a
Georgian National Guard battalion in Mukhrovani in May 2001. The mutiny, led by
Colonels Otanadze and Krialashvili seizing an Interior Ministry special troops
base in Mukhrovani, approximately 40 kilometers outside Tbilisi, highlighted the severity of the
harsh social and economic conditions that had become such a commonplace within
the Georgian armed forces. Yet, despite the obvious existence of such deep
problems within the military, Tevzadze continued to declare the ideal of
achieving a professional army consisting of 70 percent contract soldiers, even
though the defense budget could not match those ambitious aspirations, raising
questions about the Georgian approach to reform.135
Georgia's problems in making
real progress towards reforming its armed forces have been compounded by its
Post-Soviet legacy forces, and a force structure therefore inconsistent with
its current security needs. This supplies the basis for understanding their
current dilemma, in-fighting amongst the MoD and General Staff on the
priorities of reform and the military culture that pervades the decision making
and planning processes. Transforming their Soviet legacy forces into mobile
formations increasing their lethality and combat capabilities is central to
successful reform, but the mindset and culture of the military has to change in
order to foster this approach.
Military reform in the South Caucasus
generally and particularly in Georgia
is an uphill and truly monumental task. It is made more difficult by the lack
of genuine support from potential NATO sponsors that are looking for successful
defense reform in the region. The corruption within the MoD, low levels of ELT
amongst officers, poor standards in training and education, worsened by chronic
under-funding leave the armed forces weak. Successful military reform in Georgia,
achieving the requirements of a NATO MAP, would take considerable time without
sponsorship
and coordinated international assistance geared towards achieving those
goals. It is more realistic, meanwhile,
for the Alliance to
concentrate on supporting
the development and reform
of key formations and enhancing niche capabilities, such as PSO, Special Forces
and Naval (SAR) Operations.
Some practical first steps to be taken by Georgia include the following:
O Reform of the Georgian MoD should be initiated, addressing the
problems of corruption;
o Further measures should be implemented within a fixed timeframe
towards ensuring Civil-Military control of the armed forces;
o Following the planned ratification of Georgia's first National
Security Concept in May 2004 assistance should be given in the formulation of a
Military Doctrine, in order to give depth and direction to the path of defense
reform;
o Steps should be taken to ensure gradual increase in the defense
budget, with the initial focus on developing niche capabilities and investing
in training and education;
O Within the Georgian Department of International Cooperation, MoD, a
working group should be formed tasked with assisting in properly planning after
training follow-up action in cooperation with J-5 planners in order to maximize
the benefits of foreign security assistance programs;
o Assistance should be provided in training planning personnel within
the Georgian J-5 MoD; Estonia has led the way by offering such assistance on a
bilateral basis but more is required in order to support the professional
development of this key area of long term strategic planning within the
Ministry;
O Encourage the strong bilateral security assistance from Greece to Georgia, by
raising its activities to NATO level.
Developing the Niche capabilities of the South Caucasus Militaries
Strengthening future "niche capabilities" options with partner
states enables them to make potential military contributions to future NATO
operations. Niche capabilities can assist allies and non-allied partners,
developing nascent capabilities in areas that supply greater scope and
diversity to allied operations. This approach also allows emerging militaries
to focus their limited resources on the development of capabilities that they
have the capabilities and capacity to successfully accomplish. Moreover, this allows
countries to specialize and build a high quality capability in a needed skill
area that will enhance their potential contribution to future Alliance missions but notat an unreasonable
resource cost. Niche capabilities look to fill existing gaps or shortfalls in Alliance competences and
build on the experience, capability and capacity of these emerging militaries.
NATO has had success in developing niche capabilities outside the partnership
process with the Accession states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia).
Priority for niche capabilities should also focus on those skills that will
have dual-use utility, serving both national needs and meeting Alliance requirements.
Indeed, more recently, the U.S. at a bilateral level
facilitated the participation in Iraq of an engineering platoon from
Kazakhstan's
peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT); deployed in August 2003 assisting in demining
and water purification."6 The engineer example is mentioned
because this is a capability that is often in short supply on missions and has
universal utility on operations ranging from PSO to humanitarian. The
priorities for building niche capabilities within the South Caucasus could be:
light infantry that are trained and outfitted to support peacekeeping,
humanitarian support and military police missions; SAR (for Azerbaijan),
getting the Air Force involved in the process; Paramilitary Police forces and
border security forces, involving non-military security services; engineers
(company or battalion size formation); and demining operations and Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The first capability mentioned is evidently the key
role for which the PSO formations are being developed in Azerbaijan and Georgia. As
with many of the recommendations noted above, there are a number of these niche
capabilities that can be effectively supplied by all South
Caucasus states and these could be serviced by combined formations
or assets from two or more regional partners, providing another opportunity to
promote regional security cooperation, joint training facilities and enhanced
military-to-military contact.
Appendix: The Baltic Defense
College
For the Baltic States, the College
proved very beneficial for a number of reasons, to include:
1)
Fostering the development of a highly professional military academy, with first
quality facilities, modern training and educational capabilities, and a
curriculum that is Western in focus and NATO standard;
a) Means to break the legacy of
communist rule and change the leadership culture.
b) Introduce Western staff
procedures and planning, programming, budgeting and execution techniques and
procedures.
c) Pooling the resources and
needs of the participants, allowed them to save money, build a College that
they could not individual afford and get much better training for their
personnel.
2) Allowing them to train larger
numbers of personnel on an annual basis;
a) Training trainers for their
own military education facilities.
b) Establish a cadre of leaders
and managers to support necessary development and reform within the Armed
Forces.
3) Encouraging ELT, as English
is the official and working language at BALTDEFCOL.
a) For the Caucasus, English is not a
prevalent a second language and it would be beneficial to include an English
Language faculty to such a program, which is common practice in several other
equivalent programs.
4) Helping foster broader
cooperation and understanding among the Ministries of the participating states;
a) Baltic military cooperation
projects have played a major role in developing the Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian defense structures in accordance with the traditions and procedures
of Western countries.
b) Baltic military cooperation
projects have been carefully designed to develop capabilities of the Baltic States' defense forces and to make them
interoperable with NATO.
c) By applying standards
equivalent to those used in NATO and the PfP framework, the Baltic
States are also creating common standards for use within the Baltic
region.
d) The role of the projects in
the professional development of the defense structures is not limited to the
projects themselves. Participant officers are rotated within the national
defense forces, thereby spreading the skills and experience gained from the
projects to the national structures. This aspect of training applies on all
levels involved in project management, implementation and operation. At the
same time, the defense ministries gain expertise in international cooperation
and, more specifically, on how to run cooperation programs and multilateral
projects.
e) The three Baltic
States share a sense of unity, knowing that together they are
stronger and more flexible. "When needed, we give each other a supporting
hand. A stronger element of one partner's defense structure also strengthens
the other partners. Such assistance and cooperation works toward building up
balanced and well-calculated defense capabilities."
5) Providing a vehicle for
mentor nations to focus and coordinate their assistance efforts;
6) Means to expand mil-to-mil
cooperation and expand, via their outreach programs, contact and cooperation
with other militaries;
7) Providing a basis for and
understanding of the need to reform the central staffs, personnel management
structures, the officer education program, the manning structure and the
leadership culture.
BALTDEFCOL has received substantial international support during the
first years of its operation to ensure the highest possible quality of
education.'37 The Baltic military projects, including the Defense College, were cultivated by the NATO PfP
initiative. PfP also helped foster the broad international support and
assistance they received. This support was critical and included: equipment
(computers, data basis, simulators, etc.), assistance in curriculum development
and teaching support assets, recruiting
and training a faculty as well as the necessary support staff, This
international support was also critical in smoothing over national difference
and encouraging the development of a Baltic, vice national approach.
The largest part of that support has come from Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. In
addition, other states, (Belgium,
France,
Germany,
Iceland,
the Netherlands,
Poland,
the UK
and the USA)
have also supported the college. International support to the college ranges
from donating equipment and finances to hosting study tours and providing
external lecturers.
The key part of the support, however, is the secondment of experts to
the college staff. By 2004, 14 states have permanently seconded a total of 25
staff members to the college. This combination of nations that includes NATO
member states as well as non-aligned countries with total defense traditions
has brought together a unique pool of international experience. The first
commandant of the college is a Brigadier General from the Danish Army, which
provided an important balancing affect on the College ensuring that the program
was NATO-based and Baltic, not national, in focus.
Author Biographies
Svante E. Cornell is Deputy Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute (CACI) and an Assistant Research Professor at the Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University.
He is also Research Director of the Silk Road Studies Program (SRSP), Uppsala University, Sweden, and directs the research
project on Narcotics and Security in Eurasia
conducted jointly by CACI and SRSP. He is Editor of CACI's bi-weekly
publication, the Central AsiwCaucasus Analyst (http://www.cacianalyst.org/.) Cornell also founded
Cornell Caspian Consulting, LLC. Previously, he has lectured at the Royal Swedish
Military Academy
and the served as Course Chair of Caucasus Advanced Area Studies at the Foreign
Service Institute, George P. Schultz
National Foreign Affairs Training Center, U.S. Department of State. He was
educated at the Middle East
Technical University,
Ankara, and
received his Ph.D. from Uppsala
University, Sweden.
He holds an Honorary Doctorate from the Behmenyar institute of Law
and Philosophy of the Academy
of Sciences of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He is author of Small
Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, (2000),
and Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South
Caucasus (2002).
Roger N. McDermott is a graduate of the University of Oxford
specializing in defense and security issues in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). He is an Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics
and International Relations, University
of Kent at Canterbury
(UK) and Senior Associate, Cornell Caspian Consulting (Stockholm &
Washington DC). He regularly writes for scholarly journals including the Journal
of Slavic Military Studies and Central Asia
and the Caucasus. His analyses of
geopolitics and course of military reform in Central Asia have been published
in the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. His
papers have also been published by Conflict
Studies Research
Center, Defense Academy
of the United Kingdom
(Sandhurst) and Foreign Military Studies
Office, Fort Leavenworth (Kansas). He is a member of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
and the co-editor of the book: Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, Frank
Cass: London/Portland, 2003.
William O'Malley is a retired U.S. Army Officer and Foreign Area (FAO)
Specialist, Russia
and Eurasia; and currently an independent
defense consultant working with the US Navy's Center for Civil Military
Relations (CCMR) and a RAND Graduate School Fellow. His research covers a wide
range of topics: Russia and Central Asia; Central Europe; NATO
and NATO expansion; developing
national security andmilitary strategies
to conform with the evolving security environment; reorganizing and
restructuring militaries to meet changing national security requirements; and
peacekeeping. For the last three years, he has worked direct military
assistance projects with CCMR in a number of countries, including most recently
Estonia,
Moldova,
Macedonia
and Hungary.
Recent publications include RAND monographs on
airfield deployment options in the Middle East
and operational challenges in Central Asia and
the South Caucasus and a number of journal
articles on security developments in both Central Asia
and the Caucasus.
Vladimir Socor is a Senior Fellow of the Washington-based Jamestown
Foundation and its Eurasia Daily Monitor. Prior to this he was an analyst of
the RFE/RL Research Institute in Munich
(1983-1994), Jamestown
senior analyst (1995-2002), and senior fellow of the Washington-based Institute
for Advanced Strategic & Policy Studies (2002-2004). He writes since 2000 a
regular op -ed column in the European edition of the Wall Street Journal.
S. Frederick Starr is Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins
University's Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies in Washington,
DC, and a Research Professor at
the Johns Hopkins University-SAIS. His research, which has resulted in eighteen
books and 180 published articles, focuses on the rise of pluralistic and
voluntary elements in modern societies, the interplay between foreign and
domestic policy, and the relation of politics and culture. Dr. Starr was
educated at Yale; Cambridge University,
England; and Princeton University, and was Associate Professor
of History at Princeton. Before coming to the
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, he was founding director of the Kennan
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Center
in Washington, president for eleven years of Oberlin College, Ohio,
and president of the Aspen Institute. He founded the Greater New Orleans
Foundation, is a trustee of the Eurasia Foundation, and served for ten years on
the board of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. He is the recipient of four
honorary degrees and is a Fellow of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences. Dr. Starr is currently serving as the Rector Pro Tempore
of the University of Central Asia, being established with Central Asian
governments and with support of the Aga Khan.
1. Washington
Times, 10 April 1997;
Richard F. Staar,
"Russia's Military:
Corruption in the
Higher Ranks", Perspective,
Volume 9, no. 2, November-December 1998
2. Recent overviews
include Svante Cornell et. al., The South Caucasus:
A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessement, Stockhoolm: SIDA, 2002;
Martina Huber, State-Building in Georgia-Unfinished and at Risk, The Hague: Netherlands
Institute of International Relations, 2004.
3.Alexander Rondeli, Foreign Policy of Georgia and Priorities of National
Security, Tbilisi:
UNDP Discussion Paper Series, no. 3, 1999.
4.Istvan
Szönyi, "The False Promise of an Institution: Can Cooperation between
OSCE and NATO be a Cure?", Center for International Security and Arms
Control, January 1997. John J. Maresca, "Resolving the Conflict Over
Nagorno-Karabakh: Lost Opportunities for International Conflict
Resolution", in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to
International Conflict, eds. Pamela Aall, Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osier
Hampson, Washington DC: United
States Institute of
Peace Press, 1996;
Rexane Dehdashti, Gezualtminderung
und Konfliktregelung in ethnosozialen Konflikten. Moglichheiten und
Grenzen internationaler Akteure in der Kauhasusregion, unpublished
dissertation, Frankfurt am Main 1997. Rexane Dehdashti, Internationale
Organisationen als Vermittler in lnnerstaatlichen Konflikten: Die OSZE und der
Berg Karabach-Konflikt, Frankfurt: Studien
der Hessischen Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung, 2000.
5.
Fariz Ismailzade,
"Latest Efforts to
Solve Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute
Fails, Killing Talk
of Economic Cooperations", Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 October 2002
6.
Dodge Billingsley, "The Georgian Security Dilemma and Military Failure in
Abkhazia", The Harriman Review, Vol. 10 no. 4, 1998
7. Dodge Billingsley, "Security Deteriorates Along the
Abkhazia-Georgia Ceasefier Line", Jane's Intelligence Review, 6 September 2001; Alexandr
Iskandarian, Alan Parastaev, Gagik Avakian,
Sobytia v Kodorshom Ushelie. Ohtiabr' 2001 goda, Dzaujikau: UNHCR Working
Group of the CIS Conference, 2001.
8.Raffi
Khatchadourian, "Part Four: America Builds and Army for Industry", The
Village Voice, March 26-April
1, 2003; Zeyno Baran, "Tensions increasing in Abkhazia",
CSIS Georgia Update, April I, 2002.
9.
Mikha Gegeshidze, "The Mukhrovani Insurrection: An Attempted Military Coup
Or A Mutiny Reflecting Social Discontent?", Central Asia-Caucasus
Analyst, 23 May 2001.
10. Douglas Frantz, "Nuclear Booty: More Smugglers Use Asia
Route", The New York Times,II September 2001, p.A I.
11.Svante
Cornell, "The Growing Role of Transnational Crime in the South
Caucasus", The South Caucasus:
A Challenge for the EU, ed. Dov Lynch, Paris:
EU Institute of Security Studies, Chaillot Papers, 2003; Tamara Makarenko,
"Smuggling Operations Degrade Security in the Caucasus",
Jane's Intelligence Review, November 2003.
12.Anna
Matveeva and Duncan Hiscock, The Caucasus:
Armed and Divided, London:
SaferWorld, April 2003.
13.On
the Interior Ministry's corruption, see David Darchiashvili, "Georgia: A
Hostage to Arms", in Matveeva and Hiscock, The Caucasus:
Armed and Divided.
14.Svante E. Cornell, ""Iran and the
Caspian Region: The Triumph of Pragmatism over Ideology", Global
Dialogue, vol. 3 no. 2, July 2001; Brenda Shaffer, "The Formation of
Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran", Nationalities Papers, vol
28 no. 3, 2000, pp. 449-478.
15.Azerbaijan did
not ratify its membership in the CIS (1992) and demanded the withdrawal of
nearly 62,000 troops. This withdrawal was complete in 1993. Although Russia has
completed a partial withdrawal from Georgia, Moscow has been dragging its feet to meet Tbilisi's demands for
withdrawal, with negotiations still ongoing to establish a final agreement.
16.
"The Military Balance, 2003-2004', I IS S: Oxford, 2003, p. 73; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 8, 2003.
17.The
Military Balance, 2003-2004', IISS: Oxford,
2003, pp. 66, 73; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, October 19, 2001, p. 2; Kommersant, April 16, 2002, p.11
18. These officer totals include all officers, commissioned, warrant
etc. Richard Woff, "The Armed
Forces of Armenia,"
Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1994, pp. 387-391.
19.Only Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians surpassed the number of
Armenian officers in Soviet military service.
Ibid., pp. 388-389.
20.Tomas Velasek, "Armenia,"
in Ustina Markus and Daniel N. Nelson, editors, Eurasian and East European Security Yearbook, 2000,
Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000, pp. 489-490; William D. O'Malley,
"Chapter Eight. Central Asia and South Caucasus as an Area of Operations: Challenges and
Constraints," in Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, editors, Faultlines of
Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), pp. 276-277; Igor Torbakov, "Russia
Struggles To Counterbalance Rising U.S. Influence In
The Caucasus," Eurasianet
Insight, April 8, 2002, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/eavo4o8o2.shtml. In November 2003, the
two defense ministers conclude a series of agreements calling for the consolidation
of the 3,000-man Russian military facilities at Gumri in northern Armenia into
one base, in accordance with Russian defense ministry plans. Under the
agreements, Armenia
promises to provide additional territory for the combined base and agrees to
pay for public utilities to the Russian military base (the total annual cost of
those services is estimated at some $1.5 million). The Russian defense minister
also announced that Russia will continue to supply Armenia with weaponry and
military hardware, but notes that the material will be limited to "a
purely defensive nature," Richard Giragosian, "New Agreements on
Military Cooperation Signed with Russian Defense Minister," Transcaucasus:
A Chronology, ANCA, December 2003, Volume XII, Number 12.
21.Richard Giragosian, Armenia Update, July 2003,
Unpublished.
22.On 28 January 2002,
Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian and Russian Ambassador to Armenia Anatolii
Dryukov reportedly reviewed a set of documents empowering the formation of a
joint Russian-Armenian combat brigade to be drawn from troops of the Armenian
5th Army Corps and
the Russian force deployed at their military base in Armenia. Although the joint force is reportedly to be
utilized "to fight terrorism," its precise duties have not been
publicly specified. The agreement still
faces parliamentary ratification by both countries. RFE/RL Newsline, 29 January 2002; and Richard Giragosian,
Transcaucasus: A Chronology, January 2002, Volume XI, Number 1. In November 2003, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov
confirmed that this joint formation was still in the planning stage. RFE/RL
Newsline, November 25, 2003,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/11/2-tca/tca-251103.asp; Sergei Blagov, "Armenia and
Russia Reassert Bonds Amid Georgia's Crisis," Eurasianet Insight, November 17, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eavn1703.shtml.
23. U.S. State Department, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,
"Fact Sheet: Background Note: Armenia", March 2004.
24. Not long after 9/11,
Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sargsyan was visited by Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld to discuss Armenia's
involvement in the war on terrorism and improved military cooperation between
the two countries. "Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Press Conference with
Armenian Defense Minister," December 15, 2001, www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2001/t12172001_t1215arm.html.
25. In May 1992, Yerevan
signed the Tashkent Agreement that parcelled out Soviet CFE obligations and
entitlements to the former Soviet states in the Treaty zone. Armenia's armed
forces exceeded the treaty limits only on ACVs from 1993 until 1996, when they
finally destroyed or transferred out sufficient equipment to bring thern under
the ceilings. A combination of security concerns and the cost of destruction
slowed the government's willingness to comply with treaty ceilings. The treaty
was amended in 1999 to include ceilings on manpower that went into effect in
2001. The treaty was amended in 1999 to include recommended ceilings on
manpower that went into effect in 2001. Although they are not binding, manpower
the amendment does require similar CFE reporting on manpower. Zdzislaw
Lachowski, "Chapter 3. Arms Control in the Caucasus," in Alyson J.K.
Bailes, Bjorn Hagelin, Zdzislaw
Lachowski, Sam Perlo -Freeman, Petter Stalenheim and Dmitri Trofimov,
Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Stockholm: SIPRI,
July 2003, pp. 32-45.
26.These
ceilings include (the numbers in
parenthesis are those reported): Tanks
220 (110); ACVs 220 (140); Artillery 285 (229); Combat Aircraft 100 (6);
Attack Helicopters 50 (8); and Personnel 60,000 (44,660). Reporting totals are based on Armenia's 2002
CFE Reporting. Ibid., pp. 33-35.
27. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
28.The MoD is seeking to slowly professionalize the force, but the
number of contract soldiers remains small and concentrated in the Army's more
elite formations. Estimates are that approximately 70 percent of the enlisted
troops are still conscript.
29.Force reorganization is still ongoing, with the former Soviet army
headquarters and divisions reorganized (the process may not yet be fully
complete) into this more manageable-sized combat formation (brigade).
30.The various air force units are built around a mix of aircraft types,
including Mi-24 (attack helicopters), Mi-8/17 (support helicopters), Su-25
(close air support), MiG-25 (reconnaissance, fighter and fighter-bomber) and
L729 (armed trainers).
31.Although the two forces have separate command structures, Karabakh
remains heavily dependent on Armenia
for equipment and troops, and all indications suggest that the Armenian Defense
Ministry plays a significant role in maintaining the enclave's security. been
regarded as the most professional and capable standing military unit in the
region.
32.See eg. Charles Fairbanks et. al., Strategic Assessement of
Central Eurasia, Washington: CACI, 2001.
33.They are also potentially vulnerable to long-range ground-based
artillery and missile systems that can out-range their own now older generation
systems.
34. RFE/RL Newsline, November
14, 2002 and Richard Giragosian,
"Moreover, the trend was also evident for the draft 2004 state
budget," Transcaucasus: A Chronology", ANCA, December 2003, Volume
XII, Number 12.
35.See eg. UNDP, Human Rights and Human Development, Yerevan: UNDP, 2000, p.
13.
36.In 1991, there were only 3,420 officers and 6,672 NCOs of Azerbaijani
origin serving in the Soviet Army, See: Dmitry Trenin and Vadim Makarenko,
"What Can the Army Do When There is Fighting All Around?," New Times,
June 1992, pp. 8-9, as cited in Patrick Gorman, "The Emerging Army in
Azerbaijan," Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1993, available online at
Zerbaijan.com.
37.
The CFE Treaty establishes ceilings on the numbers of tanks, armored personnel
carriers, artillery pieces and attack
helicopters they may maintain. Although the Treaty went into effect in 1992,
the Azerbaijani Army did not reduce
its equipment holdings to the prescribed limits until 2000. Azerbaijan's
national limits are as follows: 220 main
battle tanks; 220 ACVs; 285 artillery guns of 100 mm or greater; and 50 attack
helicopters (the latter are in the Air
Force's inventory but do provide direct support to ground formations).
38.Although IISS reporting
indicates only 47 combat aircraft, the country's recent CFE reporting lists 54
combat aircraft.
39.The number of combat
aircraft and attack helicopters that the Azerbaijan may have in its active
inventory is constrained by the
equipment ceilings of the CFE Treaty. Azerbaijan's
national limits are 100 combat aircraft and 50 attack helicopters, both limits far exceed current
holdings.
40.Following talks in Baku
on 27 February 2003,
visiting Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and his Azerbaijani counterpart
Colonel General Safar Abiev signed a cooperation agreement for 2003 between
their respective ministries, ITAR-TASS and Turan reported. Ivanov said the
agreement paves the way for "large-scale cooperation," including
contracts to supply weapons and spare parts and to train military personnel.
"Azerbaijan,
Russia Sign Military-Cooperation Agreement," RFE/RL Newsline, February 28, 2003, www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/02/2-tca/tca-280203.asp
41.Because
of the age of much of the fleet, the ships and craft are in need of
modernization with communications systems, radars, navigation, targeting and
other electronic systems that are closer to the latest generation.
42.The country's GDP has increased significantly, particularly since
1999, and the projected growth for the short to medium-term remains optimistic.
This trend suggests that Azerbaijan
should be able to sustain continued growth in its defence budget, which
currently stands at approximately 2.6 percent of GDP (2003 numbers).
43.Georgian Military
Chronicle, Vol. I, No. I, November 1994.
44.Developing the National Security Concept for Georgia, CIPDD, Tbilisi, 1996, p. 47.
45.Author Interviews with Georgian Military Officers, December 2003.
46.RFE/RL, January
28, 2000.
47."The Military Balance, 2003-2004", I ISS: Oxford, 2003, p. 73; White Paper, Ministry of
Defense of Georgia,
2002.
48.Ibid.
49.White Paper, Ministry of Defense of Georgia, 2002.
50.Author Interviews with
Georgian Military Officers, March 2004
51.Notwithstanding Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which
prohibited military and security assistance to the government of Azerbaijan, the
U.S.
policy of evenhandedness with regards the two countries prevented the provision
of all but non proliferation security-related assistance to Armenia.
52.The move was taken in response to Armenia's support for the
U.S.-sponsored War on Terrorism. Additionally, in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom, Armenia
granted U.S.
and coalition aircraft overflight privileges, as well as refuelling and landing
rights.
53.For additional details on the extent of this development see,
"Armenian, Greek Army Chief Vow to Boost 'Strategic Partnership',"
RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Volume 3, No. 35, August 31, 2000.
54."Armenia takes first steps toward military relations with United
States and NATO," Monitor - A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States,
Volume VI, Issue 148, July 31, 2000.
55.This formation was to deploy to Kosovo in January 2004. Richard
Gragosian, "Armenian Peacekeepers to be Deployed in Kosovo,"
Transcaucasus: A Chronology, ANCA, November 2003, Volume XII, Number 11. The Armenians
are part of Task Force Falcon, which includes 2,750 multinational soldiers, is
stationed in the U.S.
sector of Kosovo, and is responsible for soldiers from the United States, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Greece, and Armenia. For
additional details see www.mnbe.hqusareur.army.mil/. Its inclusion as part
of the Greek battalion was a logical extension of the ongoing peacekeeping
training relationship between the two countries (Armenia and Greece).
56.In a statement at
Chatham House, London,
April 16, 2004, Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's Minister of Foreign
Affairs portrayed this period as follows: "...America itself was reticent to
engage Armenia
in military matters, given its desire not to offend or irritate regional
proxies, friends or rivals. Today, we have entered into substantive military
cooperation with the U.S."
57.U.S. State Department,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Armenia -Fiscal
Year 2002", June 6, 2002,
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/11027.htm and "Fact Sheet:
U.S. Assistance to Armenia
- Fiscal Year 2003", www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/29484.htm. The goals of this
assistance are to improve Yerevan's
export control and border security systems, promote a professional military,
enhance the MoD's command and control capability, improve their peacekeeping
and counterterrorism capabilities, and increase their interoperability with the
U.S.,
NATO and other multilateral forces. Also see, Vladimir Socor, "America,
Azerbaijan and Armenia," Jamestown Foundation, The Fortnight in Review,
Volume VIII, Issue 8, April 19, 2002.
58.U.S. State Department,
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Armenia -Fiscal
Year 2003", www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/29484.htm.
59.James DeTemple,
"Military Engagement in the South Caucasus,"
Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 2001/02, p. 70.
60."Armenia
and USA
step up military cooperation," Golos Armenii, April 27, 2004, Yerevan in Russian, reported by BBC Monitoring
International Reports, April
28, 2004.
61.On
April 27, 2004, Deputy Defense Minister Mikael Arutyunyan, stated that
"the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Armenia has really adopted a
decision to send an Armenian peacekeeping plato on to Iraq, but this decision
will not be final without the relevant discussion in Parliament and subsequent
ratification by the President." Although a commitment has been made,
formal ratification is still necessary before any deployment planning can
commence. Ibid.
62.Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's Minister of Foreign
Affairs statement at Chatham House, London,
April 16, 2004.
63.Svante E. Cornell,
"Azerbaijan 2002: Between the Storms," Transitions Online, Prague, Czech
Republic, 2002.
64.Office of the
Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, US Government Assistance to and
Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, Washington, DC, March 2002, pp. 27-41.
65.U.S. State Department, Fact Sheet: "U.S. Assistance to
Azerbaijan - Fiscal Year 2002", Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,
June 6, 2002, www. state. gov/p/eur/rIs/fs/11028. htm. Although the total for U.S.
military/security assistance funds provided to Azerbaijan have not been officially
published, the broad estimate provided here represents a best guess based on
interviews with personnel both in U.S. Defense and State Departments.
66.The ODC has five core functions: coordinating Foreign Military Sales
(FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), humanitarian
assistance, the Joint Contact Team, and the Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
Program,
67.Vladimir Socor,
"American to Provide Security Assistance to Azerbaijan and Armenia," Jamestown Foundation: The
Fortnight in Review, Volume VIII, Issue 8, April 19, 2002
68. In 1999, Turkey
provided $3.5 million in military aid to Baku
to support force modernization program and a new agreement expanding this
support was signed in 2002. Alyson J. K. Bailes, Bjorn Hagelin, Zdzislaw
Lachowski, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Petter Stalenheim and Dmitri Trofimov,
Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus
and Central Asia, Stockholm: SIPRI, July 2003 and "Turkey to
maintain military aid to Azerbaijan,"
Turkish Daily News, September
25, 2002.
69.Author interview with Azerbaijani officers and U.S. military
planner, March 2004.
70.Despite the Turkish proclamations, major problems have surfaced at
this academy, to include the desertion of a large number of the students in
protest of Academy and MoD policy and conduct.
Chloe Arnold, "Azerbaijan:
Mass Desertion is Final Humiliation for Failing Military," RFE/RL, November 11, 2002.
71.Author interview with Azerbaijani officers and U.S. military
planner, May 2004.
72.F.Asim,"Acquisition of U.S. Arms: Interview with Azerbaijan
Defense Minister Abiyev," Zerkalo (Azerbaijani newspaper), April 30, 2002.
73. "Defense Ministers to Sign Cooperation Documents", Azernews, Issue No.8
(294), 2003, http://www. bakupages.com/pubs/azernews/9900_en.php
74.Author interviews with the Ministry of Defense, Republic of Georgia,
October 2003.
75.Author interviews with
the Ministry of Defense, Republic
of Georgia, October 2003.
76. Ibid.
77.This dollar value includes large sums for border control (18 million
for the border troops) and military relocation assistance (13.2 million), with
the actual direct military assistance programs totalling just over $6 million.
Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Government
Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, Washington, DC, March
2002, pp. 50-70.
78.U.S. State Department, Fact Sheet: "U.S. Assistance to Georgia -
Fiscal Year 2002", Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, June 6, 2002, www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/11029.htm; and 78 U.S. State
Department, Fact Sheet: ''U.S. Assistance to Georgia - Fiscal Year 2003",
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/29486.htm.
79."In 2002, the GBSLE Program supplied equipment, training and
services, communications equipment (radios and base stations to enhance command
and control operations), vehicles and helicopters with spare parts for
transport and patrol, surveillance and detection equipment, computers for
automation of applications, licensing and regulatory systems, forensics
laboratory assistance, and a wide array of EXBS and law enforcement training.
GBSLE also provided $250,000 in
uniforms, similar amounts in vessel and aircraft maintenance, radar and
facilities operation and management, and new tactical utility vehicles, 90
percent of which were given to the GBG land border forces for mountain duty and
some to the OSCE border observer mission. The remainder went to the Georgian
Coast Guard for crew transport, shift changes, and security", U.S. State
Department, Fact Sheet: "U.S. Assistance to Georgia - Fiscal Year
2002", Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, DC
June 6, 2002
80.Roger H. Palin,
Multinational Military Forces:
Problems and Prospects,
The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper #294, 1995, pp. 41-42.
81.Ibid.
82.'U.S. General Praises Georgian Units Trained Under American Program',
Prime -News, News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, London, 1130 GMT,
November 27, 2002.
83.The program beaks down
as follows: phase I: logistics and engineering, Phases IIA and I IB: military
joint doctrine, C2, Staff/organisational training for the Georgian MoD and Land
forces Command, Phase III A: Unit level tactical training of the Georgian
Commando Battalion, Phase IIIB: Unit level tactical training and specialised
military mountaineering training for the 16th Mountain Battalion, Phase IIIC:
training the 560 man 113th Light Infantry Battalion/nth Motor Rifle Brigade to
conduct patrol base operations, ambush procedures, urban terrain operations,
long-range patrols, platoon level raids, and daylight company-level attacks and
night defensive operations.
84.'Georgia Train and Equip
Program Begins', United States Department of Defense, April 29, 2002, www.defenselink.mil/news.
85.Ibid.
86.These are similar to those taught at the U.S. National Defense
University, Joint Forces Command and U.S. Army War College. 'U.S. Marines
Continue to Train Georgian Commandos',
Kavkasia-Press News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, London,
1303 GMT, May 22, 2003.
87. 'Fourth Phase of U.S. Sponsored
Military Program Starts in Georgia',
Rustavi-2 TV, Tbilisi,
BBC Monitoring Service, London,
1000 GMT, May 23, 2003.
88.'Georgian Army to Adopt NATO Regulations', Kavkasia-Press News
Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, London, 0740 GMT, November 27, 2002.
89.Eric A. Miller, 'Morale of U.S. Trained Troops in Georgia is
High, But US Advisors Concerned About Sustainability', Eurasia Insight, Eurasia Net, May 5, 2003.
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050503_pr.shtml
90.Ibid.
91."Greece
to Transfer Missile Cruiser to Georgia",
Interfax-AVN, Moscow,
0831 GMT, March 3, 2004.
92.Ibid; this transfer is scheduled to be completed in late April 2004.
93.Author interviews with Georgian officers, October 2003.
94.The PfP program focuses on defense cooperation, seeking to transcend
mere dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership with each partner
country and NATO. In accordance with the PfP Framework Document, which was
issued by the Heads of State and Government alongside the PfP Invitation
Document, NATO undertakes to consult any active partner state if that partner
perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence,
or security. Furthermore, its nature is clearly defined by NATO: "All
members of PfP are also members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
which provides the overall framework for cooperation between NATO and its
Partner countries. However, the Partnership for Peace retains its own separate
identity within the framework provided by the EAPC and maintains its own basic
elements and procedures. It is founded on the basis of a bilateral relationship
between NATO and each one of the PfP countries", NATO Handbook, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm. Its programs relating
to education, training, mil-to-mil contact, opening to the militaries of member
states, etc., are designed to achieve the following goals: "to facilitate
transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; to ensure democratic
control of defense forces; to maintain the capability and readiness to
contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the
responsibility of the OSCE; to develop cooperative military relations with
NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises, in order to
strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field
of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may
subsequently be agreed; to develop, over the longer term, forces that are
better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic
Alliance", NATO Handbook, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hbo30202.htm.
95.Author interviews with Georgian officers, October 2003.
96.DeTemple, "Military Engagement in the South
Caucasus," p. 68.
97.Speech
by Lord George Robertson, "Caucasus Today: Perspectives of Regional
Cooperation and Partnership with NATO," Tbilisi, September 26, 2000, quoted in DeTemple, p. 68.
98.The base is also supported by an air defense squadron with 14
MiG~29s, S-300V air defense systems (with a 100-km strike radius, or 40-km for
ballistic missiles), and Obzor-3 and Nebo-SV radio tracking stations (RTSs).
99.RFE/RL Newsline, November
13,2002 and Richard Giragosian, Transcaucasus: A Chronology, ANCA,
Volume XII, Number 12, December 2003.
100.This 11 day NATO-sponsored exercise conducted in June 2003, with
more than 400 soldiers and officers from 19 countries, including forces from Georgia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Russia,
Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the U.S.
The exercise featured the formation of a single multinational battalion that
practiced routine peacekeeping drills such as
riot control, ambush
defense and convoy
escort. See: http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/06'
june/eo6i6a.htm
101.Author interviews with Armenian Government Officials, October 2003.
102.IPAP or Individual Partnership Action Plan is described as follows
by the NATO communique. They serve as an additional means for Allies to provide
support for and advice to interested partners. The IPAP is initiated by
partners and are used to prioritise, harmonise, and organize all aspects of
NATO-partner relationships via EAPC and PfP. It is reportedly the partner's
opportunity to address their particular circumstances and interests. The plans
are developed on a two-year basis and "NATO -will provide its focused,
country-specific assistance and advice on reform objectives that interested
partners might wish to pursue in consultation with the Alliance." IPAP is NATO's effort to
respond to growing complaints from the PfP partners that the program was too
narrowly focused and rarely addressed key reform concerns of the partne r
states. The program has just begun and it is too early to tell whether the IPAP
program will
effectively redress this vocal concern. "Ministerial Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, Held in Madrid on June 3, 2003: Final
Communique," NATO Press Release, June 3, 2003
103. "Azerbaijan,
Georgia
to step up bilateral cooperation," Interfax, March 9, 2004.
104.Consisting of Russia,
Belarus,
Armenia,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan
105."Azerbaijani Ministers Call For Turkish Bases in South Caucasus", Azerbaijan Daily Digest,
Eurasianet, March 26, 2001,
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/azerbaijan/hypermail/200103/0067.html
106.Ibid;
In September 2003 during a visit to Baku by a delegation from U.S. EUCOM headed
by Major-General Edward L. LaFountaine, (Director of Logistics and Security
Assistance U.S. EUCOM), Abiyev emphasised the willingness of the Azeri
government for the U.S. and NATO to increase its military cooperation with
Azerbaijan, "Azeri Defense Chief Urges Closer Ties With USA, NATO",
ANS TV, Baku, 1600 GMT, BBC Monitoring Service, September 19, 2003.
107.The Planning and Review Process is offered to Partners on an
optional basis and draws on NATO's extensive experience in defense planning. It
is in essence a biennial process involving both bilateral and multilateral
elements. For each two-year planning cycle, Partners wishing to participate in
the process undertake to provide information on a wide range of subjects
including their defense policies, developments with regard to the democratic
control of the armed forces, national policy relating to PfP cooperation, and
relevant financial and economic plans. On the basis of each Partner's response,
a Planning and Review Assessment is developed. A set of Partnership Goals is
also prepared, in order to set out the measures each Partner needs to introduce
in order to make its armed forces better able to operate in conjunction with
the armed forces of Alliance
countries. After bilateral and multilateral consultations, the Planning and
Review Assessment and the Interoperability Objectives are jointly approved by
the Alliance
and the Partner country concerned. NATO Handbook, Chapter 3; The Opening Up of
the Alliance:
Partnership for Peace: The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process
(PARP), October 8, 2002.
108.IPAP or Individual Partnership Action Plan is described as follows
by the NATO communique. They serve as an additional means for Allies to provide
support for and advice to interested partners. The IPAP is initiated by
partners and are used to prioritise, harmonise, and organize all aspects of
NATO-partner relationships via EAPC and PfP. It is reportedly the partner's
opportunity to address their particular circumstances and interests. The plans
are developed on a two-year basis and "NATO will provide its focused,
country-specific assistance and advice on reform objectives that interested
partners might wish to pursue in consultation with the Alliance." IPAP is NATO's effort to
respond to growing complaints from the PfP partners that the program was too
narrowly focused and rarely addressed key reform concerns of the partner
states. The program has just begun and it is too early to tell whether the IPAP
program will effectively redress this vocal concern. "Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Council, Held in Madrid on June 3, 2003: Final
Communique," NATO Press Release, June 3, 2003.
109.The MAP was launched in April 1999 to assist those countries wishing
to join the Alliance
in their preparations by providing advice, assistance and practical support on
all aspects of NATO membership. Its key elements are: "the submission by
aspiring members of individual annual national programmes on their preparations
for possible future membership, covering political, economic, defence,
resource, security and legal aspects; a focused and candid feedback
mechanism on aspirant countries' progress on their programmes that
includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual 19+1 meetings
at Council level to assess progress; a clearing-house to help coordinate
assistance by NATO and by member states to aspirant countries in the
defence/military field; a defence planning approach for aspirants which
includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets", NATO
Handbook, Chapter 3: The Opening Up of the Alliance: The Process of
Enlargement: The Membership Action Plan, October 8, 2002.
110.Author interviews with Azerbaijani Officers, March 2004.
111.Indications are that more than 500 NATO-trained or U.S.
coalition-trained officers have served in PSO operations, ranging from Kosovo
to Afghanistan
and Iraq.
Author interview with Azerbaijani officers and U.S. military planner, May 2004.
112.ISAF is the NATO commanded International Security Assistance Force
that began operations in Afghanistan
in August 2003. Diego A. Ruiz
Palmer, "The Road to Kabul," NATO
Review, Summer 2003; "NATO in Afghanistan (ISAF 4)," NATO
Issues, Posted March 9, 2004;
and "ISAF Personnel by Nation," NATO Update, Posted February 10, 2004.
113.'The Military Balance,
2002-2003', IISS: Oxford, 2002, pp. 65-66; 'The Military Balance, 2003-2004',
IISS: Oxford, 2003, pp. 66-68; "Azerbaijan Ready to Send Soldiers to
Iraq," Pravda, April 22, 2003; and "Azerbaijan: Staunch Ally and
Strong Partner," Azerbaijan Newsletter, released by the Embassy of the
Republic of Azerbaijan, Washington DC, March 5, 2004.
114.Author interviews with
Azerbaijani Officers, December 2003.
115.P. Polkovnikov,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September
13, 2002, pp. I, 11; I. Safronov,
Kommersant, September 16
2002, p. 10; See: Jacob W. Kipp, 'War Scare in the Caucasus: Redefining the Threat and the War on
Terrorism', Anne C. Aldis & Roger N. McDermott (Eds), Russian Military
Reform 1992-2002, Frank Cass: London/ Portland 2003, pp. 234-256.
116.The Parliament decreed the following main points: '1. To give an
assignment to the executive power of Georgia, in cooperation of the relevant
structures of the Parliament of Georgia, to begin NATO membership process. 2.
To give an assignment to the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Georgia, in
cooperation with Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Georgia, to
provide for the support on the international arena to the political will of Georgia regarding
integration into NATO. 3. To give an assignment to Defense and Security
Committee of the Parliament of Georgia, in cooperation with the respective
structures of the executive power, within the period of two months to work out
and submit to the Parliament specific action plan on the reformation of defense
sphere and achievement of military forces compliance with NATO requirements. 4.
To give an assignment to the Ministry of Finance of Georgia in cooperation with
Financing-Budgeting Committee of Parliament of Georgia, in the process of
working out the draft of the annual state budget to set as a special priority
the financial provision of the programs related to NATO membership. 5. David
Gamkrelidze, the Member of the Parliament of Georgia is assigned as a
rapporteur on the implementation of this resolution and he must submit the
corresponding information to the Parliament at the spring session of 2003', http://www.bits.de/frames/databases.htm
117.Georgian President Elect confirms His NATO Ambitions', RIA Novosti, January 25, 2004.
118.Author interviews with Georgian officers, October 2003.
119.Ibid.
120.Author interviews with Georgian officers, December 2003.
121. Ibid
122.'President of Georgia Visits
NATO', April 7,
2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/04-april/e0407a.htm
123.For an example of this desire for flexibility see Vartan Oskanyan, Armenia,s
Minister of Foreign Affairs statement at Chatham House, London, April 16, 2004.
124.NATO
has had success doing this in other countries by dividing up the
responsibilities among potential mentor states, e.g., Germany works with the
air force, Sweden with the PSO training centre, Denmark logistics, and so on.This
establishes clear areas of responsibility, helps ensure a consistent
training/assistance effort, and tends to minimize overlap, inconsistent or
conflicting advise, etc.
125.The BALTDEFCOL is used
to present third and fourth level military education to the officer corps and
builds on the junior officer and branch specific training that is a national
responsibility.
126.Although the
Defense Ministers of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania agreed
in principle to
the College's establishment as
early as 1992, it wasn't until 1997 that final agreement was reached
127. For further detail on the strengths and merits of BALTDEFCOL see
Appendix I.
128. White Paper, Ministry of Defense of Georgia, 2002.
129. Sam Perlo-Freeman & Peter Stalenheim, 'Military
Expenditure in the South Caucasus and Central Asia', in Alyson J.K. Bailes, et. al, Armament
and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia, SIPRI, Stockholm, July 2003,
pp. 15-20; Chris Hill & Peter Sutcliffe, 'An Economic Analysis of Military
Expenditure Levels in Central Asia and Transcaucasus', NATO Colloquium 2001,
pp. 271-95, www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/colloqoi.htm.
130.Author interviews with Georgian officers and MoD staff,
October-December, 2003.
131.Bezhaushvili is 37 years
old, serving as Georgia'
Ambassador to Kazakhstan
1993-96 and head of the Department of International Law, Foreign Ministry
1997-2000. See: RFE/RL Caucasus Report, February 20, 2004.
132. Interfax-A VN, January 8, 2004
133.RFE/ RL Caucasus Report,
July 26, 2002.
134.RFE/RL Caucasus
Report, February 20, 2004.
135.Mikha Gegeshidze, 'The
Mukhrovani Insurrection: An Attempted Military Coup Or A Mutiny Reflecting Social Discontent?' Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Washington
DC, May 23, 2001
136. See: Roger N. McDermott
and Colonel Igor Mukhamedov, "Kazakhstan's Peacekeeping Support
in Iraq",
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, January
28, 2004
137.
The international support is based on the "Memorandum of Understanding
concerning cooperation in the establishment, operation, administration and
initial funding and secondment of staff to a Baltic Defence College in the
Republic of Estonia", signed in Brussels on June 12,1998